scholarly journals The problem of mind-body interaction and the causal principle of Descartes’s Third Meditation

Sententiae ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-43
Author(s):  
Dmytro Sepetyi ◽  

The article analyses recent English publications in Cartesian studies that deal with two problems: (1) the problem of the intrinsic coherence of Descartes’s doctrine of the real distinction and interaction between mind and body and (2) the problem of the consistency of this doctrine with the causal principle formulated in the Third Meditation. The principle at issue is alternatively interpreted by different Cartesian scholars either as the Hierarchy Principle, that the cause should be at least as perfect as its effects, or the Containment Principle, that the cause should contain all there is in its effects. The author argues that Descartes’s claim (in his argument against the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms) that it is inconceivable how things of different natures can interact does not conflict with the acknowledgement of interaction between things of different natures in the case of soul and body. The case is made that Cartesian mind-body interaction can agree with both the Hierarchy Principle and the Containment Principle, because the Principle is about total and efficient cause, whereas in the interaction, mental and brain states are only partial (and plausibly, in the case of brains states, occasional) causes. In particular, in the case of the causality in the brain-to-mind direction, the mind is conditioned by brain states to form the corresponding specific ideas on the basis of its innate general ideas of movements, forms, colours, etc. Eventually, for Descartes, the most natural way to deal with worries about the possibility of mind-brain interaction is to rely on God’s omnipotence, which certainly enables Him to arrange for such interaction.

2020 ◽  
pp. 218-267
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Platt

Chapter 6 argues that La Forge is a “partial” occasionalist, who appeals to “body–body” occasionalism to defend Descartes’ central epistemic thesis that mind is better known than body. La Forge argues for an occasionalistic version of Descartes’ physics. However, La Forge presents a theory of the mind–body union that implies that the human mind and body causally interact. While he says bodies are the “only occasional causes” of sensations in the mind, he uses “occasional cause” to refer to a type of accidental efficient cause. La Forge’s arguments for occasionalism are limited to body–body interaction: Although he holds that God continually re-creates finite substances, he is not committed to full-blown occasionalism. La Forge does not adopt occasionalism simply because he takes it to be a logical consequence of Cartesian physics. He sees body–body occasionalism as playing a broader theoretical role: He uses it to respond to criticisms of Cartesian epistemology.


Author(s):  
Walter Ott

Despite its difference in aspiration, the Meditations preserves the basic structure of perceptual experience outlined in Descartes’s earliest works. The chapter explores Descartes’s notion of an idea and uses a developmental reading to clear up the mystery surrounding material falsity. In the third Meditation, our protagonist does not yet know enough about extension in order to be able to tell whether her idea of cold is an idea of a real feature of bodies or merely the idea of a sensation. By the time she reaches the end of her reflections, she has learned that sensible qualities are at most sensations. As in his earliest stages, Descartes believes that the real work of perceiving the geometrical qualities of bodies is done by the brain image, which he persists in calling an ‘idea,’ at least when it is the object of mental awareness.


Philosophy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-114
Author(s):  
Andrea Christofidou

AbstractFirst, I offer a solution to the metaphysical problem of the mind–body relation, drawing on the fact of its distinctness in kind. Secondly, I demonstrate how, contrary to what is denied, Descartes’ metaphysical commitments allow for the intellect's clear and distinct conception of the mind–body union. Central to my two-fold defence is a novel account of the metaphysics of Descartes’ Causal Principle: its neutrality, and the unanalysable, fundamental nature of causality. Without the presupposition, and uniqueness of the mind-body union there can be no mind-body interaction; this throws new light on current concerns in metaphysics and philosophy of mind.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-43
Author(s):  
Surjo Soekadar ◽  
Jennifer Chandler ◽  
Marcello Ienca ◽  
Christoph Bublitz

Recent advances in neurotechnology allow for an increasingly tight integration of the human brain and mind with artificial cognitive systems, blending persons with technologies and creating an assemblage that we call a hybrid mind. In some ways the mind has always been a hybrid, emerging from the interaction of biology, culture (including technological artifacts) and the natural environment. However, with the emergence of neurotechnologies enabling bidirectional flows of information between the brain and AI-enabled devices, integrated into mutually adaptive assemblages, we have arrived at a point where the specific examination of this new instantiation of the hybrid mind is essential. Among the critical questions raised by this development are the effects of these devices on the user’s perception of the self, and on the user’s experience of their own mental contents. Questions arise related to the boundaries of the mind and body and whether the hardware and software that are functionally integrated with the body and mind are to be viewed as parts of the person or separate artifacts subject to different legal treatment. Other questions relate to how to attribute responsibility for actions taken as a result of the operations of a hybrid mind, as well as how to settle questions of the privacy and security of information generated and retained within a hybrid mind.


Author(s):  
Diana Deutsch

In this groundbreaking synthesis of art and science, Diana Deutsch, one of the world’s leading experts on the psychology of music, shows how illusions of music and speech – many of which she discovered - have fundamentally altered thinking about the brain. These astonishing illusions show that people can differ strikingly in how they hear musical patterns - differences that reflect both variations in brain organization and influences of language on music perception. They lead Deutsch to examine questions such as: When an orchestra performs a symphony, what is the ‘real’ music? Is it in the mind of the composer, or the conductor, or different members of the audience? Deutsch also explores extremes of musical ability, and other rare responses to music and speech. Why is perfect pitch so rare? Why are some people unable to recognize simple tunes? Why do some people hallucinate music or speech? Why do we hear phantom words and phrases? Why are most people subject to stuck tunes, or ‘earworms’? Why do we hear a spoken phrase as sung just because it is presented repeatedly? In evaluating these questions, she also shows how music and speech are intertwined, and argues that they stem from an early form of communication that had elements of both. Many of the illusions described here are so striking and paradoxical that you need to hear them to believe them. So the book enables you to listen to the sounds that are described while reading about them.


2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-101
Author(s):  
J. P. MORELAND

In an important paper, Clifford Williams advanced a Lockean-style argument to justify the parity thesis, viz., that there is no intellectual advantage to Christian physicalism or Christian dualism. In an article in Religious Studies I offered a critique of Williams's parity thesis and he has published a rejoinder to me in the same journal centring on my rejection of topic neutrality as an appropriate way to set up the mind–body debate. In this surrejoinder to Williams, I present his three main arguments and respond to each: (1) The dualist rejection of topic neutrality is flawed because it expresses a conceptual approach to the mind–body problem instead of the preferable empirical approach. The latter favours physicalism and, in any case, clearly supports topic neutrality. (2) If the dualist rejects the first argument, then a second parity thesis can be advanced in which an essentialist view of soul and the brain are presented in which each is essentially a thinking and feeling entity. Thus, an essentialist parity thesis is preserved. (3) If the dualist rejects the second argument, a new topic neutrality emerges in the dialectic, so topic neutrality is unavoidable. Against the first argument, I claim that Williams makes two central confusions that undermine his case and that he fails to show how the mind–body debate can be settled empirically. Against the second argument, I claim that it leaves Williams vulnerable to a topic-neutral approach to God and it merely proffers a verbal shift with a new dualism between normal and ‘special’ matter. Against the third argument, I point out that it misrepresents the dualist viewpoint and leads to two counterintuitive features that follow from topic neutrality.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 133-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Hanna ◽  
Evan Thompson

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable (Nagel1980, p. 150). My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed (Nagel1998, p. 338). Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain (Kelso 1995, p. 288).


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 649-656
Author(s):  
Akshara Pande ◽  
Richa Gupta ◽  
Amit Gupta ◽  
Rishika Yadav ◽  
Navin Garg ◽  
...  

Background & Objective: Ayurveda, the “Mother of all healing”, has existed for over 5,000 years and hence is considered to be the oldest healing science. Ayurveda states that the mind can heal and transform a person's whole being as the mind and body are associated. Herbs are the heart of Ayurvedic belief. They are used to boost defense against diseases and viruses and keep the brain, body, and soul in complete balance. Although ayurvedic medicines and herbs have natural components, they should still be used with certain precautions under the supervision of a medical practitioner. This study aims to manually curate information for the various ayurvedic medicinal herbs that have antiviral activity against harmful viruses. Methods: Detailed information is collected from the literature regarding the following (a) types of viruses (b) which particular category they belong to(c) the respective components of herbs that are responsible for curing viruses. We developed a web interface with the help of php and mysql to get the desired output. Results: The database consists of 104 viruses and 704 natural components. The web server is available at: http://ayurvir.com. Interpretation & Conclusion: We believe that AyurVirDB database will be extremely beneficial for the research community. It not only aids in investigations of Ayurvedic medicinal plants and their components. On the emergence or re-emergence of a virus, one could be able to predict the ayurvedic plants/herbs used for viral treatment based on virus similarity or disease symptoms.   


2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 303-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niruj Agrawal ◽  
Simon Fleminger ◽  
Howard Ring ◽  
Shoumitro Deb

Some believe that Cartesian dualism of mind and body in the 19th century and the rise of psychoanalysis by the turn of the 20th century was what led to the separation of neurology and psychiatry. More recently, conceptualisations of the mind/brain paradigm have helped rediscover the relationship between the mind and the brain, bringing renewed synergy between neurology and psychiatry (Cunningham et al, 2006). However, division is still apparent in current service planning and provision in the UK for individuals whose presentation lies in the no-man's-land between these two historical domains.


Dialogue ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 713-726
Author(s):  
Paul Raymont

Traditionally, one of the primary obstacles for physicalist accounts of the mind has been the apparent contrast between the intrinsic nature of our experiences and the intrinsic nature of the brain states with which they are allegedly identical. For instance, the intrinsic nature of an itch seems quite different from that of any electro-chemical state or event in the brain.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document