scholarly journals Środki tymczasowe w stanach nadzwyczajnych. Uwagi na tle sprawy Gruzja v. Federacja Rosyjska przed Międzynarodowym Trybunałem Sprawiedliwości

Author(s):  
Elżbieta Hanna Morawska

The article deals with some aspects of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction considered in recently decided dispute between Georgia and Russian Federation. The analysis essentially covers the question of provisional measures: the conditions for their indication, their legal nature and function. The article refers to measures indicated under Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ which allows the Court to indicate provisional measures providing interim protection to the rights of either party to a pending dispute. Having regard to the relevant case-law of the ICJ, two issues are discussed, namely the existence of prima facie jurisdiction and risk of irreparable prejudice and urgency. In addition to the measures referred to specific measures aimed at preserving specific rights, the article draws attention to the Interim measure of general nature with the view of ensuring the non-aggravation of the dispute between the Parties. As Russia does not recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the greater part of the article are dedicated to questions regarding the jurisdictional basis for Georgia’s action before the ICJ and the issues of the procedural preconditions for the sesin of the Court in the compromissory clause, under art. 22 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). It will also comment on whether the dispute between Georgia and Russia really concerned the issues of “the interpretation or application” of CERD,  or respect for others international law principles, i.e. the legality of the use of force, sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination.

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Brölmann

AbstractThis vignette deals with the position of international intergovernmental organisations as non-state actors. In the case law of the ICJ the independent identity of international organisations is addressed in the formal terms of international legal personality. Such personality is undisputed in international practice: for example, international organisations not only have the capacity to conclude treaties but also, although the legal framework is not entirely settled yet, to bear international responsibility for violations of international law. The ICJ arguably has had a central role in the conceptualisation of organisations as independent actors in international law: with the 1949 Reparation Opinion intergovernmental organisations essentially received at one stroke the paraphernalia required by an international legal actor. The framework proposed by the Court was widely adopted to match developing practice and, although organisations figure in the majority of cases subsequently brought before the ICJ, it was considered and to some extent refined only in the 1996 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Opinion.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-560
Author(s):  
Momchil Milanov

Abstract Although Sir Hersch Lauterpacht never dealt with security exceptions during his time at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), his entire body of work formed the intellectual premise for the approach of the Court towards security exceptions and the way in which the ICJ manoeuvers in the larger debate on the relationship between law, politics and the proper discharge of the judicial function. The Lauterpachtian approach is understood as a particular attitude towards the judicial function in which the Court serves as an instrument for the protection of peace, as a guardian of the coherence and unity of the international legal system and as a driving force for the development of international law. However, in some other important elements of its reasoning, the Court seems to remain more Lauterpachtian in spirit than in letter. Despite these inconsistencies, the Court arguably exerted significant (albeit somehow uneven) influence over World Trade Organization panels and investment tribunals.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-169
Author(s):  
Elisa RUOZZI

AbstractThe practice of carrying out an environmental impact assessment (EIA) has gained strength in international law and jurisprudence, finding application in the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). If, on the one hand, the ICJ has recognized the customary nature of this principle, on the other its application poses a set of challenges, mainly linked to the autonomy of this obligation from other international environmental law norms. More precisely, the obligation at issue has been applied in connection with the due diligence and notification principles, creating uncertainty about its scope, as well as about its substantive or procedural nature. Likewise, the autonomy of the obligation to perform an EIA has been challenged in relation to the definition of the content and scope of the obligation itself, which in turn is linked to the existence of applicable treaty provisions or of soft law. This article discusses the impact of these elements on the reasoning of the Court in the cases at issue, in order to demonstrate how such lack of autonomy can undermine the coherence of the reasoning itself and, therefore, an effective application of the principle.


Author(s):  
Gabriele Gagliani

The International Court of Justice, and its predecessor court, the Permanent Court of International Justice, have dealt with cultural heritage issues in a number of cases extending back over a century. Scholars’ attention to this case law appears fragmentary. This chapter intends to fill this gap and analyze the ICJ jurisprudence involving cultural heritage. Through the analysis of ICJ case law on cultural heritage and cultural heritage-related arguments resorted to by States in ICJ disputes, this chapter wishes to prove the relevance of cultural heritage issues for public international law and the key, often-underestimated role of the ICJ for international law on cultural heritage.


Author(s):  
Mark Weston Janis

This chapter introduces a ‘meta-theory’ of international law. It employs the insights of Thomas Kuhn, who argued that once a paradigm has been accepted by a scientific community, most scientists accept it without much question. When the paradigm is overwhelmed, a ‘scientific revolution’—a new paradigm—emerges. The paradigm for the sources of international law is Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute, which emerged during and after World War I when international lawyers, faced with the horrors of that awful conflict, lost faith in their old discipline, thereby initiating Kuhn’s scientific revolution. Nowadays, Article 38 remains an attractive paradigm: first because the ICJ and its Statute are almost universally accepted; secondly, because it is neatly formulated; thirdly, because the paradigm has been confirmed in case law and commentary; and fourthly, because it is widely taught.


Author(s):  
Ole Spiermann

This chapter takes a look at Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute. This article intends to define so-called sources or origins of international law to be used by the World Court. The text dates back to 1920, before the predecessor of the ICJ, i.e. the PCIJ, took up its activities. The chapter notes that since 1920, Article 38 has featured prominently in the theory on so-called sources of international law, while the provision has been of little relevance in the case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its predecessor. Based mainly on historical records, the chapter seeks an explanation, which in turn may shed new light on sources theory.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREAS KULICK

AbstractThe judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 11 November 2013, interpreting its 1962 judgment in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, inspires a reconsideration of the role of interpretation proceedings pursuant to Article 60 of the Statute of the Court. In particular, it invites us to take a closer look at the role and scope of the principle of res judicata in public international law in general and as considered in the case law of the Court in particular. This contribution reveals the competing concepts of the principle in interpretation and consecutive original contentious proceedings, and promotes instead a uniform concept that avoids the conflict inherent in current approaches.Section 1 introduces Article 60 of the ICJ Statute (section 1.1.) and thereinafter views interpretation proceedings before the Court in light of the Court's case law, in particular its 2013 interpretation judgment in the Temple case (section 1.2.). Section 2 constitutes the heart of the analysis and discusses what will be identified as the competing concepts of res judicata. Section 2.1. presents the functions, concepts, and case law of res judicata in public international law in general, whereas section 2.2. focuses specifically on the case law of the ICJ and the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in this regard. Finally, section 2.3. concludes this study by setting out the approach that the author regards as appropriate to reconcile the competing concepts of res judicata.


Author(s):  
Petro Halimurka ◽  
Ihor Zeman

The article explores the legal nature of advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice. It has been established that advisory jurisdiction consists of at least two main elements – ratione personae and ratione materiae. The original power to request advisory opinions is given to the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Court’s case-law demonstrates that political aspects of question or political motives don’t give any grounds to refuse the request for an advisory opinion. The advisory opinions de jure are not legally binding. However, in practice, due to its quality and the status of the International Court of Justice, the advisory opinions are authoritative. In order for the advisory opinion to be authoritative, it is important that the Court’s position is not divided. Advisory proceedings in its form are similar to the proceedings in disputes, indicating the judicial nature of the advisory opinions. It has been found that in practice, the bodies that requested an advisory opinions of the ICJ, as a rule, follow them. An analysis of the interpretation and application by the Court of the international treaties in the advisory opinions demonstrates that the Court acts as the main judicial organ of the United Nations. There has been established the indirect influence of the ICJ on the formation of an international custom through the use of resolutions of the UN agencies as proof of opinio juris. In the advisory opinion Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations International Court of Justice has created a new rule of international customary law regarding the status of a legal entity in international organizations and, consequently, personal legal personality. It is also worth mentioning the advisory opinion Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by which the Court has given an impetus to the development of international customary law in the area of reservations to multilateral treaties, in particular with humanitarian purposes. In the advisory opinion of the Western Sahara, the Court not only substantiated the universality of the principle of self-determination, but also clarified what features, in it’s opinion, should have the will of the people. In the advisory opinion Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons the Court substantiated that the rules of international humanitarian law became part of international customary law. Advisory opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory has contributed to the understanding of a number of norms as customary. In particular, the Court confirmed the customary nature of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907. In addition, the Court noted that the obligation to respect the right of other peoples to self-determination was a commitment erga omnes. Key words: court; law; justice; dispute; advisory opinion; case-law; custom.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 641-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
MASSIMO LANDO

AbstractIn 2009, the International Court of Justice introduced plausibility as a requirement for indicating provisional measures under Article 41 of its Statute. Upon its introduction, plausibility was conceived as a test to establish that the rights asserted by applicant states might exist under international law. However, the Court subsequently developed the plausibility test into a higher standard, which requires the Court also to assess that the alleged conduct of the respondent state might breach that applicant state's asserted rights. This development has important implications for provisional measures proceedings before the Court. First, one could distinguish two aspects of plausibility, legal and factual. Second, plausibility has different functions in requests for provisional measures depending on whether the applicant state asserts rights arising under a treaty or under customary international law. Third, the Court's enquiry into plausibility could overlap with the enquiry into prima facie jurisdiction ratione materiae, although these two requirements conceivably entail different thresholds. Fourth, plausibility in provisional measures indicated in interpretation proceedings could be seen to be different from plausibility in provisional measures indicated in ordinary contentious proceedings.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-76
Author(s):  
Marco Longobardo

Abstract This article explores the role of counsel before the International Court of Justice, taking into account their tasks under the Statute of the Court and the legal value of their pleadings in international law. Pleadings of counsel constitute State practice for the formation of customary international law and treaty interpretation, and they are attributable to the litigating State under the law on State responsibility. Accordingly, in principle, counsel present the views of the litigating State, which in practice approves in advance the pleadings. This consideration is relevant in discussing the role of counsel assisting States in politically sensitive cases, where there is no necessary correspondence between the views of the States and those of their counsel. Especially when less powerful States are parties to the relevant disputes, the availability of competent counsel in politically sensitive cases should not be discouraged since it advances the legitimacy of the international judicial function.


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