scholarly journals Inter arma silent Musae? Swoboda wypowiedzi artystycznej naruszającej porządek publiczny

2019 ◽  
pp. 79-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcin Górski
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Artistic Expression ◽  
Public Order ◽  
The Public

Courts of different jurisdictions (including the ECtHR) tend to employ the notion of “artistic expression” intuitively. Definitional attempts are rare (see e.g. the ruling of the Canadian Supreme Court in Sharpe). One may postulate that “artistic” is the expression which is rooted in the sphere of sensitiveness of an individual appealing to the same sphere of other individuals. The consequence of such understanding of artistic expression is that it is designed to “offend, shock and disturb” (i.e. to appeal to human feelings) by its definition. A further consequence is that artistic expression should be likely to have impact on the public order. However the case-law of the ECtHR proves that it happens only when artistic expression is contaminated by political elements. Purely artistic expression seems indifferent to the public order.

scholarly journals The interpretation complying with EU law manifested in the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013 of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 82-96
Author(s):  
Carla Machado
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One

This article aims to address the interpretation that has been made by Portuguese courts in relation to the concept of “communication of the work to the public” enshrined in Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, duly transposed into the Portuguese legal order by Law No. 50/2006 of 24 August, which culminated in the drafting of the case law unifying judgment No. 15/2013. By verifying its content and analysing the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter CJEU), concerning the interpretation of that concept, we conclude that the said case law unifying judgment does not comply with EU law. Therefore, we will list, on the one hand, the inherent consequences regarding the upkeep of the interpretation that has been held by the Portuguese judicial authorities and, on the other, we will suggest solutions for the resolution of similar cases by appealing to the principle of conforming interpretation.

scholarly journals Ejecutividad y prescripción de las sanciones administrativas en las Leyes 39/2015, del Procedimiento Administrativo Común de las Administraciones Públicas y 40/2015, de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público

2018 ◽  
pp. 57-95
Author(s):  
Carmen CHINCHILLA MARÍN
Keyword(s):  
Public Sector ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Supreme Court

LABURPENA: Sektore Publikoaren Araubide Juridikoari buruzko 40/2015 Legeak arau berria sartu du zigorrak preskribitzeko epearen zenbaketaren inguruan, zigorren aurka jarritako gora jotzeko errekurtsoak administrazioaren isiltasunaren bidez ezesten diren kasuetarako. Hala, lege horren 30.3. artikuluan ezarritakoaren arabera, errekurtsoa ustez ezesten bada, errekurtso horren ebazpena emateko legez aurreikusi den epea amaitu eta hurrengo egunetik aurrera hasi behar da zenbatzen zigorra preskribitzeko epea. Preskripzioari buruzko arau berri horrek, zentzuzkoa denez, ondorioak eduki behar ditu zigorrak betearazteko araubidearen gainean, zigorra bete behar izatea baita zigorra preskribatzeko oinarria. Artikulu honetan, bi berritasun horien berri ematen da, eta kontraesan-arazoa aztertzen, Konstituzio Auzitegiak eta Auzitegi Gorenak errekurtso-bideko isiltasunaren eta isiltasun horrek zigorren preskripzioaren eta bete behar izatearen gainean dituen ondorioen —hobeto esanda, «ondorio-ezaren»— inguruan duten jurisprudentziari dagokionez. RESUMEN: la Ley 40/2015, de Régimen jurídico del Sector público, ha introducido una nueva regla sobre el cómputo del plazo de prescripción de las sanciones en los casos en los que el recurso de alzada interpuesto contra las mismas se desestima por silencio administrativo. Así, a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 30.3 de esta ley, en el caso de desestimación presunta del recurso, el plazo de prescripción de la sanción comenzará a computarse desde el día siguiente a aquel en el que finalice el plazo legalmente previsto para la resolución de dicho recurso. Esta nueva regla sobre la prescripción lógicamente tiene que producir consecuencias sobre el régimen de ejecutividad de las sanciones, pues la ejecutividad de la sanción constituye el presupuesto de la prescripción de la misma. En este artículo se da cuenta de ambas novedades y se analiza el problema de su contradicción respecto de la jurisprudencia —del Tribunal constitucional y del Tribunal Supremo— sobre el silencio en vía de recurso y sus efectos (más bien, sus «no efectos») sobre la prescripción y la ejecutividad de las sanciones. ABSTRACT: The Act 40/2015 of the legal regime of the Public Sector has introduced a new rule on the calculation of the limitation period to be applied to sanctions in cases where hierarchichal appeal filed against them had been rejected by administrative silence. Thus, within the meaning of section 30.3 of this Act, in case of implied rejection of the appeal, the calculation of the limitation period of the sanction shall begin from the day following the deadline legally established to resolve that appeal. This new rule about the limitation period has logically to have consequences over the enforceability of sanctions, since enforceability of the sanction as such is a prerequisite for the limitation period of it. This article deals with both novelties and analyzes the problem of their contradiction with the case law —by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court— regarding the silence within the appeal and its effects (or rather lack of effects) about the limitation period and enforceability of sanctions.

scholarly journals Sedición (Delito de) = Sedition (Crime of)

2019 ◽  
pp. 299
Author(s):  
Rafael Rebollo Vargas
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Penal Code ◽  
Public Order ◽  
The Public

Resumen: El delito de sedición se ubica sistemáticamente en el Código penal como un delito contra el orden público, por lo que su objeto de tutela y sus fines nada tienen que ver con una «rebelión en pequeño», a pesar de que algunas resoluciones recientes de la Audiencia Nacional y del propio Tribunal Supremo lo desnaturalicen hasta el punto de atribuirle unas finalidades que no se corresponden con su actual configuración típica.Palabras clave: Delitos contra la Constitución, delitos contra el orden público, rebelión, sedición, alzamiento público y violento, alzamiento público y tumultuario.Abstract: The sedition crime is located systematically in the Penal code as a crime against the public order, for what its object of tutelage and its ends not at all they have to do with a «rebellion in child», although some recent resolutions of the National Audience and of the proper Supreme Court denature it up to the point of attributing to him a few purposes that do not correspond to its current typical configuration.Keywords: Crimes against the Constitution, crimes against public order, rebellion, sedition, violent and public uprising, public uprising and tumultuary.

Public Order: Concept and Category Content

2020 ◽  
pp. 95-99
Author(s):  
R. G. Kalustov
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Law Enforcement Agencies ◽  
The Public ◽  
History Of

The article discusses the emergence and development, as well as existing approaches to understanding the concept of “public order”. The history of the formation of this category is examined by analyzing regulatory legal acts. This method allows you to track the change in value and determine how to correctly understand the “public order” today. Revealing the concept, ambiguity arises in understanding this category, in connection with which the most applicable approach is currently determined for use in practice by law enforcement agencies.

Public order as a protectable interest

Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Zhilong Guo
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Important Criterion ◽  
Public Interests ◽  
The Public

Abstract Public order as a protectable interest is an important criterion for determining a consistent and rational scope of crimes against public order. From the specific perspective of everyday life, Feinberg's theory of minimum welfare interests neglects those kinds of interests that relate to a smooth or harmonious life. Socio-legal perspectives make it clear that safety interests, which directly concern basic living (bodily existence), do not include various kinds of order interests – and thus life order interests in convenience, comfort and peace, distinguishable from safety interests that are protected by English public order laws, can be construed as the public order interest. By critically adopting Feinberg's individualistic approach to analysing public interests in three types of case, the test of being public is further clarified. Typical categories of public order are socially and normatively identified before concluding with a discussion of the effects the identification made by the paper might make to the scope and nature of public order law and offences.

NON-DISCRIMINATORY TRADE RESTRICTIONS AFTER KECK

2002 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-52
Author(s):  
Alan Dashwood
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Sales Promotion ◽  
Trade Restrictions ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Public ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Equivalent Effect ◽  
The One ◽  
Domestic Products ◽  
By Products

IN its Keck judgment—famous or notorious according to taste—the Court of Justice drew a distinction, for the purposes of the application of the prohibition in Article 28 EC against measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions (“MEEQRs”), between two categories of national measures. On the one hand were “product requirements”: measures specifying requirements to be met, in order to obtain access to the market of a Member State, by products coming from other Member States where they are lawfully manufactured and marketed, like the minimum alcohol requirement for fruit liqueurs in Cassis de Dijon (Case 120/78 [1997] E.C.R. 649). Such product requirements are liable to constitute MEEQRs, and therefore require specific justification, in order to escape prohibition, on one of the public interest grounds recognised by Community law. On the other hand was the category of measures described in the judgment as “provisions restricting or prohibiting certain selling arrangements”. An example was the legislation at issue in the main proceedings in Keck, which prohibited the resale of products below their purchase price, thereby depriving retailers of a form of sales promotion. Other examples, attested by the case law post-Keck, are measures regulating advertising methods, the kind of shop in which goods of a certain description can be sold, shops’ opening hours and Sunday trading. National provisions in this latter category are not normally such as to hinder trade between Member States under the test formulated by the Court in Dassonville (Case 8/74 [1974] E.C.R. 837, at para. 5), and so do not call for justification; not, that is, “so long as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory and so long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products and those from other Member States”: see Joined Cases C-267 and 268/9 [1993] E.C.R. I-6097, at paras. 15–17.

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