scholarly journals Język prawny i język prawniczy jako przedmiot badań językoznawczych i prawoznawczych w latach 1935–1999

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 151-164
Author(s):  
Anna Śliwicka

The article describes the state of the research and the directions for thedevelopment of the linguistic and jurisprudential thought including the issueof the legislative language and legal language in the period from 1935 to 1999.

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-283
Author(s):  
Marta Andruszkiewicz

AbstractThis article analyses the linguistic norms found within legal and legislative language and their implementation. It attempts to answer the following questions: is there a common scope for the use of linguistic norms in general language and legislative language, what can form the basis for resolving issues of correctness in legal and legislative language and is a codification of the linguistic norms for legislative language necessary? The discrepancies observed between normative standards and linguistic practise raise the issue of the need to codify linguistic norms within legal and legislative language. In this article, I hypothesise the need to elaborate a source for codifying the norms of legal and legislative language.


2021 ◽  
pp. 291-308
Author(s):  
Anna Nylund

AbstractBased on the insights from the previous chapters in this volume, this concluding chapter discusses key traits of Nordic courts: colloquial legal language, generalist judges, ‘unrefined’ and fragmentary laws, high trust in the state and judges, and corporatism. The development of these traits over time is explored as well as the emergence of new traits that could be labelled ‘Nordic’. It also discusses how two current trends—Europeanisation and privatisation of dispute resolution processes—influence Nordic courts. The question whether a unified Nordic procedural culture still exists is raised. Finally, the future of Nordic courts is discussed.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatiana Chauvin

The purpose of the article is to analyze the principle of social justice regualted by the Polish constitution as a category of legal language, the legal principle and the principle on which Catholic social teaching is built. Both in the opinion of the doctrine and the jurisprudence, clear references to claims in the field of Christian morality are visible. A man as a person (according to UDHR - All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights) should be supported by the community, including the state, especially if it belongs to the category of weaker or excluded entities. At the same time, however, as a member of this community he must adopt an active attitude, acting for the benefit of others. Catholic social teaching perfectly complements legal interpretation with a coherent axiological aspect.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Ng-A-Fook

…the foreigner is first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc.  He has to ask for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his own, the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the lord, the authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc.  This personage imposes on him translation into their own language, and that’s the first act of violence.(Derrida, 2000, p. 15)             Today, Rohingya refugees continue to flood across the Ganges-Brahmaputra Delta from Myanmar to Bangladesh.  For many of them, there is no promise of return, of reprieve, of refuge, as they seek asylum from religious persecution.  There are no homes, only hospital rooms and hallways awaiting the wounded and injured.  These are the news headlines on TV.  In a post-truth era of poll-I-ticking, liking, loving, emoji-ing, tweeting, we are, our family, myself included, failing to witness what Solnit (2013) calls elsewhere the stories of lives faraway, nearby. 


2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo D. Faingold

The constitutions and legislative statutes of the fifty states in the United States are given an exhaustive screening to identify legal language defining the linguistic obligations of the state and the language rights of individuals and groups. The author suggests that in the United States, “hands-off” is good language policy not only nationwide but also statewide because states adopting a hands-off linguistic policy are consistent with the Constitution of the United States while states adopting a “hands-on” policy are in conflict with it. States adopting hands-on language legislation in their constitutions or statutes are deemed to be “nativist” because they seem unfavorable toward speakers of minority languages, while states adopting a hands-off policy are “non-nativist” because they seem favorable (or at least neutral) toward speakers of minority languages.


2018 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 27-54
Author(s):  
Maria Teresa LIZISOWA

The article is a linguistic lecture on mutual relations between legal language and legislative language on the semantic, syntactic, pragmatic and stylistic planes. The author analysed decisions and official regulations with regard to the status of language as well as the linguistic understanding of communication. A decisive official act is a testimony of the primary reading of the text of a legislative act by an official, fulfilling the role of an interpreter and a decision maker in applying law. He fulfils a duty imposed on him by the norm of competence, verbalised in principles of legal acts. In the process of organizing a legal text, he makes use of the rules of language, according to both the studied and the statutorily recommended rules of the interpretations of law. Through evoking the content of legal articles in official documents, therefore through concretization of legal norms in the process of reception, the legal meanings and contexts undergo a certain kind of assimilation by an official-interpreter. Later, they become adapted in corresponding legal situations, and finally, as a consequence, a process of universalization of knowledge about the established law takes place, because an official-decision maker inscribes his personal knowledge of the legislative content into a specific legal reality of his own community.


Author(s):  
Matthew Williams

This chapter examines the reasons for the changes in Parliament's use of language. It begins by elaborating on the meaning of legislative indeterminacy, focusing on four parts of speech that are significant to the determinacy of a text and their policy benefits: noun/verb qualifers, conjunctions, modal auxiliary verbs and enabling verbs. It then traces the historic patterns in the use of legislative language since 1900 and presents three case studies that illustrate how and why choices were made to change the language of the law: the cases of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) and Franklin and Others v The Minister of Town and Country Planning (1947), and the Immigration Act 1971. The chapter shows that enactment of indeterminate legislation increased substantially since 1900, in part due to choices taken by post-war governments to ‘roll back the state’ and allow policy to adapt to changeable market conditions.


2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-276
Author(s):  
Merit-Ene Ilja

The Estonian Legal Language Centre, initially known as the Estonian Legislative Support Centre and later on as the Estonian Legal Translation Centre, started operation in 1995 as a state agency under the governance of the Estonian State Chancellery. It was funded from the state budget.


Author(s):  
Christie S. Warren

The Constitution of Madinah, written by the Prophet after his flight from Mecca and arrival in Madinah (622 ce/1 ah), is considered by many to be the first written constitution. Nevertheless, and although Islamic law has developed in rich detail since then in a number of other areas, constitutionalism remains a comparatively underdeveloped area of Islamic law. Only recently has this started to change. Since 2011 and in part due to events of the so-called Arab Spring, the topic of Islam and constitutions has been the subject of heightened interest. In recent years, a number of Muslim-majority countries, including Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Palestine, have embarked upon constitutional processes, and the relationship between Islam and the state has been debated in each of them. A variety of models has emerged over time; whereas in Saudi Arabia the Qur’an serves as the constitution itself, in Egypt Shari’ah is the principal source of legislation. Similarly, while the 2012 draft constitution of Libya states that Islam shall be the state religion and Islamic Shari’ah the main source of legislation, the constitution of Iraq provides that no law contradicting established provisions of Islam may be enacted. Language in the Afghan constitution is even more precise and states that Afghanistan is an Islamic republic, that no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of Islam, and that in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative language governing the disposition of a case, courts shall implement principles of Hanafi jurisprudence. In similar fashion, academic scholarship analyzing the relationship between Islam and constitutionalism has increased in scope and vibrancy in recent years. Historically, scholarship in this field tended to focus on issues relating to governance and administrative structures in Muslim-majority countries—not on normative constitutional principles. More recently, Islamic perspectives on constitutional norms have become the focus of significant scholarship. Some constitutional issues of recent academic interest include state sponsorship of a particular religion to the exclusion of others, freedom to practice Islam and other religions, and options for articulating the role of Shari’ah within constitutional frameworks, including the use of supremacy and repugnancy clauses, the role of Shari’ah as a source of legislation, “Shari’ah checks” to ensure that legislation does not contravene Islamic law, review by Shura Councils, and the role of the judicial branch in interpreting Islamic law. Additional constitutional issues impacted by defined relationships between Shari’ah and the state include human and women’s rights, protection of religious minorities; criminal law and hudud punishments; finance law and restrictions on charging interest; rights of freedom of association, expression, and expression; and provisions governing marriage, divorce and inheritance.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document