scholarly journals Harman on Mental Paint and the Transparency of Experience

Organon F ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Erhan Demircioglu
Keyword(s):  
Transparency Of Experience ◽  
Mental Paint

scholarly journals Qualia realism and representationalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-121
Author(s):  
A.A. Gusev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Realism ◽  
Transparency Of Experience ◽  
Epistemic Dimension ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Mental Paint ◽  
Reductionist Approach

The article deals with the problem of naturalistic explanation of an essential feature of all conscious mental states – the phenomenal character. The conception of qualia realism can be considered as one of the options for a non-naturalistic explanation of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is believed that the phenomenal character of experience can be explained in terms of representational content that are more acceptable to naturalism. As a rule, in these discussions, qualia are identified with the non-representational properties of experience – mental paint. The author analyzes in detail the relationship between the concepts of “qualia” and “mental paint” in the key work of G. Harman. It is shown that Harman’s argument against qualia realism fails. He defined qualia in terms of the mental paint conception, which contains consequences that replace the original thesis of qualia realism. To attack the foundations of qualia realism in a more relevant way, the author develops A. Kind’s idea of the epistemic dimension of qualia. Kind points out that since the philosophers arrived at the question of the existence of qualia by considering the plausibility of functionalism, they were so focused on metaphysical considerations that they forgot that this phenomenon is connected in the first epistemic dimension. On the basis of this, a new version of the argument from transparency of experience versus qualia realism was proposed. The argument demonstrates that the qualia realism fails the test of introspective analysis of perceptual experience. Qualia turn out to be theoretical objects that do not fulfill their prescribed explanatory function. This undermines the foundations of metaphysical arguments against the reductionist approach to consciousness, since they proceeded from the assumption of the existence of referents of the concept of “qualia”. The variant of the explanation of the phenomenal character of experience in terms of representationalism also faces internal problems. In this regard, the author offers the option of direct realism, since it is well compatible with the transparency thesis and is generally consistent with the naturalistic attitudes of the representationalism.

scholarly journals Colors and Things

i-Perception ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 204166952095843
Author(s):  
Jan Koenderink ◽  
Andrea van Doorn ◽  
Karl Gegenfurtner
Keyword(s):  
Visual Field ◽  
Color Vision ◽  
Ecological Factors ◽  
Color Naming ◽  
Hunter Gatherers ◽  
Object Properties ◽  
Color Differences ◽  
Ill Posed ◽  
Mental Paint ◽  
The Way

How many colors are there? Quoted numbers range from ten million to a dozen. Are colors object properties? Opinions range all the way from of course they are to no, colors are just mental paint. These questions are ill-posed. We submit that the way to tackle such questions is to adopt a biological approach, based on the evolutionary past of hominins. Hunter-gatherers in tundra or savannah environments have various, mutually distinct uses for color. Color differences aid in segmenting the visual field, whereas color qualia aid in recognizing objects. Classical psychophysics targets the former, but mostly ignores the latter, whereas experimental phenomenology, for instance in color naming, is relevant for recognition. Ecological factors, not anatomical/physiological ones, limit the validity of qualia as distinguishing signs. Spectral databases for varieties of daylight and object reflectance factors allow one to model this. The two questions are really one. A valid question that may replace both is how many distinguishing signs does color vision offer in the hominin Umwelt? The answer turns out to be about a thousand. The reason is that colors are formally not object properties but pragmatically are useful distinguishing signs.

scholarly journals The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention

Synthese ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Assaf Weksler ◽  
Hilla Jacobson ◽  
Zohar Z. Bronfman
Keyword(s):  
Transparency Of Experience ◽  
Neuroscience Of Attention

Introspection

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-215
Author(s):  
Artem P. Besedin ◽  
Dmitry B. Volkov ◽  
Anton V. Kuznetsov ◽  
Evgeny V. Loginov ◽  
Andrey V. Mertsalov ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Summer School ◽  
English Language ◽  
Conscious State ◽  
Consciousness Studies ◽  
Current State ◽  
Language Research ◽  
Transparency Of Experience ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Representative System

The article is a review of the philosophical problems of introspection as a method of cognition that are actively discussed in the contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. The article is the result of discussions that were held during the Summer School “Consciousness and Introspection” organized in July 2020 by the Moscow Center for Consciousness Studies and led by Professor D. Stoljar, one of the top experts in this field. The purpose of the article is to describe to readers the current state of affairs in the English language research in this area. Modern theories of introspection have been formed as a result of discussions in the philosophy of mind and epistemology in the XX century. One of them is S. Shoemaker’s critique of the perceptual model of introspection and the related problem of self-blindness. Another topic is the transparency of experience (G.E. Moore, G. Evans). Finally, D. Dretske offered an influential critique of introspection in general. The discussion of these topics led to the arising of various modern theories: rationalistic (A. Byrne, D. Stoljar), acquaintance theories (B. Gertler, D. Chalmers), constitutive (S. Shoemaker), simple (D. Smithies), and others. An important area in which introspection finds their application is the philosophy of consciousness. The article considers the thesis of revelation, according to which the conscious state reveals its essence in introspection: the relation of this thesis to folk psychology is analyzed (D. Lewis, D. Stoljar), arguments against physicalism based on it are considered (P. Goff). Finally, the authors consider illusionist approaches to introspection based on the understanding of introspection as a representative system (D. Dennett, K. Frankish). Proponents of these approaches suggest the most acute criticism of introspection, pointing out its unreliability as a method of cognition, and, accordingly, the inapplicability of introspection in the philosophy of consciousness. Objections to this position are represented by M. Nida-Rumelin. This work does not pretend to consider all the existing theories of introspection and related problems. However, this review can give an idea of the main positions and problems in this area and assess the prospects for its development.

The Transparency of Experience Argument

2011 ◽  
pp. 142-145
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Muñoz-Suárez
Keyword(s):  
Transparency Of Experience

scholarly journals The Transparency of Experience

2002 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 376-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.G.F. Martin
Keyword(s):  
Transparency Of Experience

Against Representationalism

2021 ◽  
pp. 39-82
Author(s):  
David Papineau
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Properties ◽  
General Argument ◽  
Transparency Of Experience

In this chapter some initial arguments for representationalism are considered and dismissed. Naturalist representationalism is distinguished from phenomenal intentionalism and shown to be implausible. Appeals to the ‘transparency’ of experience are considered and shown to be problematic. These doubts are put on a more explicit footing and are shown to lead to a general argument that conscious sensory properties cannot possibly be essentially representational. Phenomenal intentionalism is argued to collapse into the qualitative view.

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