scholarly journals American options with asymmetric information and reflected BSDE

Bernoulli ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 1394-1426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neda Esmaeeli ◽  
Peter Imkeller
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
American Options ◽  
Reflected Bsde

scholarly journals American options in an imperfect complete market with default

2018 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roxana Dumitrescu ◽  
Marie-Claire Quenez ◽  
Agnès Sulem
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Stopping ◽  
Value Function ◽  
American Options ◽  
American Option ◽  
Stopping Times ◽  
Optimal Stopping Problem ◽  
Nonlinear Expectation ◽  
Portfolio Strategy ◽  
Reflected Bsde ◽  
The Value Function

We study pricing and hedging for American options in an imperfect market model with default, where the imperfections are taken into account via the nonlinearity of the wealth dynamics. The payoff is given by an RCLL adapted process (ξt). We define the seller's price of the American option as the minimum of the initial capitals which allow the seller to build up a superhedging portfolio. We prove that this price coincides with the value function of an optimal stopping problem with a nonlinear expectation 𝓔g (induced by a BSDE), which corresponds to the solution of a nonlinear reflected BSDE with obstacle (ξt). Moreover, we show the existence of a superhedging portfolio strategy. We then consider the buyer's price of the American option, which is defined as the supremum of the initial prices which allow the buyer to select an exercise time τ and a portfolio strategy φ so that he/she is superhedged. We show that the buyer's price is equal to the value function of an optimal stopping problem with a nonlinear expectation, and that it can be characterized via the solution of a reflected BSDE with obstacle (ξt). Under the additional assumption of left upper semicontinuity along stopping times of (ξt), we show the existence of a super-hedge (τ, φ) for the buyer.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

LP valuation of exotic American options exploiting structure

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Dempster ◽  
J Hutton ◽  
d Richards
Keyword(s):  
American Options
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