Contrasting sentiments of social justice in France and Quebec

2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-34
Author(s):  
Michel Forsé ◽  
Simon Langlois ◽  
Maxime Parodi

Sociologists from many countries have recently paid attention to measures of social justice sentiments. In doing so, they are following the lead of philosophers like John Rawls (1971) or Michael Walzer (1983), among many others, and are now studying the question of justice empirically. Do individuals evaluate justice from the perspective of equity (or fairness) like Rawls proposed? Do they conceptualize different spheres of justice like Walzer argued? Only empirical studies can provide answers to these questions and offer “grounded knowledge” (Boudon 2012) that is knowledge that connect philosophical concepts with the actions and thought of social actors, at least in contemporary democratic societies.

Author(s):  
Margaret Moore

This essay examines the ideas and influence of Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice. It argues that Walzer’s influence on the discipline has taken a different form than many other writers on justice, such as Rawls, where the central ideas have been taken up and argued about in essentially Rawlsian terms. Walzer’s influence has operated on different levels, of which we can distinguish at least three. There is a micro level, with numerous authors picking up fruitful ideas, lines of inquiries or suggestions, found in Walzer’s work, and appropriating them or using them to pursue further arguments. There is a more general social justice level, where ideas that are central to his understanding of social justice have been appropriated by diverse thinkers, often in quite different ways. He has been also influential on a very general, methodological level, where theorists have adopted his method and style of doing political theory.


Author(s):  
Sanna Vehviläinen ◽  
Anne-Mari Souto

AbstractThe aim of this article is to show how interaction research can contribute to the understanding and praxis of socially just guidance. The article is theoretical, but it makes use of our previous empirical studies. We combine the ethnographic study of school and racism, and interactional research on guidance. We define guidance for social justice, explaining how this translates to the level of interactional practices. We show two empirical examples of interactional phenomena hindering socially just praxis. We lastly discuss our practical conclusions on how to help school career counsellors change their interactional practices.


1982 ◽  
Vol 32 (127) ◽  
pp. 190
Author(s):  
D. D. Raphael ◽  
H. Gene Blocker ◽  
Elizabeth H. Smith
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Stanley Souza Marques ◽  
Marcelo Andrade Cattoni De Oliveira

The article takes up the criticisms directed by Axel Honneth to the basic structure of the dominant conceptions of justice, but merely to point out the general outlines of his alternative project of justice normative reconstruction. If John Rawls and Michael Walzer structure theories of distributive justice very consistently and in order to get to the autonomy protection (already taken so) in a more sophisticated way, that to be satisfied it transcends the (mere) obligation of not interfering in the realization of individual life projects, Honneth proposes the radicalization of justice's demands. It is because he pays his attention to the mutual expectation of consideration. This point would be the new texture of the social justice. In this sense, the principles of fair distribution leave the scene to make way for principles which guidelines are directed towards the society basic institutions involved in a new goal: to set up favourable contexts for the success of plural reciprocal relationships.


Author(s):  
Maluleka Khazamula Jan

The main issue that bothers indigenous people is an unequal and unjust representation of their knowledge in relation to the formalized Western education system. Despite the affirmation of indigenous knowledge by the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Western formal education system defines what knowledge and teaching methods are authentic or not. The purpose of this chapter is to determine the value of the indigenous knowledge and their pedagogic methods for preschool and school teachers. The data collected has been critically analyzed through John Rawls' theory of social justice. There is an agreement between authors and teachers that indigenous people had education systems that sustained them for years. This chapter provides some recommendations on how these valuable methods of teaching can be incorporated into the mainstream education systems.


2021 ◽  
pp. 247-269
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

This essay was written for a Stanford conference on philosophy of education on whether virtue can be taught. The general questions considered are: What is virtue? How can social conditions promote it? How can individuals effectively strive for it? The specific focus is on the conceptions of virtue in the works of Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. Kant regarded virtue as a good will that is also strong enough to resist contrary passions, impulses, and inclinations. Childhood training can prepare children for virtue but becoming virtuous requires an empirically inexplicable commitment and effort that is up to each individual. Rawls explains a sense of justice as a civic virtue that he conjectures will develop naturally, according to certain psychological laws, if the basic structure of society is just. Rawls’ reliance on empirical studies addresses questions left mysterious by Kant, but his theory faces problems of its own.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 148-160
Author(s):  
Rainer Forst

John Rawls famously claimed that “the accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circumstance” are “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” Luck egalitarians believe that a conception of justice that eliminates the effects of circumstance but not of choice captures that intuition better than Rawls’s own principles of justice. This chapter argues that the opposite is the case. We can learn from Rawls that one cannot overcome moral arbitrariness in social life by using a morally arbitrary distinction between choice and circumstance. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the incompatibility between these two approaches points to a deeper difference between a deontological and a teleological paradigm that is crucial for the debate between relational and nonrelational notions of political and social justice.


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