Reproductive Autonomy and the Evolving Family in the Supreme Court of Canada: Implications for Assisted Reproductive Technologies

2014 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave Snow
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Assisted Reproductive Technologies ◽  
Reproductive Technologies ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reproductive Autonomy ◽  
The Supreme Court

The Compensation of Wrongful Pregnancy in Québec Civil Law

1999 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Louise Langevin
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Child Rearing ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Reproductive Autonomy ◽  
Canadian Charter ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Cost

AbstractThe Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the right to reproductive autonomy for women based on the right to liberty protected by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Thus, it is a woman's choice whether to have children. It follows, therefore, that in the case of a violation of her reproductive autonomy, a woman has a right to compensation. It is in light of these principles that I analyze the wrongful pregnancy cases in Québec civil law. From a feminist analytical framework, I posit that Québec courts have effectively denied women the right to reproductive autonomy by awarding compensation for the cost of child-rearing only in cases where a difficult economic situation is evidenced by the parents. In so doing, the courts have not only refused to fully compensate women for the injuries caused to them, but they continue to reproduce the dominant pronatalist ideology in reproductive matters. This judicial reaction to cases of wrongful pregnancy is another example of the gendered dimension of law.

The concept of human dignity in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Canada on Charter Equality Rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Equality Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Additional Burden ◽  
The Impact

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada of February 28, 2020, on Nevsun v. Araya: a “quiet revolution” in the assessment of the status of corporations under public international law?

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
International Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
International Human

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.

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