Mapping and Visualization of Storm-Surge Dynamics for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean B. Gesch
Keyword(s):  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Storm Surge ◽  
Hurricane Rita

scholarly journals Hurricane Gustav (2008) Waves and Storm Surge: Hindcast, Synoptic Analysis, and Validation in Southern Louisiana

2011 ◽  
Vol 139 (8) ◽  
pp. 2488-2522 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. C. Dietrich ◽  
J. J. Westerink ◽  
A. B. Kennedy ◽  
J. M. Smith ◽  
R. E. Jensen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Gulf Of Mexico ◽  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Storm Surge ◽  
Unstructured Mesh ◽  
Wind Waves ◽  
Wave Model ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Research Division ◽  
Time Histories ◽  
Southern Louisiana

AbstractHurricane Gustav (2008) made landfall in southern Louisiana on 1 September 2008 with its eye never closer than 75 km to New Orleans, but its waves and storm surge threatened to flood the city. Easterly tropical-storm-strength winds impacted the region east of the Mississippi River for 12–15 h, allowing for early surge to develop up to 3.5 m there and enter the river and the city’s navigation canals. During landfall, winds shifted from easterly to southerly, resulting in late surge development and propagation over more than 70 km of marshes on the river’s west bank, over more than 40 km of Caernarvon marsh on the east bank, and into Lake Pontchartrain to the north. Wind waves with estimated significant heights of 15 m developed in the deep Gulf of Mexico but were reduced in size once they reached the continental shelf. The barrier islands further dissipated the waves, and locally generated seas existed behind these effective breaking zones.The hardening and innovative deployment of gauges since Hurricane Katrina (2005) resulted in a wealth of measured data for Gustav. A total of 39 wind wave time histories, 362 water level time histories, and 82 high water marks were available to describe the event. Computational models—including a structured-mesh deepwater wave model (WAM) and a nearshore steady-state wave (STWAVE) model, as well as an unstructured-mesh “simulating waves nearshore” (SWAN) wave model and an advanced circulation (ADCIRC) model—resolve the region with unprecedented levels of detail, with an unstructured mesh spacing of 100–200 m in the wave-breaking zones and 20–50 m in the small-scale channels. Data-assimilated winds were applied using NOAA’s Hurricane Research Division Wind Analysis System (H*Wind) and Interactive Objective Kinematic Analysis (IOKA) procedures. Wave and surge computations from these models are validated comprehensively at the measurement locations ranging from the deep Gulf of Mexico and along the coast to the rivers and floodplains of southern Louisiana and are described and quantified within the context of the evolution of the storm.

Mitigating Impacts of Natural Hazards on Fishery Ecosystems

2008 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Executive Director ◽  
Task Force ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Governing Board ◽  
State University ◽  
Program Administration ◽  
Hurricane Rita ◽  
Louisiana State University ◽  
Relief Program

<em>Abstract.</em>—Hurricane Katrina (landfall 29 August 2005) and Hurricane Rita (landfall 24 September 2005) devastated large portions of Louisiana and Mississippi and caused significant impacts to Alabama, Florida, and Texas. Immediately following these storms, the American Fisheries Society (AFS) established the AFS Hurricane Relief Task Force (HRTF). The HRTF was composed of AFS chapter officers from Louisiana and Mississippi as well as state and government agency personnel and university faculty and staff from the impacted region. Because essential members of the HRTF were dealing with personal, professional, and agency needs in the months immediately following these storms, a meeting of the HRTF could not be scheduled until 13 January 2006. This 1-d meeting, held on the campus of Louisiana State University, resulted in the drafting of the AFS Hurricane Relief Initiative Action Plan. During January–February 2006, the HRTF worked primarily through the organizational structure and leadership of the Louisiana and Mississippi chapters and coordinated these activities with the southern division of AFS (SDAFS), and the parent society’s officers, governing board, and executive director. The AFS Hurricane Relief Initiative Action Plan was approved and renamed the AFS Disaster Relief Program by the governing board during its midyear meeting in March 2006. In accordance with the approved program, administration and programmatic responsibility for the initiative were transferred from the HRTF to the SDAFS in June 2006, and funds to support the program were made available to the chapters through the SDAFS.

scholarly journals A Tsunami Ball Approach to Storm Surge and Inundation: Application to Hurricane Katrina, 2005

2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven N. Ward
Keyword(s):  
Finite Element ◽  
Finite Difference ◽  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Storm Surge ◽  
Volume Density ◽  
Momentum Equation ◽  
Cape Cod ◽  
Laptop Computer ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Advection Term

Most analyses of storm surge and inundation solve equations of continuity and momentum on fixed finite-difference/finite-element meshes. I develop a completely new approach that uses a momentum equation to accelerate bits or balls of water over variable depth topography. The thickness of the water column at any point equals the volume density of balls there. In addition to being more intuitive than traditional methods, the tsunami ball approach has several advantages. (a) By tracking water balls of fixed volume, the continuity equation is satisfied automatically and the advection term in the momentum equation becomes unnecessary. (b) The procedure is meshless in the finite-difference/finite-element sense. (c) Tsunami balls care little if they find themselves in the ocean or inundating land. (d) Tsunami ball calculations of storm surge can be done on a laptop computer. I demonstrate and calibrate the method by simulating storm surge and inundation around New Orleans, Louisiana caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and by comparing model predictions with field observations. To illustrate the flexibility of the tsunami ball technique, I run two “What If” hurricane scenarios—Katrina over Savannah, Georgia and Katrina over Cape Cod, Massachusetts.

Hurricane Katrina storm surge distribution and field observations on the Mississippi Barrier Islands

2007 ◽  
Vol 74 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 12-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hermann M. Fritz ◽  
Chris Blount ◽  
Robert Sokoloski ◽  
Justin Singleton ◽  
Andrew Fuggle ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Storm Surge ◽  
Barrier Islands ◽  
Field Observations

scholarly journals “Certain Death” from Storm Surge: A Comparative Study of Household Responses to Warnings about Hurricanes Rita and Ike

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hung-Lung Wei ◽  
Michael K. Lindell ◽  
Carla S. Prater
Keyword(s):  
Storm Surge ◽  
Similar Data ◽  
Jefferson County ◽  
Questionnaire Data ◽  
Hurricane Ike ◽  
Hurricane Rita ◽  
Warning Message ◽  
Show Evidence ◽  
Initial Source ◽  
Household Responses

Abstract This study examines the effect of an unusual “certain death” warning message on Galveston, Harris, and Jefferson County, Texas, residents’ expectations of storm surge damage and evacuation decisions during Hurricane Ike. The effect of this message was tested by comparing questionnaire data collected after Hurricane Ike to similar data collected 3 yr earlier after Hurricane Rita. If the certain death message had an effect, one would expect nonsignificant differences in perceptions of the two storms’ surge threats because the category 2 storm (Ike) had a surge that was more characteristic of a category 5 storm (Rita). However, the ratings of the storm surge threat for Ike were significantly lower than those for Rita in Galveston County—the point of landfall. Moreover, evacuation rates for Ike were consistently lower than those for Rita in all three counties, and there were no statistically significant differences between storms in the correlations of expected storm surge damage with evacuation decisions. In summary, these data fail to show evidence that the dramatic certain death warning increased expectations of surge threat and evacuation decisions. These findings underscore the need for those disseminating weather warnings to better understand how hurricane warnings flow from an initial source through intermediate links to the ultimate receivers as well as how these ultimate receivers receive, heed, interpret, and decide how to act upon those warnings.

Lessons from Hurricane Katrina Storm Surge on Bridges and Buildings

2007 ◽  
Vol 133 (6) ◽  
pp. 463-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian N. Robertson ◽  
H. Ronald Riggs ◽  
Solomon C. Yim ◽  
Yin Lu Young
Keyword(s):  
Hurricane Katrina ◽  
Storm Surge
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