Zabezpieczenia rzeczowe dotyczące spółdzielni w orzecznictwie sądowym – wybrane zagadnienia

2021 ◽  
Vol 4(165) ◽  
pp. 205-219
Author(s):  
Jacek Widło

The article presents the issue of securing cooperative claims against the background of selected judgments of the Supreme Court. Such claims may be secured by establishing a mortgage, a registered pledge or the transfer of ownership for security. A cooperative, especially a housing cooperative, may be a beneficiary of such securities as a creditor. The assets of a cooperative can also be encumbered. It is not possible to establish security on a real estate with an unclear legal status. Establishing a mortgage on a separate ownership of the premises for which a land and mortgage register cannot be established is excluded. In a case of a title transfer for security, it is crucial to contractually define the mechanism of clearance for the parties and the issue of the so-called oversecuring.

Author(s):  
Roy L. Brooks

This chapter lays the foundation for an understanding of the socio-legal race problem and possible solutions. It begins with the Supreme Court’s inglorious racial history in which the Court, from Dred Scott up to Brown v. Board of Education, engaged in a pattern and practice of sabotaging black equality granted by Congress. Racial oppression, including the torture and murder of blacks without trial, was part of a national narrative largely written by the Supreme Court. Brown was a conscious attempt by the Court to reverse its inglorious racial past. Brown had a profound effect on racial progress, changing the legal status of blacks which in turn greatly improved their socioeconomic and socio-cultural position in our society. But the Court, in the years following this landmark decision, did not remain faithful to the spirit of Brown. It began to impede black progress through its civil rights rulings by suppressing the black equality interest litigated in those cases. This is juridical subordination, which can be resolved if the Supreme Court remains faithful to the spirit of Brown. This is good social policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-257
Author(s):  
V. V. Chumak

The role and place of higher specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine have been studied and determined. The author has studied such main categories as “judicial system of Ukraine”, “judiciary”, “judicial system” and “judicial power”. The judicial system of Ukraine has been established. The normative and legal base of functioning of highest specialized courts of Ukraine has been characterized. The author has provided own definition of the categories “judicial system of Ukraine” and “judicial power of Ukraine”. The author has offered to understand the category of “judicial system of Ukraine” as the totality of all hierarchically structured elements of the system (courts), which are endowed with exclusive competence to administer justice, built on the principles of territoriality and specialization, are defined by law and united by general principles of their organization and activity. In turn, the concept of “judicial power of Ukraine” is defined as the activity of courts (judicial system) to administer justice and to perform their professional duties within the limits and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine in accordance with international and legal documents. It has been determined that highest specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine are the Supreme Court on Intellectual Property Issues and the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court. It has been concluded that highest specialized courts in the judicial system of Ukraine play an important role in the holistic mechanism of the entire judicial system, since they are endowed with exclusive competence to consider and decide cases on the merits of certain categories, and their activities are determined at the level of a separate regulatory act, which determines their legal status, and hence their place in the judicial system of Ukraine.


1993 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn Ann Farr

The criminalization of abortion in the United States began in the early 1800s and was nearly universal by the late 1800s. It was not until the middle of the 1900s that abortion reform gained momentum, culminating in 1973 in the Roe v. Wade decision that protected women's right to abortion. In this article it is argued that since Roe, litigation has been increasingly used to shape abortion policy. The rise of such litigation, as well as the kinds of issues and concerns raised by litigants, are described. The role played by the Supreme Court in changing the legal status of abortion is examined.


Author(s):  
Wendy A. Adams

SummaryThe distinction between formal and essential validity in Anglo-Canadian choice of law regarding marriage is an illogical bifurcation that unnecessarily invalidates same-sex relationships contracted in foreign jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently reformulated certain rules of private international law, taking into account both the constitutional and sub-constitutional imperatives inherent in a federal setting and the need for order and fairness when co-ordinating diversity in the face of increasing globalization. Reform of the choice of law rules regarding the validity of foreign marriages should proceed accordingly with the result being that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. No principled reason exists to deny recognition to same-sex relationships validly contracted in other jurisdictions, nor to differentiate between the rights and obligations arising from the legal status of same-sex and different-sex relationships.


Author(s):  
Hasir Budiman Ritonga

Judicial power in Indonesia under the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia shall be exercised by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. One of the authority of the Constitutional Court according to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is to decide the dissolution of political parties. The facts in the current Indonesian system of ketatanegaran no cases of political parties that were dissolved through the decision of the Constitutional Court, it's just that the problem is when the Constitutional Court uses its authority to break the dissolution of political parties there are things that are formal juridically there is no clear rules, such as the legal status of party members who are not directly involved in the violation committed by the party and the status of party members who hold the position of members of the legislature both at the center and in the regions. So for that must be resolved by emphasizing the certainty, justice and benefit in the decision of the constitutional court


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 82-100

The article studies the history of the origin and development of legal regulation of judicial law-making in Ukraine. The analysis of doctrinal ideas about judicial law- making, as well as the peculiarities of its formation in Ukraine, allowed us to emphasise that our scientific research is relevant because of: 1) the duration of the domestic judicial system and judicial reform, which dates back to the proclamation of Ukraine’s independence (1991) and continues to this day; 2) the ambiguity of the legal support for judicial law-making in Ukraine, the high level of its variability, and the uncertainty of the legal status of the subjects of judicial power in the mechanism of domestic law-making; 3) the doctrinal uncertainty of the place of judicial law-making in the domestic legal system, the ambiguity of its scientific perception, and the understanding of its function in the domestic mechanism of legal regulation. This paper analyses the provisions of the legislation of Ukraine in terms of legal support for forms and procedures of judicial law-making, the legal significance of judicial law-making acts, and their impact on administering justice in Ukraine. Particular attention is paid to the activities of the judiciary in the areas of law enforcement and law-making, the relationship and interaction of which requires strengthening in the current context of reforming the judicial system and the judiciary in Ukraine. The stages of development of the legal regulation of judicial law-making in Ukraine are revealed, the peculiarities of the legal support for judicial law-making are determined, and the content of the legal regulation of the mechanism of participation of the subjects of the judicial power of Ukraine in the national law-making is characterised. Analysis of the history of the legal regulation of judicial law-making in Ukraine and the current state of its legal provision allowed us to conclude that despite the scale of legislative changes in the legal support for the judicial system of Ukraine today, neither the Supreme Court, nor the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, nor any other court institution is recognised by the legislation of Ukraine as subjects of law-making. The legislation of Ukraine does not contain a clear definition of their status as the subject of law-making with the right to accept generally obligatory acts of this process. It is noted that such uncertainty significantly weakens both the legal support for the courts and their activities. At the same time, it is noted that as a result of the adoption of legislative acts within the judicial reform during 2014-2017, which are still in force today, the legislator has made a significant step towards recognising and consolidating the official status of judicial law-making, namely: 1) a number of legislative powers of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine were consolidated; 2) the legislative regulation of the stages of the law-making process by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has been strengthened; 3) the legal consolidation of the status of law-making acts of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has been improved.


2011 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-458
Author(s):  
Ólafur Ísberg Hannesson

AbstractIn October 2007, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court confirmed that the doctrines of direct effect and primacy could not be generated by the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement alone. Rather, the effects of non-implemented EEA provisions were to remain in the hands of the EFTA States. Hence, the relevant question is what weight should be accorded to such norms in domestic law? The Icelandic Supreme Court has yet to take a stance on the direct effect question relation to incorrectly or insufficiently transposed EEA law. The issue has, however, been addressed several times in connection with the European Convention on Human Rights, before its incorporation. In order to address the unclear legal status of EEA norms in Icelandic law, this contribution takes a closer look at the judicial attitude of the Supreme Court taken towards international law in general and the Convention in particular. The perceived differences between EEA law and the Convention have made it easy for observers to dismiss such comparison on the grounds that the two kinds of legal regime are not readily comparable. The article questions these apparent differences by pointing out that EEA law in fact shares all of the features of the Convention that led judges to enforce it in the Icelandic legal order.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-194
Author(s):  
Jarosław Adam Szczechowicz

The study discusses the issue of a contract of the rent-free use of agricultural land (Article 708 of the Civil Code 1964). Particular attention has been paid to the possibility of terminating the contract without notice period due to failure to settle the tax obligation. The admission of the provisions on the failure in paying rent to the contract for the rent-free use of arable land means that the lack of payment of taxes or other burdens related to the ownership of real estate, which is the equivalent of not paying the rent in the lease contract, authorizes the termination of this contract. The author shares the view formulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court that Article 703 of the Civil Code (1964) is a provision of a relatively binding nature. As a consequence, adopting the above position leads to the conclusion that the contract may be terminated even without the notice period if the parties to the contract have differently regulated the effects of delay in payment of these benefits than is stipulated in Article 703 (1964).


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