scholarly journals Keep America Christian (and White): Christian Nationalism, Fear of Ethnoracial Outsiders, and Intention to Vote for Donald Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Baker ◽  
Samuel Perry ◽  
Andrew L Whitehead
Keyword(s):  
African American ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Cultural Framework ◽  
Order Of Magnitude ◽  
Christian Nationalism

Some of the strongest predictors of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election were Christian nationalism and antipathy toward Muslims and immigrants. We examine the interrelated influence of these three factors on Americans’ intentions to vote for Trump in 2020. Consistent with previous research, Christian nationalism and Islamophobia remained strong and significant predictors of intention to vote for Trump; however, the effect of xenophobia was stronger. Further, xenophobia and Islamophobia significantly and substantially mediated the effects of Christian nationalism. Consequently, though Christian nationalism remains theoretically and empirically distinct as a cultural framework, its influence on intending to vote for Trump in 2020 is intimately connected to fears about ethnoracial outsiders. In the penultimate year before Trump’s reelection campaign, the strongest predictors of supporting Trump, in order of magnitude, were: political party, xenophobia, identifying as African American (negative), political ideology, Christian nationalism, and Islamophobia.

scholarly journals Keep America Christian (and White): Christian Nationalism, Fear of Ethnoracial Outsiders, and Intention to Vote for Donald Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election

2020 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 272-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph O Baker ◽  
Samuel L Perry ◽  
Andrew L Whitehead
Keyword(s):  
African American ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Cultural Framework ◽  
Order Of Magnitude ◽  
Christian Nationalism

Abstract Some of the strongest predictors of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election were Christian nationalism and antipathy toward Muslims and immigrants. We examine the interrelated influence of these three factors on Americans’ intentions to vote for Trump in 2020. Consistent with previous research, Christian nationalism and Islamophobia remained strong and significant predictors of intention to vote for Trump; however, the effect of xenophobia was stronger. Further, xenophobia and Islamophobia significantly and substantially mediated the effects of Christian nationalism. Consequently, though Christian nationalism remains theoretically and empirically distinct as a cultural framework, its influence on intending to vote for Trump in 2020 is intimately connected to fears about ethnoracial outsiders. In the penultimate year before Trump’s reelection campaign, the strongest predictors of supporting Trump, in order of magnitude, were political party, xenophobia, identifying as African American (negative), political ideology, Christian nationalism, and Islamophobia.

It’s their fault: Partisan attribution bias and its association with voting intentions

2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022199008
Author(s):  
Ethan Zell ◽  
Christopher A. Stockus ◽  
Michael J. Bernstein
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Positive Outcomes ◽  
Opposing Party ◽  
Registered Voters ◽  
Attribution Bias ◽  
Democrats And Republicans ◽  
Voting Intentions

This research examined how people explain major outcomes of political consequence (e.g., economic growth, rising inequality). We argue that people attribute positive outcomes more and negative outcomes less to their own political party than to an opposing party. We conducted two studies, one before the 2016 U.S. presidential election ( N = 244) and another before the 2020 election ( N = 249 registered voters), that examined attributions across a wide array of outcomes. As predicted, a robust partisan attribution bias emerged in both studies. Although the bias was largely equivalent among Democrats and Republicans, it was magnified among those with more extreme political ideology. Further, the bias predicted unique variance in voting intentions and significantly mediated the link between political ideology and voting. In sum, these data suggest that partisan allegiances systemically bias attributions in a group-favoring direction. We discuss implications of these findings for emerging research on political social cognition.

scholarly journals Political Ideology, Trust, and Cooperation

2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 797-818 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Balliet ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur ◽  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Christian Antonellis ◽  
Paul A. M. Van Lange
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Group Versus ◽  
Party Affiliation ◽  
Two Samples ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Us Presidential Election ◽  
Political Party Affiliation

Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before ( n = 362) and after ( n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners’ outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis ( r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups.

scholarly journals Social Media for Political Campaigns: An Examination of Trump’s and Clinton’s Frame Building and Its Effect on Audience Engagement

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205630511985514 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdulsamad Sahly ◽  
Chun Shao ◽  
K. Hazel Kwon
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Political Campaigns ◽  
Hillary Clinton ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Audience Engagement ◽  
Frame Effect ◽  
Frame Building ◽  
Cross Platform

This study investigates cross-platform differences in social media by analyzing the contending candidates who represent different political ideology during the 2016 presidential election. Borrowing the frame-building and frame-effect perspectives, it examines the ways in which the two contending candidates (Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton) built their message frames in two different social platforms—Twitter ( N = 3,805) and Facebook ( N = 655)—and how the frame differences affected audience engagement in each platform. The results showed that Trump’s messages presented more variety in frame selection than Clinton’s, focusing on conflict and negative emotional frames on Twitter while displaying frequent positive emotional frames on Facebook. Clinton’s strategy relied heavily on conflict and positive emotional frames on both Twitter and Facebook. The results also suggested that for both Trump and Clinton followers on Twitter, conflict and morality frames consistently attracted retweeting behaviors and emotional frames attracted favoriting behaviors. However, Facebook engagement behaviors did not show a consistent pattern between the followers of the two candidates.

scholarly journals Analysis of Facebook Meme Groups Used During the 2016 US Presidential Election

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 205630511880879 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mia Moody-Ramirez ◽  
Andrew B Church
Keyword(s):  
Facial Expressions ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Hillary Clinton ◽  
Group Setting ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Political Ideas ◽  
Us Presidential Election ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Facebook Pages

Using content analysis, this study examines how citizens may use memes to share grassroots political ideas in a social media group setting during elections. Specifically, it offers a glimpse at the types of meme-related Facebook pages that emerged during the 2016 presidential election with an emphasis on representations of the two front-runner candidates—Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Generally, Facebook-meme pages and profile photos of both candidates were negative in tone with Trump more likely to be framed in terms of his hairstyle and facial expressions and Clinton in terms of the email scandal and her relationships with people. Political party and gender differences between these two candidates contributed to variations in representations. Study findings are important as they offer a look at grassroots use of memes during a major election and provide a general overview of Facebook user depictions of the two politicians.

scholarly journals Sexual Disgust Trumps Pathogen Disgust in Predicting Voter Behavior During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 147470491876417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Billingsley ◽  
Debra Lieberman ◽  
Joshua M. Tybur
Keyword(s):  
Political Party ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
Voter Behavior ◽  
Party Affiliation ◽  
Disgust Sensitivity ◽  
Sexual Disgust ◽  
Political Party Affiliation

Why is disgust sensitivity associated with socially conservative political views? Is it because socially conservative ideologies mitigate the risks of infectious disease, whether by promoting out-group avoidance or by reinforcing norms that sustain antipathogenic practices? Or might it be because socially conservative ideologies promote moral standards that advance a long-term, as opposed to a short-term, sexual strategy? Recent attempts to test these two explanations have yielded differing results and conflicting interpretations. Here, we contribute to the literature by examining the relationship between disgust sensitivity and political orientation, political party affiliation, and an often overlooked outcome—actual voter behavior. We focus on voter behavior and affiliation for the 2016 U.S. presidential election to determine whether pathogen or sexual disgust better predicts socially conservative ideology. Although many prominent aspects of Donald Trump’s campaign—particularly his anti-foreign message—align with the pathogen-avoidance model of conservatism, we found that pathogen-related disgust sensitivity exerted no influence on political ideology, political party affiliation, or voter behavior, after controlling for sexual disgust sensitivity. In contrast, sexual disgust sensitivity was associated with increased odds of voting for Donald Trump versus each other major presidential candidate, as well as with increased odds of affiliating with the Republican versus the Democratic or Libertarian parties. In fact, for every unit increase in sexual disgust sensitivity, the odds of a participant voting for Trump versus Clinton increased by approximately 30%. It seems, then, that sexual disgust trumps pathogen disgust in predicting socially conservative voting behavior.

scholarly journals TRUMP, CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM, AND ISSUE POLARIZATION: THE ATTITUDES AND ACTIVISM OF IOWA CLERGY IN THE 2020 CAUCUSES

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-349
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Political Activism ◽  
Racial Justice ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Presidential Nomination ◽  
Catholic Clergy ◽  
General Elections ◽  
Candidate Support ◽  
Christian Nationalism

Prior research has investigated the differences between evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, and Catholic clergy in American general elections. We know less about attitudes and activism of clergy in presidential nomination campaigns. This research highlights results from a survey of 480 clergy on candidate support, issues, and political activism in the 2020 Iowa caucuses. A strong Iowa caucus showing often fuels momentum for candidates in the rest of the nomination race, as with Barack Obama in 2008. This 2020 survey covers issues such as immigration, racial justice, health care, and more. I also explore how Iowa clergy think about political activism and views on Christian nationalism. I find that most Democratic-leaning clergy supported center-left candidates in Iowa in 2020. Among Iowa clergy of all parties (including independents), most disapproved of the job Donald Trump was doing as President. A comparison with a 2012 survey reveals increasing polarization of the three clergy groups on political ideology, church-state issues, and racial justice.

Engendering support: Hostile sexism predicts voting for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 U.S. presidential election

2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 578-593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kate A. Ratliff ◽  
Liz Redford ◽  
John Conway ◽  
Colin Tucker Smith
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Minority Group ◽  
The United States ◽  
Benevolent Sexism ◽  
Hostile Sexism ◽  
Hillary Clinton ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Positive Attitudes

This research investigated the role of gender attitudes in the United States 2016 presidential election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. The results of three studies (combined N = 2,816) showed that, as expected, Trump voters were higher in hostile and benevolent sexism than were Clinton voters. Even after controlling for political ideology and gender (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and minority group attitudes (Study 3), greater hostile sexism predicted more positive attitudes toward Trump, less positive attitudes toward Clinton, and retrospective reports of having voted for Trump over Clinton (Studies 2 and 3). Benevolent sexism did not predict additional variation in voting behavior beyond political ideology and hostile sexism. These results suggest that political behavior is based on more than political ideology; even among those with otherwise progressive views, overtly antagonistic views of women could be a liability to women—and an asset to men—running for office.

scholarly journals Make America Christian Again: Christian Nationalism and Voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential Election

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L Whitehead ◽  
Samuel Perry ◽  
Joseph O. Baker
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Political Identity ◽  
The United States ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
2016 Election ◽  
National Probability Sample ◽  
Christian Nationalism ◽  
Political Actions

Why did Americans vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election? Social scientists have proposed a variety of explanations, including economic dissatisfaction, sexism, racism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia. The current study establishes that, independent of these influences, voting for Trump was, at least for many Americans, a symbolic defense of the United States’ perceived Christian heritage. Data from a national probability sample of Americans surveyed soon after the 2016 election shows that greater adherence to Christian nationalist ideology was a robust predictor of voting for Trump, even after controlling for economic dissatisfaction, sexism, anti-black prejudice, anti-Muslim refugee attitudes, and anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as measures of religion, sociodemographics, and political identity more generally. These findings indicate that Christian nationalist ideology—although correlated with a variety of class-based, sexist, racist, and ethnocentric views—is not synonymous with, reducible to, or strictly epiphenomenal of such views. Rather, Christian nationalism operates as a unique and independent ideology that can influence political actions by calling forth a defense of mythological narratives about America’s distinctively Christian heritage and future.

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