scholarly journals Individual Accountability in International Economy Policymaking after the Global Financial Crisis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Pagliari ◽  
Iosif Kovras

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the design of accountability mechanisms has taken on renewed importance in academic and policy debates. Calls for holding individuals whose actions and omissions contributed to the meltdown accountable have gained traction in a number of countries after the crisis. Yet, individual accountability norms are seemingly absent from the international economic agenda in response to crisis. In this paper we address this puzzle by exploring the evolution of two major international organisations, the IMF and the FSB, in bringing accountability following financial crises. Our analysis reveals how these institutions have increasingly incorporated in their toolkit policy recommendations related to the unethical or illegal conduct by government officials of individuals in the financial industry, but these tools were geared almost exclusively towards forward-looking policies designed to deter the reoccurrence of illegal or unethical behavior rather than punishing or scrutinizing past wrongdoing. We argue that the extent to which individual accountability norms permeate the international economic agenda is mediated by the institutional characteristics of the organizations that comprise the international financial regime.

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Najeeb Zada ◽  
Ahcene Lahsasna ◽  
Muhammad Yusuf Saleem

The recent financial crisis resulted destructive effects on finance industry. Islamic financial industry (IFI) is still naïve and largely untested in the face of a major financial turmoil. Major issues and uncertainties of the insolvency of IFI include the issue of moral hazard, government bailouts, excessive risk taking and deposit insurance. This paper addresses the issue of crisis management in IFI from the perspective of al-Siyasah al-Shar’iyyah and attempts to derive public policy guidelines that are useful in developing a timely and efficient crises management framework for Islamic finance industry. By using qualitative methods, the study found that the global financial crisis resulted in great destruction of financial institution. Although Islamic finance was quite immune to the global crisis as compared to its conventional peer, concerns still exist. It is time that Islamic finance industry learns from the financial woes of the rest of the world. =========================================== Krisis keuangan baru-baru ini mengakibatkan efek destruktif pada industri keuangan. Industri keuangan Islam (IKI) masih naif dan sebagian besar belum teruji dalam menghadapi gejolak keuangan besar. Isu utama dan ketidakpastian dari kebangkrutan IKI meliputi moral hazard, dana talangan pemerintah, pengambilan risiko yang berlebihan dan asuransi deposito. Makalah ini membahas isu manajemen krisis dalam IKI dari perspektif al-Siyasah al-Shar'iyyah dan berusaha mendapatkan pedoman kebijakan publik yang bermanfaat dalam mengembangkan kerangka kerja manajemen krisis yang tepat waktu dan efisien bagi IKI. Dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif, studi ini menemukan bahwa krisis keuangan global mengakibatkan kehancuran besar bagi industri keuangan. Meskipun keuangan Islam cukup kebal terhadap krisis global dibandingkan dengan keuangan konvensional, kekhawatiran masih ada. Sudah saatnya industri keuangan Islam belajar dari krisis keuangan dari seluruh dunia.


Criminology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Rex ◽  
Spencer Headworth

No senior Wall Street executives were imprisoned for actions that contributed to the global financial crisis. The few criminal prosecutions for management were reserved for executives at small and regional financial firms. This stands in stark contrast to the approximately 1,000 executives jailed after the 1989 savings and loan crisis. It also runs counter to public support for criminal accountability post-crisis as well as the general trend toward criminal social control in the United States. Likewise, few firms faced criminal prosecution. Instead, the primary punishment resulted from civil penalties leveled against individuals and firms, with most of the largest banks paying billions in fines to regulatory agencies and in restitution to victims. Now that the five- or ten-year statute of limitations for the criminal fraud statutes most relevant to questionable pre-crisis behavior has passed, and the political salience and public outcry over financial misdeeds has subsided, the window of opportunity for criminal accountability is closed. Still, the lack of accountability raises important questions for financial regulation, the state of prosecution for white-collar crime, the nature of financial industry influence over politics, and the broader health of US democracy. What role did Wall Street, and the broader financial services industry, play in bringing about the crisis? What behaviors, if any, crossed the line from legitimate business activity intro criminal behavior? Is that distinction easily drawn? And if actors did behave criminally, why did state and/or federal prosecutors not pursue criminal charges more aggressively? What can be learned from countries that used criminal prosecutions more successfully? Even if criminal behavior occurred, is strong prosecution the appropriate remedy to deter future crime and prevent another financial crisis? There is substantial agreement that financial industry behavior contributed to, and amplified the severity of, the crisis. There is, however, much less agreement about whether white-collar crime occurred; if it did, why it went unpunished; and whether criminal punishment is the proper response on moral or practical grounds. The historical and political context for how white-collar crime was (re)framed, how this framing contributed to the deregulation of the financial industry, and the rise of its political power explain how the Wall Street’s behavior was understood, rationalized, and left largely unpunished.


2010 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rae Cooper

While the sphere of industrial relations was overshadowed by the global financial crisis, 2009 was a year of immense change in the regulation of work and workplaces. Many provisions of the Rudd government’s Fair Work Act 2009, including the new collective bargaining regime, came into effect. Unions and employer organizations were preoccupied with the monumental process of award modernization throughout 2009. The AIRC has ceased to exist and it, along with a number of other regulatory bodies, has been subsumed into the new institution Fair Work Australia. The remaining key provisions of the Fair Work Act 2009, including the NES and modern awards, are effective on January 1 2010. This article analyses the early days of the operation of this ‘new’ Australian industrial relations.


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