scholarly journals Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch

Author(s):  
Trevor W. Morrison

106 Columbia Law Review (2006) When executive branch actors interpret statutes, should they use the same methods as the courts? This Article takes up the question by considering a rule frequently invoked by the courts-the canon of constitutional avoidance. In addition to being a cardinal principle of judicial statutory interpretation, the avoidance canon also appears regularly and prominently in the work of the executive branch. It has played a central role, for example, in some of the most hotly debated episodes of executive branch statutory interpretation in the "war on terror." Typically, executive invocations of avoidance are supported by citation to one or more Supreme Court cases. Yet those citations are rarely accompanied by any discussion of the values courts try to serve when they employ avoidance. Are those values specific to the federal judiciary, or do they reflect substantive commitments extending beyond the courts? Equally lacking is any sustained consideration of interpretive context. Does their particular institutional location and function enable executive actors to call upon sources of statutory meaning that are unavailable to courts, rendering rough tools like the avoidance canon unnecessary?This Article explores executive use of the avoidance canon along both these dimensions. As to theoretical justification, Professor Morrison shows that whether constitutional avoidance is appropriate in the executive branch turns on whether one accepts the conventional account of the canon, which sees it as serving values specific to the federal judiciary, or an alternative account, which views it as serving a set of broader norms not confined to the courts. As to interpretive context, Professor Morrison shows that because executive officials often have better access to and knowledge of statutory purpose than do the courts, some facially ambiguous texts may in fact be entirely unambiguous to the executive interpreter. In those circumstances, the avoidance canon has no role to play.

Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

This concluding chapter concedes that, in many of the areas considered, on certain issues the federal judiciary has already proceeded perilously far in the wrong direction. Justice Jackson's opinion in Youngstown helps explain why, citing the distinct advantages of the executive in particular in asserting foreign affairs powers in a dangerous world, especially given a subservient legislative branch. The executive's advantages, moreover, may be even more ominously robust than Jackson supposed, and not just because of the nature of modern international relations. The combination of aggressive executive and supine Congress has for some time reached into the composition of the Supreme Court itself. Typical among recent appointments are candidates with executive branch experience and an ensuing commitment to judicial deference to the president, especially in foreign affairs.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-364
Author(s):  
Logan Dancey ◽  
Kjersten Nelson ◽  
Eve M. Ringsmuth ◽  
Emma Solomon

Judicial confirmation hearings offer a rare opportunity for senators to engage in a public exchange with current and future members of the federal judiciary. Below the Supreme Court level, however, we know relatively little about how members of the Judiciary Committee use these hearings. In this article, we examine senator mentions of Supreme Court cases at circuit court confirmation hearings between 1993 and 2012 to test whether these hearings serve as a venue for position-taking, as well as for interbranch dialogue. We find evidence that senators do reference decisions in ways that seem motivated by electoral considerations. However, we also find that hearings are frequently used as a forum for interbranch dialogue over Supreme Court cases. When used in this fashion, the dialogue is often focused on cases that challenge congressional power. The results suggest that confirmation hearings are an underappreciated venue for interbranch conversations.


1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Bulzomi ◽  
Robert M. Dunn
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Scott Burris ◽  
Micah L. Berman ◽  
Matthew Penn, and ◽  
Tara Ramanathan Holiday

This chapter describes “due process,” a Constitutional restriction on governmental actions that impact individuals, in the context of public health. It outlines the doctrines of procedural and substantive due process, including the legal tests that courts apply to decide whether individuals’ due process rights have been violated. It uses examples from Supreme Court cases that have defined due process in the context of public health, including those that struggle to define the scope of reproductive rights. It also examines two cases where public health principles were raised as a justification for governmental action: one about involuntary sterilization and one about Ebola. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the “state action doctrine” that defines which public health actors may be challenged on due process grounds.


2021 ◽  
pp. 192536212110325
Author(s):  
Victor W. Weedn

Background: The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause gives defendants a right to confront their accusers. Method: U.S. Supreme Court cases that interpreted this right as applied to forensic scientists were reviewed. Results: Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams examined constitutional rights to confront forensic scientists. Lower courts have specifically examined their application to forensic pathology. Whether autopsy reports are considered “testimonial” varies among jurisdictions and has not been definitively settled. Defendants are generally able to compel testimony of forensic pathologists. Where the forensic pathologist is truly unavailable, the surrogate expert should be in a position to render an independent opinion.


2010 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 377-406
Author(s):  
Stephen Wood ◽  
Mary Anne Wood ◽  
Stephen Wood ◽  
Rachel Asbury

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