scholarly journals Legalized Rent-Seeking: Eminent Domain in Kazakhstan

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Hanson

Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 50 : No. 1 , Article 2Kazakhstan ranks consistently low on measures of property rights protection and the rule of law more generally.1 Echoing these evaluations, existing literature emphasizes the degree to which informal institutions shape property relations in personalist, authoritarian regimes, like Kazakhstan. The expectation is that formal institutions like law and courts fail to restrain or otherwise influence state agents’ rent-seeking behavior. In effect, they serve primarily as ornamentation. Regardless, these explanations fail to explain why both citizens and the State regularly turn to these institutions to settle property disputes. This Article focuses on conflicts over eminent domain and finds that in these cases the law provides lower and upper bounds for officials’ rent-seeking behavior. Within these limits, law combines with informal practices to determine legal outcomes. Although the law and courts sometimes provide citizens with opportunities for limited redress, they also help facilitate and legitimize officials’ use of eminent domain for personal enrichment.

Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

This chapter argues for a reinvigorated role of the market access doctrine and references a number of important antitrust and intellectual property law decisions in which courts have given priority to market access. It finds a novel function for market access to play within antitrust and intellectual property law liability: courts that grant plaintiffs access to a defendant’s production output should refer to a three-step test under which they inquire (1) whether the inventor, through first-mover advantages, has reaped a sufficient reward such that contractual or intellectual property rights protection would no longer be required to facilitate innovation, (2) whether competitors were able to challenge the proprietary platform’s position in the market without the possibility of granting access, and (3) whether competitors seeking to benefit from market access will make use of it to facilitate the introduction of new goods rather than merely to copy the initial invention.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tong Chu ◽  
Yu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Wang

Based on the oligopoly game theory and the intellectual property rights protection policy, we investigate the complex dynamical behaviors of a mixed duopoly game with quadratic cost. In the new system, a few parameters are improved by considering intellectual property rights protection and the stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium point are discussed in detail. A set of the two-dimensional bifurcation diagrams is demonstrated by using numerical modeling, and these diagrams show abundant complex dynamical behaviors, such as coexistence of attractors, different bifurcation, and fractal structures. These dynamical properties can present the long-run effects of strengthening intellectual property protection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Guanghua Yu

AbstractThis article examines the evolution of democratic practice in Brazil. The article begins with a discussion on the country’s performance in terms of social equality, violence, and weak economy after the consolidation of democracy in 1985. Based on historical evidence, the article offers explanations concerning the weak performance in Brazil. The case of Brazil provides a challenge to the theory of open access order of North and his colleagues in the sense that open access to political organizations and activities does not necessarily lead to either better political representation or better economic performance. The case of Brazil also shows that open access to economic organizations and activities in the absence of the necessary institutions in the areas of property rights protection and contract enforcement, the financial market, the rule of law, and human resources accumulation does not lead to long-term economic growth.


Public Choice ◽  
1985 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Corcoran ◽  
Gordon V. Karels

1918 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 162
Author(s):  
W. C. J. ◽  
Philip Nichols
Keyword(s):  

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