scholarly journals Social and Economic Rights in the German Basic Law? An Analysis with Respect to Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 190
Author(s):  
Christoph Enders

The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany did originally not provide for social or economic rights understood as claims to benefits. The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) did, indeed, recognise the states obligation to protect individuals against assault by others (right to security) and further ruled that everyone has the right to use facilities provided by the state under equal conditions (right to participation). These rights, however, aim to ensure that the state uses existing means as intended. In addition, the FCC by now has recognised a “right to the guarantee of a dignified minimum subsistence”. It is an original entitlement as the state is obliged to create and provide benefits for individuals in need. This new legal construction, however, misconceives the division of responsibilities between the FCC and the legislator and collides with the principle of the separation of powers

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 2081-2094
Author(s):  
Peter E. Quint

Without much doubt, the two great pillars of American scholarship on the German Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court are (in the order of first appearance) Donald Kommers's monumental casebook, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany and David Currie's magisterial treatise, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Professor Kommers's comprehensive work was a milestone in a long career that has been very substantially devoted to the study of German constitutional law. In the late 1960s, Kommers spent a research year at the German Constitutional Court and, drawing in part on personal interviews with the justices, he published the first major work in English on that court. Since then, Kommers has produced a steady stream of significant works on German constitutional law.


Author(s):  
Nadezhda G. Geymbukh ◽  

Representatives of German state (constitutional) law define political extremism as "a set of political beliefs and aspirations... which are aimed at denying the democratic constitutional state and its fundamental values". Based on the definition, the criterion for recognising any "political belief or aspiration" as extremist is the notion of a democratic constitutional state. In line with this, the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has given an expansive interpretation of a "free democratic state" that "constitutes a legal state order whose basis is the self-determination of the people according to the will of the majority, freedom and equality. It excludes all forms of despotism or arbitrariness. Among the basic principles of this order are at least: the protection of human rights as laid down in the Basic Law of Germany, the sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers, the responsibility of the government, the legitimacy of government, the independence of the judiciary and the principle of multi-partyism. According to article 21, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), political parties that "endeavour to harm or destroy the foundation of the free demo-cratic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany" are declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. The possibility to ban political parties as provided for in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany guarantees the development of a democratic political system of the state. It is worth emphasising that the stability and democratism of the German political system and the stability of the constitutional order in the state depend not only on the prohibition provision in the Basic Law of the FRG, but above all on the ability of political parties to reach agreement on the basic principles of a "free democratic state system" and to implement these principles in the minds of the people. To realise these goals, Germany has the Federal Office for the Protection of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949, a public authority whose task is to control and supervise the legality of the activities of political parties. The forms of extremism in the Federal Republic of Germany are "left-wing extremism" and "right-wing extremism". In right-wing extremism, the older generation is gradually being freed from the aggressive youth, in an increased willingness to use force. Left-wing extremism has become less focused on global global themes - it has become more local and regional, more relatable and at the same time integrated. Because of the new nature of the development of extremism in a united Germany a left-right antagonism has emerged. At the same time, different tendencies of West and East Germany can be observed: in West Germany the struggle "left vs. right" prevails, in East Germany the struggle "right vs. left" prevails.


Author(s):  
Christian Starck

Duties of protection are duties of the state to protect certain legal interests of its citizens. They cover the interests of life, health, freedom and property and also protect some other interests and certain constitutionally recognised institutions. State duties of protection must be considered in connection with fundamental rights. The foundations of modern constitutionalism and attendant procedures are essential to develop guidelines for a constructive critique of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. This is done with reference to the recent history of France, Germany and England. The historical excursus reveals that a single theory underlies the variety of constitutional states. The development of the constitutional state gave rise to the significance of the preservation of freedom through the maintenance of law and the separation of powers. This has given rise to various legal devices, based also in part on experience with moderate rule and earlier theories of the imperium limitatum.A textual analysis of the German Basic Law is undertaken to determine whether and how the duties of protection are expressly created. Furthermore, the duties that have been discovered in the Basic Law by the Federal Constitutional Court are considered. These duties include the protection of human life and health, personal freedom, the right to autonomous development of one's personality, freedom of science, research and teaching, marriage and the family, children, mothers, professional freedom, property and the protection of German nationals against foreign states. Finally the justification of such duties and the constitutional control of the manner of protection are considered.In a final section a critique of relevant constitutional jurisprudence is undertaken. It is argued that claims to protection cannot be directly binding law. They presuppose legislation. If statutory protection is connected with infringements of third-party fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality can be adopted to test whether the protection is effective. Insofar as protection can be achieved without infringements of rights, one must attempt to test the effectiveness of protection by some other means. Where the legislature omits to protect at all, the court should limit itself to establishing the existence of a duty and to querying its non-fulfilment. The Court may not pass protective regulations or impose a duty to pass specific regulations. Where general statutory norms apply, protective duties can be realised through the socalled indirect third-party effect of fundamental rights. In its reaching its decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court is responsible for preserving the political discretion of the legislature in protecting interests and remembering the structural distinction between "hard" defensive rights and "soft" protective duties in order to prevent the erosion of the directly binding nature of defensive rights.


Author(s):  
Nadezhda G. Geymbukh ◽  

With the split of Germany in the Western Länder, the constitutional process of framing the new political and legal reality in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949 begins. In considering and discussing the draft Basic Law of the FRG, the Parliamentary Council chose the term "basic law" instead of "constitution". The choice of this expression was intended to emphasise that the task of the Parliamentary Council was not to create a legal regime for the whole of the united German state, but only for a particular part of it, which consisted of the eleven Western states. In line with this, the German statesman G. Peters pointed out that it was the title "Basic Law" which was intended to express the will of the German Länder not to create any new "Western German State", but "to construct only something temporary and territorially limited until such time as the Federal Republic of Germany". Thus, the notion of the Basic Law was intended to denote not a part, but a general arrangement of state life; not a permanent and durable, but a temporary order in the western part of Germany. This attribute also explains the differences with the concept of the constitution. The preamble to the Basic Law contains the fundamental ideas of German unity and is the basis for its interpretation in the spirit of its founders. As the main aim of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany the preamble indicates the need to safeguard the national and state unity of the German people. It seeks to establish a new free democratic state order. The legal basis for the unification of Germany was laid down in Article 23 of the Basic Law. This article, which listed the states of the FRG, stipulated that "in the remaining parts of Germany, the Basic Law shall take effect upon their accession". Consequently, according to this article, other parts of Germany could join the Federal Republic of Germany. The Basic Law of the FRG enshrined the idea of the formal constitutionality of German unification. Article 146 stipulated that a new constitution, adopted by "the free decision of the German people," was to be drawn up. The option of unification of Germany under Article 23 was envisaged by the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany equally with the possibility of unification under Article 146 of the Basic Law. This is confirmed by the position taken by the Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 31 July 1973: "A provision of Article 23 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany has a constitutional legal value of its own and is one of the essential precepts of the Basic Law. Therefore, the FRG is obliged, as soon as the legal possi-bility for the accession of the 'remaining parts' of Germany arises, to do everything necessary to bring about the unity of Germany. Thus, the constitutional and legal basis for the unification of Germany was laid down in the Basic Law of the FRG of 1949. Democracy and freedom in a Western-oriented environ-ment became the priority in the Federal Republic of Germany. The idea of the unity of the country, however, was not discarded and remained one of the leading objectives of the state in the Basic Law. The main guarantor of unification was the preamble, which stated the aim of achieving unity of the country, while Art 16, Art 23, Art 116, Art 146 set out the legal mecha-nisms for the future unification of Germany.


2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Müller ◽  
Tobias Richter

TheBundesverfassungsgericht(Federal Constitutional Court) is a constitutional body charged with the task of ensuring that all state institutions, i.e. the legislator as well as the judiciary and executive branches, obey the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Its review standard is theGrundgesetz(Basic Law). Since its foundation in 1951, the Court has helped to secure respect and effectiveness for the free democratic constitutional order. The decisions have far-reaching repercussions, which becomes particularly clear when the Court declares a law unconstitutional. Given the large number of cases handed down every year – at present nearly 5,000 constitutional complaints come before the Federal Constitutional Court annually – it is nearly impossible to give a representative summary of the comprehensive case law. Therefore, the report will concentrate on a selection of four decisions that have drawn the most attention over the course of the years 2005 and 2006.


Author(s):  
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ◽  
Mirjam Künkler ◽  
Tine Stein

In this article Böckenförde contrasts his concept of open encompassing neutrality (found in most Scandinavian countries and in Germany) with that of distancing neutrality, as practised in France. While the latter champions negative religious freedom, open encompassing neutrality aims for a balancing of negative and positive religious freedom. Religious freedom for Böckenförde is multidimensional and includes the right to have (or not) a religious faith (freedom of belief), to affirm (or not) this faith privately and openly (freedom to profess), to exercise (or not) one’s religion publicly (freedom of worship), and to join together (or not) in religious communities (religious freedom of association). The correlate to these individual and group rights is the open and overarching principle of the state’s neutrality towards religion and other worldviews, entailing a prohibition on the state justifying law on religious grounds. Furthermore, it requires the state not to privilege religion over non-religion and one religious faith over another. Siding with the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (at a time when he was not a sitting judge), Böckenförde underlines that even religious communities who reject the democratic state have the right to be recognized and legally protected. What matters is not whether communities accept or reject the state, but whether they obey or violate its laws. This was the court’s view on the Jehovah’s Witnesses, and it must also be applied, Böckenförde writes, to religious fundamentalists who do not accept the secular order, as long as they do not violate any laws.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Röben

The Untersuchungsausschuss-Fall (Parliamentary Committee Case) 2 BvE 2/01, decided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) on 8 April 2002, concerns the so-called right of enquête, a central function of Parliament under the parliamentary system designed by the German Basic Law. The right of enquête, the investigation by Parliament by taking evidence complete with the subpoena powers normally reserved to criminal investigations, has been an integral part of both the Weimar and the Bonn Constitutions. Max Weber, in the era of the Bismarck-Constitution for the German state founded in 1871, made a forceful pitch for the equality of the Parliament and Executive. He argued that members of Parliament needed to be professionals and to have full access to the information that, traditionally, was the source of power of the executive. Instituting committees of investigation with the power to take evidence was the means to do so. In fact, Weber went further, arguing that the right to call for an investigative parliamentary committee needed to be vested in a (qualified) minority of the members of Parliament. There is no equivalent of this specific aspect in the other European parliamentary systems. Article 34 of the Weimar Constitution provided that one fifth of the members of Parliament could ask for the institution of a committee of investigation. The same quorum had the right to move for the hearing of specific evidence by the committee.


Author(s):  
Shu-Perng Hwang

This article critically approaches the recent decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court regarding the ban on strikes for civil servants. It shows that the judgment cannot be seen as a decision committed to international public law, as some scholars suggest. By once more adopting a material understanding of Art. 33 para. 5 Basic Law and thereby not only confirming the constitutionality, but in particular the constitutional status of the ban on strikes for civil servants, the court holds on to the absolute primacy of the Basic Law that is not to be undermined by the ECHR or the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as a means of interpretation. The reference to the need to contextualize the jurisprudence of the ECtHR as well as the emphasis on the national particularity of the Federal Republic of Germany clearly indicate that, by developing a state-centred principle of commitment to public international law, the court does not seek to align and harmonize the requirements of the ECHR and the Basic Law by developing a state-centred principle of commitment to public international law but rather to achieve a delimitation of competences between the spheres of the ECtHR and the Federal Constitutional Court.


Author(s):  
O. Kosilova

The article examines the problem of restriction of political rights and freedoms. It is emphasized that the protection against unlawful restrictions on political rights and freedoms is particularly important for the functioning of direct and mediatory democracy. The meaning of the concept of «restriction of rights and freedoms» is analyzed. The article addresses the basic principles which should not be violated when the restriction of rights and freedoms is applied. To achieve this goal, the author analyzes the rules of domestic law, the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the rules of international law governing these issues. The author differentiates political rights and freedoms into those that may be restricted in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law of Ukraine and those that are not subject to any restrictions; features of realization of political rights and freedoms in comparison with other groups of rights, such as social and economic, cultural are defined. Some of the political rights and freedoms that may be restricted are analyzed and ways to restrict them are identified, in particular: the right to join political parties, suffrage, the right to peaceful assembly, rallies, marches and demonstrations, the right to equal access to public service, freedom words, thoughts, views and beliefs. It is noted that from the standpoint of the ECHR it is important to check whether the possibility of restricting the exercise of the right was provided by law; whether the purpose of such a restriction is legitimate; whether such a restriction is necessary in a democratic society. The legitimate grounds for restricting human rights enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine have been identified: public health; social necessity; rights, freedoms and dignity of citizens; public order; economic well-being; national security; territorial integrity; morality of the population. It is emphasized that in accordance with the practice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, the restriction of the content and scope of rights and freedoms should be considered as a restriction. It is important that all restrictions were established exclusively by the constitution; were not arbitrary and unjust; the law restricting human rights must be of a general nature; restrictions must be proportionate and justified; they must optimally achieve a legitimate goal with minimal interference in the exercise of rights or freedoms, not to violate the essential content of the relevant right. It is determined that special qualification requirements for holding public positions, as well as participation in the electoral process (implementation of active and passive suffrage) cannot be considered restrictions. It is emphasized that the state, represented by its organs, should refrain from unjustified interference with political rights (for example, from discriminatory restrictions on the suspension of political rights of prisoners, violation of electoral secrecy of the ballot); take measures against possible violations of political rights by third parties (individuals, companies, etc.). It is concluded that restrictions on the exercise of political rights of individuals can be introduced either in favor of guaranteeing the rights of other individuals, or in favor of ensuring the functioning of the state. The legitimate exercise of political rights can be restricted only if the general conditions for interfering with fundamental human rights are met.


Author(s):  
Bumke Christian ◽  
Voßkuhle Andreas

This book provides a comprehensive summary of German constitutional law, in particular the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. It provides first-hand insight into the complex principles of the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz (GG), and an authoritative introduction to the history of the German constitution, the Basic Law, and the methodology of the Federal Constitutional Court. As well as an analysis of the general principles of German constitutional law, the book covers the salient articles of the German constitution and offers relevant extracts of the Court's most important decisions on the provisions of the Basic Law. It provides notes and discussions of landmark cases to illustrate their legal and historical context and give the reader a clear understanding of the principles governing German constitutional law. The book covers the fundamental rights catalogue of the Basic Law and offers a comprehensive account of its intellectual moorings. It includes landmark jurisprudence on the equal treatment of same-sex couples, life imprisonment, the legal structure of property, the right to assembly, and the right to informational self-presentation. The book also covers the provisions and respective case law governing the state structure of Germany, for instance the recent decisions on the prohibition of the far-right German nationalist party, and the Court's jurisprudence on European integration, including the most recent decisions on the OMT program of the European Central Bank.


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