scholarly journals The Jews in Finland and World War II

2000 ◽  
Vol 21 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 157-166
Author(s):  
Tapani Harviainen

In the years 1989–1944 two different wars against the Soviet Union were imposed upon Finland. During the Winter War of 1989–1940 Germany remained strictly neutral on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact&&Great Britain and France planned intervention in favour of Finland. When the second, so-called Continuation War broke out in the summer of 1041, Finland was co-belligerent of Germany, and Great Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941. De jure, however, Finland was never an ally of Germany, and at the end of the war, in the winter 1944–1945, the Finnish armed forces expelled the German troops from Lapland, which was devastated by the Germans during their retreat to Norway. Military service was compulsory for each male citizen of Finland. In 1939 the Jewish population of Finland numbered 1 700. Of these, 260 men were called up and approximately 200 were sent to serve at the front during the Winter War.

Author(s):  
Karen Hagemann

During the First and Second World Wars, women’s wartime service became increasingly important for the functioning of the home front and battlefront in Britain, Germany, Russia, the United States, and other war-powers. Hundreds of thousands of women served in the militaries of the belligerents during World War II. Scholars estimate that the percentage of women in the Allied armed forces reached up to 2–3 percent. The number of women in military service in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was especially high, but only in the latter were they officially enlisted as soldiers. Despite their numbers and importance, until recently, mainstream historiography and public memory have largely ignored women’s military service. This chapter takes a closer, comparative look at women’s wartime service in the Age of the World Wars in history and memory and explains the paradox that while it was increasingly needed, it has long been downplayed and overlooked in public perception and memory in all war powers and across the ideological divide of the Cold War.


1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (02) ◽  
pp. 255-268
Author(s):  
Basil Dmytryshyn

Literature in many languages (documentary, monographic, memoir-like and periodical) is abundant on the sovietization of Czechoslovakia, as are the reasons advanced for it. Some observers have argued that the Soviet takeover of the country stemmed from an excessive preoccupation with Panslavism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by a few Czech and Slovak intellectuals, politicians, writers and poets and their uncritical affection and fascination for everything Russian and Soviet. Others have attributed the drawing of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet orbit to Franco-British appeasement of Hitler's imperial ambitions during the September 1938, Munich crisis. At Munich, Czechoslovakia lost its sovereignty and territory, France its honor, England its respect and trust; and the Soviet Union, by its abstract offer to aid Czechoslovakia (without detailing how or in what form the assistance would come) gained admiration. Still others have pinned the blame for the sovietization of Czechoslovakia on machinations by top leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who, as obedient tools of Moscow, supported Soviet geopolitical designs on Czechoslovakia, who sought and received political asylum in the USSR during World War II, and who returned to Czechoslovakia with the victorious Soviet armed forces at the end of World War II as high-ranking members of the Soviet establishment. Finally, there are some who maintain that the sovietization of Czechoslovakia commenced with the 25 February 1948, Communist coup, followed by the tragic death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk on 10 March 1948, and the replacement, on 7 June 1948, of President Eduard Beneš by the Moscow-trained, loyal Kremlin servant Klement Gottwald.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-324
Author(s):  
Elsa Haxha

Abstract As is known historically, part of the World Anti-Fascist Grand Coalition was also another great ally, United States. Even the allies had issued the Declaration of December 1942, for recognition of the anti-fascist resistance of the Albanian people, as well as Great Britain and the Soviet Union, making it part of the International Coalition and part of his war against the common enemies nazi and fascists. Nevertheless, beyond the lack of these interests, the Americans under the World Anti-Fascist Grand Coalition few months after the british began in the tiny Balkan military missions, although few toward British ally.


Author(s):  
Boris G. Koybaev

On the eve of the Second World War, Iran’s relations with Germany in the field of political, trade, economic, military and cultural relations significantly increased. At the same time, Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union and Britain were deteriorating. Many attempts to enter Iran, especially to gain access to Iranian oil, have also been made by the United States. They were actively opposed by the USSR and Great Britain, and the latter acted more decisively and persistently, which caused the anger of Washington. All this prompted Tehran to search for a “third force” that could protect Iran from the encroachment of the USSR and Great Britain on its interests. And such a” third force “ Iran found in the person of Germany, which after Hitler came to power began to develop intensively in military and economic terms. Reza Shah was impressed by Hitler, who, in turn, expressed interest in cooperation with Iran, as a large state in the Middle East, which occupied an important place in the plans of Nazi Germany to conquer world domination. As you know, the fascist leadership after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan intended to defeat Great Britain, but first to capture its pearl-British India. Berlin hoped to implement these plans in alliance with Iran, using its territory for subversive and aggressive actions against India. It was also intended to seize the AIOC oil fields, because the Axis powers did not have their own sources of oil.


Author(s):  
Zoltan Barany

This chapter examines the democratization of civil–military relations in two former fascist dictatorships, postwar Germany and Japan, whose armies had destroyed and terrorized large swathes of the surrounding territory. The creation of lasting democratic regimes on the ashes of these dictatorships stands as the signal achievement of democracy promotion. An important part of this process was the building of the new West German and Japanese armed forces. On the other hand, Hungary after World War II illustrates the trajectory of military politics in numerous European states where domestic political forces were defeated by the Soviet Union and its native communist puppets. The chapter then considers the evolution of Hungarian civil–military relations from the end of the war until the March 1953 death of Joseph Stalin, which is a suitable point to mark the consolidation of the Soviet-controlled communist regime and the completion of the armed forces' transformation.


2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 140-144
Author(s):  
Cynthia Roberts

In the lead-up to World War II, both Germany and the Soviet Union pursued important changes in military doctrine that proved crucial during the armed confrontation between the two countries in 1941–1945. Using a new book by the military historian Mary Habeck as a point of departure, this essay explains how the German and Soviet armed forces by the late 1930s had developed almost identical doctrines without extensively borrowing from each other. Although the doctrinal innovations that informed the German Blitzkrieg and the Soviet conception of “deep battle” have long attracted attention, Habeck's book is the first detailed comparison of the development of armored warfare in these two countries. Although the book does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the sources of innovation in military doctrine, it sheds a great deal of light on the revolutionary changes in German and Soviet military doctrines during the interwar years.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-121
Author(s):  
Lauri Hannikainen

In September 1939, after having included a secret protocol on spheres of influence in the so-called Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland and divided it between themselves. It was not long before the Soviet Union approached Finland by proposing exchanges of certain territories: ‘in our national interest we want to have from you certain territories and offer in exchange territories twice as large but in less crucial areas’. Finland, suspicious of Soviet motives, refused – the outcome was the Soviet war of aggression against Finland by the name of the Winter War in 1939–1940. The Soviet Union won this war and compelled Finland to cede several territories – about 10 per cent of Finland’s area. After the Winter War, Finland sought protection from Germany against the Soviet Union and decided to rely on Germany. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland joined the German war effort in the so-called Continuation War and reoccupied the territories lost in the Winter War. Finnish forces did not stop at the old border but occupied Eastern (Soviet) Karelia with a desire eventually to annex it. By that measure, Finland joined as Germany’s ally in its war of aggression against the Soviet Union in violation of international law. In their strong reliance on Germany, the Finnish leaders made some very questionable decisions without listening to warnings from Western States about possible negative consequences. Germany lost its war and so did Finland, which barely avoided entire occupation by the Soviet Army and succeeded in September 1944 in concluding an armistice with the Soviet Union. Finland lost some more territories and was subjected to many obligations and restrictions in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, dictated by the Allies. This article analyses, according to the criteria of international law, Finland’s policy shortly prior to and during the Continuation War, especially Finland’s secret dealings with Germany in the months prior to the German attack against the Soviet Union and Finland’s occupation of Eastern Karelia in the autumn of 1941. After Adolf Hitler declared that Germany was fighting against the Soviet Union together with Finland and Romania, was the Soviet Union entitled – prior to the Finnish attack – to resort to armed force in self-defence against Finland? And was Finland treated too harshly in the aftermath of World War ii? After all, its role as an ally of Germany had been rather limited.


2020 ◽  
pp. 140-169
Author(s):  
David F. Schmitz

Roosevelt's grand strategy of ensuring the survival of Great Britain and the Soviet Union was based on the understanding that Germany was the most dangerous enemy and Berlin defeated first. It was also predicated on the idea that World War II provided the United States a second chance to take up its rightful place as a world leader. As the nation fully mobilized in 1942, the Grand Alliance struggled with question of the best strategy for defeating Germany with the Soviet Union seeking an immediate second front and Great Britain wanting to attack Germany in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt ultimately sided with the British. As the course of the war started to turn in favor of the Allies with the victory at Midway over Japan's navy, the successful attack on North Africa, and the Russians victory at Stalingrad, Roosevelt met with Churchill in Casablanca and sought to solidify Grand Alliance with the declaration of unconditional surrender.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-51
Author(s):  
M. Yu. Myagkov

The article offers an overview of modern historical data on the origins, causes of World War II, the decisive role of the USSR in its victorious end, and also records the main results and lessons of World War II.Hitler's Germany was the main cause of World War II. Nazism, racial theory, mixed with far-reaching geopolitical designs, became the combustible mixture that ignited the fire of glob­al conflict. The war with the Soviet Union was planned to be waged with particular cruelty.The preconditions for the outbreak of World War II were the humiliating provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty for the German people, as well as the attitude of the "Western de­mocracies" to Russia after 1917 and the Soviet Union as an outcast of world development. Great Britain, France, the United States chose for themselves a policy of ignoring Moscow's interests, they were more likely to cooperate with Hitler's Germany than with Soviet Russia. It was the "Munich Agreement" that became the point of no return to the beginning of the Second World War. Under these conditions, for the USSR, its own security and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany began to come to the fore, defining the "spheres of interests" of the parties in order to limit the advance of German troops towards the Soviet borders in the event of German aggression against Poland. The non-aggression pact gave the USSR just under two years to rebuild the army and consolidate its defensive potential and pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of kilometers westward. The signing of the Pact was preceded by the failure in August 1939 of the negotiations between the military mis­sions of Britain, France and the USSR, although Moscow took the Anglo-French-Soviet nego­tiations with all seriousness.The huge losses of the USSR in the summer of 1941 are explained by the following circum­stances: before the war, a large-scale modernization of the Red Army was launched, a gradu­ate of a military school did not have sufficient experience in managing an entrusted unit by June 22, 1941; the Red Army was going to bleed the enemy in border battles, stop it with short counterattacks by covering units, carry out defensive operations, and then strike a de­cisive blow into the depths of the enemy's territory, so the importance of a multi-echeloned long-term defense in 1941 was underestimated by the command of the Red Army and it was not ready for it; significant groupings of the Western Special Military District were drawn into potential salients, which was used by the Germans at the initial stage of the war; Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler to start a war led to slowness in making the most urgent and necessary decisions to bring troops to combat readiness.The Allies delayed the opening of the second front for an unreasonably long time. They, of course, achieved outstanding success in the landing operation in France, however, the en­emy's losses in only one Soviet strategic operation in the summer of 1944 ("Bagration") are not inferior, and even exceed, the enemy’s losses on the second front. One of the goals of "Bagration" was to help the Allies.Soviet soldiers liberated Europe at the cost of their lives. At the same time, Moscow could not afford to re-establish a cordon sanitaire around its borders after the war, so that anti- Soviet forces would come to power in the border states. The United States and Great Britain took all measures available to them to quickly remove from the governments of Italy, France and other Western states all the left-wing forces that in 1944-1945 had a serious impact on the politics of their countries.


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