The American biodefense industry: From emergency to nonemergence

2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filippa Lentzos

Since 1998, and especially since the “Amerithrax” emergency of 2001, the United States has ambitiously funded biodefense projects, intending not only to enhance detection and management of any biological-weapons attack but also to establish a robust domestic biodefense industry. I asked if the United States had fulfilled this latter intention. Using the RAND Corporation's RaDiUS database, I examined federal biodefense grants and contracts awarded from 1995 through most of 2005, noting recipient type, awarding unit, funding level, and the disease focus of research-and-development support. Patterns in these data as well as other sources suggest that the biodefense industry as late as 2005 remained in a nascent stage, with most firms small, precariously financed, and more responsive to funders' announcements and solicitations than to opportunities for self-directed innovation. A biodefense industry with investor-capital funding and retained earnings, with its own leading companies, with its own stock analysts, and with its own legitimacy in commercial and financial markets did not emerge over the period studied, nor does its emergence appear imminent.

2016 ◽  
pp. 26-46
Author(s):  
Marcin Jan Flotyński

The global financial crisis in 2007–2009 began a period of high volatility on the financial markets. Specifically, it caused an increased amplitude of fluctuations of the level of gross domestic products, the level of investment and consumption and exchange rates in particular countries. To address the adverse market circumstances, governments and central banks took actions in order to bolster the weakening global economy. The aim of this article is to present the anti-crisis actions in the United States and selected member states of the European Union, including Poland, and an assessment of their efficiency. The analysis conducted indicates that generally the actions taken in the United States in response to the crisis were faster and more adequate to the existing circumstances than in the European Union.


Bizinfo Blace ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-28
Author(s):  
Milena Marjanović ◽  
Ivan Mihailović ◽  
Ognjen Dimitrijević

In the context of globalization, due to the accelerated process of economic integration of countries and financial markets, the interdependence of the world's leading financial markets is more than obvious. This paper investigates the interdependence of stock exchange indices from leading capital markets in the world: USA, European Union and Asia. Our intention is to determine the direction of causality between the observed capital markets, as well as whether and in what way shocks in one market are transmitted to other markets. Research methodology includes stationarity testing, the existence of cointegration, the application of the Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) which is complemented by the Granger causality test and the Impulse Response Function (IRF) analysis. The results of the research are as follows. Johansen's cointegration test showed that there is no long-term equilibrium relationship between the observed markets, while Granger's test showed that there is mutual causality between the capital markets of Germany and the United States. As for the Japanese index, previous events in Germany and the United States are statistically significant, but previous events on the Tokyo Stock Exchange cannot explain movements in Germany and the United States. According to the results of the IRF analysis, shocks that may occur in the US market have an almost identical impact on all observed markets. On the other hand, disturbances on the Japanese market are not transmitted to the German and American market, i.e. remain in Japan.


Author(s):  
William P. Osterberg ◽  
James B. Thomson

The increased turmoil in international financial markets, starting with the Asian crises of 1997, has led to calls for financial assistance from the wealthier nations. In December 1997, the United States announced a $5 billion commitment toward an international package of financial assistance for South Korea. Two months earlier the United States pledged $3 billion for assistance to Indonesia. In both instances, the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) was to be involved.


2011 ◽  
pp. 93-99
Author(s):  
Emerson Fernandes Marcal ◽  
Pedro L. Valls Pereira ◽  
Diogenes Manoel Leiva Martin ◽  
Wilson Toshiro Nakamura ◽  
Wagner Oliveira Monteiro

Author(s):  
Daniel Belingher ◽  
Cantemir Adrian Calin

The current chapter shows the gap between the real economy and the financial markets in the United States during the pre-crisis period at the end of 2007, as well as during the subsequent crisis period. The current research chapter also emphasizes the catastrophic effect that financial markets had inside the whole economic system due to this gap. The premise from which this chapter starts can be found in the systems theory and consists in Heinz von Foerster’s theorem. This research has an empirical nature and shows in which way an anomaly within the system can destabilize the entire system, finally resulting in the installation of the crisis period that we are still facing. In order to illustrate this, the authors refer to the evolution of the values of DJIA and real GDP, observed between mid 1940s until 2010 in the United States.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-36 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neta C. Crawford

The Bush administration's arguments in favor of a preemptive doctrine rest on the view that warfare has been transformed. As Colin Powell argues, “It's a different world … it's a new kind of threat.” And in several important respects, war has changed along the lines the administration suggests, although that transformation has been under way for at least the last ten to fifteen years. Unconventional adversaries prepared to wage unconventional war can conceal their movements, weapons, and immediate intentions and conduct devastating surprise attacks. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, though not widely dispersed, are more readily available than they were in the recent past. And the everyday infrastructure of the United States can be turned against it as were the planes the terrorists hijacked on September 11, 2001. Further, the administration argues that we face enemies who “reject basic human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.” Although vulnerability could certainly be reduced in many ways, it is impossible to achieve complete invulnerability.


2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-335
Author(s):  
Harald A. Benink ◽  
Reinhard H. Schmidt

AbstractThe turbulence in the international financial markets in the 1980s inspired the idea that independent academics might be in a position to make a contribution to the improvement of regulation and thus ultimately also to the stability of the national financial sector in the United States. This led to the creation of the US “Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee“, a group of academics and other independent experts working in the field of financial regulation, which meets regularly and issues statements concerning conceptual as well as current issues in financial regulation. Two years ago, a similar shadow committee was founded in Europe. It is composed of members from 11 different countries. The special problems of financial regulation in Europe, as well as the special features of the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC), derive from the fact that despite the trend towards economic and political integration, Europe is still a collection of different nations with different institutional set-ups and political and economic traditions. In this paper, Harald Benink, chairman of the ESFRC, and Reinhard H. Schmidt, one of the two German members, describe the origin, the objectives and the functioning of the committee and the thrust of its recommendations.


1987 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin J. Perkins

In this article Professor Perkins reexamines President Andrew Jackson's objections to the bill to recharter the Second Bank of the United States, as expressed in his famous veto message of 1832. He observes that, in addition to its exaggerated rhetoric, the veto message discusses at length a number of alleged deficiencies in the existing charter provisions. Professor Perkins's systematic analysis of the probable ramifications of a series of judicious alterations reveals that a compromise bill reformulated to meet most of the president's stated objections would not have seriously undermined the institution's position in American financial markets. Although several opportunities for sensible compromise arose, Nicholas Biddle and other members of the probank faction disregarded them. Perkins argues that the failure of bank supporters to consider comparatively modest modifications in the terms of recharter was a major blunder that ultimately doomed the Second Bank.


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