The Fourth Way: A Theory of Knowledge

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reinhardt Grossman
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Fourth Way

The Fourth Way: A Theory of Knowledge.

Noûs ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul K. Moser ◽  
Reinhardt Grossmann
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Fourth Way

When Is True Belief Knowledge?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Foley
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Significant Aspect ◽  
Coming To Know ◽  
Contemporary Epistemology ◽  
What Matters

A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. This book finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs—something important that she doesn't quite “get.” This may seem a modest point but, as the book shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

Geocartographic thinking in modern science

2020 ◽  
Vol 961 (7) ◽  
pp. 27-36
Author(s):  
A.K. Cherkashin
Keyword(s):  
Differential Geometry ◽  
Fiber Bundle ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Map ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Geographical Environment ◽  
New Knowledge ◽  
Thematic Layer

The purpose of the study is to show how the features of geocartographic way of thinking are manifested in the meta-theory of knowledge based on mathematical formalisms. General cartographic concepts and regularities are considered in the view of metatheoretic analysis using cognitive procedures of fiber bundle from differential geometry. On levels of metainformation generalization, the geocartographic metatheoretic approach to the study of reality is higher than the system-theoretical one. It regulates the type of equations, models, and methods of each intertheory expressed in its own system terms. There is a balance between the state of any system and its geographical environment; therefore the observed phenomena are only explained theoretically in a metatheoretic projection on the corresponding system-thematic layer of the knowledge map. Metatheoretic research enables passing from the systematization of already known patterns to the formation of new knowledge through the scientific stratification of reality. General methods of metatheoretic analysis are mathematically distinguished

Knowledge, Benign Falsehoods, and the Gettier Problem

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio de Almeida
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Knowledge ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Gettier Problem ◽  
Inferential Knowledge ◽  
The Gettier Problem

Contrary to millennial thought, inferential knowledge does seem to arise in certain cases of reasoning to which false premises are evidentially essential. The phenomenon refutes all of the well-known epistemologies that account for inferential knowledge. I offer an explanation of the phenomenon based on a fairly conservative revision to the defeasibility theory of knowledge, and explain why Peter Klein’s proposed solution fails. The explanation put forward here aims at giving us these two highly desirable results: (a) something we have never had and may not have noticed we needed, a defeasibility theory that is compatible with epistemological fallibilism, and, (b) within this revised, fallibilistic version of the defeasibility theory, an explanation of the benign/malignant distinction for false beliefs that completes the defeasibilist resolution of the Gettier Problem.

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