scholarly journals Dead Wrong: Capital Punishment, Wrongful Convictions, and Serious Mental Illness

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 336-363
Author(s):  
Alexis E. Carl
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Serious Mental Illness ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
National Registry ◽  
Wrongful Convictions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Intellectual Capacity ◽  
Case Vignettes ◽  
Mitigating Factor

Serious mental illness (SMI), wrongful convictions, and capital punishment is explored, as having a SMI may heighten an individual’s risk of being wrongfully convicted and consequently dealt a capital sentence. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court banned the use of capital punishment for individuals with intellectual disabilities, ruling it unconstitutional, due to the diminished moral and intellectual capacity held by these individuals. Based on these Supreme Court findings, an argument is made that SMI is a compelling mitigating factor that ought to disqualify the pursuit of capital punishment. Due to the cognitive and volitional impairments associated with SMI, people with SMI are especially vulnerable to being wrongfully convicted of a crime and further wrongfully sentenced to death. Data to build this argument include that those with SMI are more likely to: 1) falsely confess; 2) struggle with assisting in their defense; 3) be perceived as an unreliable witness; 4) appear as though they lack remorse; and 5) face prejudices from judges and jurors; which all contribute to wrongful convictions. An explanation of these vulnerabilities are discussed in detail by examining 26 case vignettes (derived from the National Registry of Exonerations and other sources) where such individuals were wrongfully convicted due to SMI. Data from the National Registry of Exonerations is further analyzed, leading to discussion of the disproportionate co-occurrence of wrongful convictions that are stimulated by SMI. This paper concludes with an analysis of reforms and a discussion of how to enact safeguards to protect individuals with SMI.

scholarly journals Forty Years of Death: The Past, Present, and Future of the Death Penalty in South Carolina (Still Arbitrary after All These Years)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Blume ◽  
Lyndsey S. Vann
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Gender Bias ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Looking Back

11 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 183 (2016)Forty years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States deemed constitutional new death penalty laws intended to minimize the arbitrariness which led the Court to invalidate all capital sentencing statutes four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia. Over the last four decades the Court has — time and again — attempted to regulate the “machinery of death.” Looking back over the Court’s work, many observers, including two current Supreme Court justices, have questioned whether the modern death penalty has lived up to expectations set by the Court in the 1970s or if, despite 40 years of labor, the American death penalty continues to be administered in an unconstitutionally arbitrary manner. This Article presents data from South Carolina’s forty-year experiment with capital punishment and concludes that the administration of the death penalty in that state is still riddled with error and infected with racial and gender bias. It is — in short — still arbitrary after all these years. The authors maintain that the only true cure it to abolish South Carolina’s death penalty, although they do argue that lesser steps including additional safeguards and procedure may limit, but will not eliminate, some of the arbitrariness and bias which are present in the current imposition of South Carolina’s most extreme punishment.

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF REMORSE IN SENTENCING

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter du Toit
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
South African ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
The South ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Mitigating Factor ◽  
Court Of Appeal

It has become an established feature of the South African sentencing practice to consider the level of remorse displayed by the accused. Genuine contrition or remorse is generally regarded as a mitigating factor whilst the absence thereof is considered to be an aggravating factor. Our courts link the presence of remorse with the prospect of the rehabilitation of the offender. In S v Seegers (1970 (2) SA 506 (A) 512G–H) Rumpff JA held that remorse, as an indication that the offence will not be committed again, is an important consideration, in suitable cases, when the deterrent effect of a sentence on the accused is considered. This note considers the meaning of “remorse” in the eyes of our courts, the approach of South African courts (in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal) to the role of remorse in sentencing, as well as the question whether the presence or absence of remorse can truly be determined by a court.

scholarly journals Threaten Sentencing Enhancement, Coerce Plea, (Wash, Rinse,) Repeat

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-302
Author(s):  
Wes Reber Porter
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Justice System ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Trojan Horse ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Wrongful Convictions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Clean Break ◽  
The Individual

Our American criminal justice system is too often described as broken. It was not a clean break in a single, isolated location. Instead, our criminal justice system suffers from many, many little nicks, bumps, and bruises at the hands of its keepers. The evolution of sentencing enhancements within our criminal justice system represents the latest nagging, reoccurring injury. In the ultimate Trojan horse to criminal defendants, the Supreme Court sought to protect the individual rights of the accused with its recent decisions on sentencing enhancements. But at the hands of lawmakers, the judiciary, and prosecutors, criminal defendants suffer more. Our criminal justice system also suffers from practices related to sentencing enhancements and the resulting wave of wrongful convictions by guilty plea.

Supreme Court Limits Permissible Scope of Government’s Ability to Force Medication of Mentally Ill Defendants

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-739
Author(s):  
Mayelin Prieto-Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Side Effects ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Mentally Ill ◽  
Antipsychotic Drugs ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Law Enforcement Officials ◽  
History Of ◽  
Criminal Charges

On June 16, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that forced administration of antipsychotic drugs to a defendant facing serious criminal charges is appropriate in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only in limited circumstances. The treatment must be medically appropriate, substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and necessary to significantly further important government interests, after taking account of less-intrusive alternatives.Charles Sell, a former dentist, had a long history of mental illness. He had been hospitalized twice, in 1982 and 1984, after expressing paranoid ideas to law enforcement officials. In May 1997, Sell was charged with fifty-six counts of mail fraud, six counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of money laundering. He was released on bail after a magistrate determined that he was currently competent to stand trial.

scholarly journals Litigating in the Shadow of Innocence

2006 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence C. Marshall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Justice System ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Justice System ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court

In 1976, the Supreme Court of the United States, allowing optimism to trump experience, accepted various states’ assurances that new death penalty procedures the states had then recently adopted would avoid the vices that had led the Court to strike down the death penalty in 1972. Now, some thirty years later, a body of evidence has developed demonstrating that this experiment has failed—that the problems of arbitrariness, racism and propensity to error are endemic to the criminal justice system (particularly with regard to capital punishment) and cannot be cured by what Justice Blackmun called “tinker[ing] with the machinery of death.” Despite the Court’s best intentions, the death penalty procedures of the 1980s and 1990s and the first half of this decade reflect little if any significant improvement over the condemned pre-1972 systems.

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