scholarly journals The Tortious Liability of Directors and Officers to Third Parties in Common Law Canada

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon O'Byrne ◽  
Yemi Philip ◽  
Katherine Fraser
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Directors And Officers ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The law regarding the tortious liability of corporate directors and officers to third parties remains conflicted. One line of authority, adopted in Alberta, provides that liability is rare in the context of torts committed in a corporate capacity, and it largely closes the door on liability for ordinary negligence. A competing line of authority, however, contends that tortious liability is common. Signalling a different approach, Justice Slatter of the Alberta Court of Appeal provides a policy-based stance that accounts for the importance of both tort law and corporate law principles to the question of liability for ordinary negligence. Beyond offering balance, Justice Slatter’s approach has the benefit of aligning with pronouncements from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding directors’ and officers’ liability in negligence to third parties. This article outlines the current authorities in the area, concluding that Justice Slatter’s judgment provides a clear and principled way forward.

scholarly journals Alberta's Court of Next-to-Last Resort: Appeals from the Alberta Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, 1970-1990

1969 ◽  
pp. 861
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Success Rates ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Statistical Survey ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This paper reports the results of a statistical survey of the success rates of appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada. Appeals from all provinces were examined, but in his analysis Professor McCormick focuses on the Alberta Court of Appeal. The variables he discusses include the geographic and political composition of the Supreme Court, the mix of cases from different areas of the law, the length of experience of Court of Appeal judges, and the presence or absence of dissenting opinions.

scholarly journals Be careful what you promise: Proprietary estoppel in Cowper-Smith v Morgan

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin
Keyword(s):  
British Columbia ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Canadian Experience ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Proprietary estoppel provides one of equity’s most powerful remedies. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which arises when one party acts on the reliance of the promise of another. The promise and corresponding reliance creates a quasi-contract with reliance acting as an alternative to the consideration usually required in contracts. Proprietary estoppel is distinct from other equitable estoppels in that a proprietary estoppel can act as a ‘sword’ and form the basis of a cause of action. If all of the parts of proprietary estoppel are made out, a court can modify or create property rights to satisfy the equity.With regard to the Canadian experience, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently noted that proprietary estoppel has received “somewhat uneven treatment in Canada.” It is within this context that the Court of Appeal for British Columbia split on the proper scope for the Supreme Court of Canada. In Cowper-Smith v Morgan, the Supreme Court of Canada has both clarified the test for — and arguably expanded the scope of — proprietary estoppel in the context of promises exchanged between children over their mother’s care during her lifetime. The fact that a party lacks an interest in the disputed property at the time of the promise does not negate the obligation of fulfilling the promise. Instead, when the party responsible for the expectation has or acquires sufficient interest in the property, proprietary estoppel will attach to that interest and protect the equity. This article will discuss the law of proprietary estoppel in other jurisdictions and how the Supreme Court of Canada has infused this remedy with greater flexibility to satisfy the equity.

scholarly journals The Eve Decision — A Common Law Perspective

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 657-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward W. Keyserlingk
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Prince Edward Island ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Medical Procedures ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Mentally Disabled ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Parens Patriae ◽  
The Law ◽  
Do So

By its decision in the Eve case, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified and settled the law in at least two important respects. From now on, provincial statutes can only be used to authorize guardians to permit involuntary contraceptive sterilizations if their wording clearly and explicitly so provides. The Prince Edward Island statute in question did not do so. Secondly, though the Court's parens patriae jurisdiction is of unlimited scope and does extend to cases involving medical procedures, it cannot serve as the basis for authorizing non-therapeutic sterilizations. By ruling out the applicability of parens patriae, and by insisting that judges are not able to deal adequately with such cases, the Supreme Court may have strengthened the case for new legislation in this area. The writer argues that such legislation should provide for access to contraceptive sterilization for the mentally disabled, and the needed safeguards to protect those unable to consent or refuse from the imposition of sterilization in the interests of parties other than themselves.

scholarly journals Self-Defence and Consent: The Use of Common Law Developments in Canadian Criminal Code Analysis

1994 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 484
Author(s):  
M. Anne Stalker
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Code Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Canadian Criminal Code ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Self Defence

The author examines the interaction between the Criminal Code and the common law in relation to two areas of law recently handled by both the Alberta Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada

scholarly journals EXTRA-CURIAL STATEMENTS BY A NON- TESTIFYING CO-ACCUSED, THE CANADIAN SUPREME COURT AND CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
BC Naudé
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In S v Ndhlovu (2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA)), the court opened the door to the admissibility of extra-curial statements made by a non-testifying accused against a co-accused as hearsay in terms of section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988), if the interests of justice so require. However, first the Supreme Court of Appeal and later the Constitutional Court rejected such an approach.It is beyond the scope of this comment to repeat the arguments in favour of a discretionary approach for such statements, but it is submitted that there is scope for disagreement with the findings of both courts.Whitear points out that the provisions dealing with the admissibility of hearsay in the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) were not declared unconstitutional by any court. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) could not be used to admit the extra-curial statement of an accused against his co- accused because the interests of justice would never allow this. The Constitutional Court found that section 3 did not override the common-law rule prohibiting the admission of extra-curial statements against a co- accused since this would amount to unfair discrimination against an accused implicated by such admissions or confessions. Significantly, because it is stated in section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) that section 3 is subject to the “provisions of any other law”, the court decided that the common-law prohibition should prevail.Previously, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that the “other laws” referred to in the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) are alternative ways for admitting hearsay, and do not preclude the admissibility of hearsay in terms of section 3, even where there is another law that prohibits it. The court also referred with approval to S v Ndhlovu (supra) where it was explained that the very purpose of section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) was to “supersede the excessive rigidity and inflexibility – and occasional absurdity – of the common law position” by allowing for the admission of hearsay when the interests of justice so require. The admissibility of out-of-court statements by an accused against a co- accused is also dealt with differently in the United Kingdom (our relevant common law) today. Section 114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 makes it possible to admit the out-of-court statement of an accused against a co-accused as hearsay. However, the court in R v Y (supra par 57−62) did mention that this does not mean such statements should routinely be admitted without a consideration of the relevant factors mentioned in the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 and that, in the majority of cases, it will not be in the interests of justice to admit such statements, especially those made during police interviews.Even though, under South African law, it is not currently possible to present evidence of an extra-curial statement made by an accused that also implicates a co-accused, the recent judgment by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Bradshaw (2017 SCC 35) provides insight into how this could possibly happen in future. It is thus useful to consider the Supreme Court’s decision.

Notes: The unlamented demise of the common-law derivative action: A note remembering Michael Larkin

2021 ◽  
Vol 138 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-521
Author(s):  
Tshepo H Mongalo
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This contribution presents an exposition of how the common-law rules relevant to the common-law derivative action would have clashed with the current statutory derivative action remedy had the common law not been repealed by s 165(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The analysis of the possible impact of the common law is a relevant and timely one — irrespective of the fact that a statutory derivative action and remedy has been introduced in s 165(2) of the Companies Act — as it provides lessons to policy-makers on how to deal effectively with common-law rules whose time has passed and must be eradicated, particularly in corporate law. This is so since the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment in Hlumisa Investment Holdings (RF) Ltd & another v Kirkinis & others 2020 (5) SA 419 (SCA) has recently endorsed previous Constitutional Court judgments which confirmed the continued validity of the common-law principle of statutory interpretation that a statute should not be taken to alter the common law unless it is clear that that is what was intended. The contribution arrives at the conclusion that the limiting effect of English judgments, particularly Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 and Prudential Assurance v Newman Industries (CA) [1982] Ch D 204 would have still been applicable in South Africa, even though they allow for a conservative exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle in providing for derivative action claims at common law.

scholarly journals The Odhavji Decision: Old Ghosts and New Confusion in Canadian Courts

1969 ◽  
pp. 1061
Author(s):  
Michael Bodner
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Tort Law ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Public Office ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Law ◽  
To Come

The tort of misfeasance in public office was recently examined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Odhavj Estate v. Woodhouse. While the case provided a statement on the law in this area, it also left many questions unanswered. This article lays out the factual background of the case, the elements of the tort as laid down by the Court and the tort's relationship with other aspects of Canadian tort law. Further, the author critically examines the ambiguities and additional problems that have arisen in the wake of the decision and how the lower courts have been dealing with the tort in subsequent cases. The author ultimately concludes that it is very likely that the Supreme Court of Canada will need to revisit this area of tort law in the years to come.

Transforming the Law on Psychiatric Lesions

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Expert Witnesses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Psychological Harm ◽  
The Law ◽  
Constitutional Right ◽  
Law Of Delict ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Made In

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.

scholarly journals The Law Regarding Pension Interest in South Africa has been settled! Or has it? With Reference to Ndaba v Ndaba (600/2015) [2016] ZASCA 162

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Motseotsile Clement Marumoagae
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Golden Opportunity ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This article reflects on the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In particular, it assesses whether the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ndaba v Ndaba had adequately clarified how this area of law should be understood. In light of the inconsistent approaches from various divisions of the High Court, it has not always been clear how the courts should interpret the law relating to pension interest in South Africa. In this paper, aspects of this area of law which have been clarified by the Supreme Court of Appeal are highlighted. This paper further demonstrates aspects of this area of law which the Supreme Court of Appeal did not settle and would potentially be subject to future litigation. This paper is based on the premise that while Ndaba v Ndaba is welcomed, the Supreme Court of Appeal nonetheless, missed a golden opportunity to authoritatively provide a basis upon which the law relating to pension interest in South Africa should be understood. 

scholarly journals A Choice among Values: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives on the Defence of Necessity

1969 ◽  
pp. 848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin L. Berger
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Historical Perspectives ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
A Value ◽  
Canadian Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Way

The author explores various theoretical approaches to the defence of necessity, rejecting both excusatory conceptions of the defence and those based on the notion of moral involuntariness. Rather, the author argues that necessity is properly understood as a justificatory defence based on a lack of moral blameworthiness. After extensively surveying the history of the defence in Canadian law, the author critiques the way in which the Supreme Court of Canada has restricted the defence. He contrasts the current Canadian approach with the treatment of the defence in other jurisdictions and concludes that Canadian law would be served best by a robust defence of necessity, which would acknowledge that, in some circumstances, pursuit of a value of greater worth than the value of adherence to the law can be justified.

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