scholarly journals Bill C-59 and CSIS’s “New” Powers to Disrupt Terrorists Threats: Holding the Charter-Limiting Regime to (Constitutional) Account

2019 ◽  
pp. 233
Author(s):  
Michael Nesbitt

In 2017, the Liberal government released Bill C-59, which was its update to the national security legislation that was introduced by the previous government via Bill C-51. Bill C-59’s goal was to address the criticisms of its predecessor, including the new “kinetic” powers granted to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) to actively disrupt threats to the security of Canada. While Bill C-59 made some improvements to ensure that CSIS’s new powers are exercised in accordance with the Charter, there are still deficiencies to be addressed. This article reviews the changes brought in with Bill C-59, examines how those amendments may not avoid constitutional challenge, and outlines what a section 1 Oakes justification may look like. Ultimately, to address the Charter implications of the new legislation, further changes are required, including the use of court-appointed special advocates to ensure an adversarial system and further oversight of CSIS’s new, disruptive authority.

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-190
Author(s):  
Steven Price

Last year [2003], in a supremely hypocritical editorial, The New Zealand Herald laid into the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) for its ‘farcical level of research’ on Ahmed Zaoui.1 Zaoui is an Algerian national who turned up at Auckland International Airport in early December 2002, and asked for political asylum. He was immediately imprisoned. Relying on classified NZSIS information, the Minister of Immigration has declared Zaoui a threat to national security and issued a Security Risk Certificate against him, allowing his continued detention. The Herald pointed to the just-released decision of the Refugee Status Appeals Authority 2, which had found no credible evidence that Zaoui was a terrorist.


1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 21-23
Author(s):  
John Stockwell

Following several years of shocking revelations about the United States intelligence service, we now have a unique opportunity to rethink our objectives in the Third World, especially in Africa, and to modify our intelligence activities to complement rather than contradict sound, long term policies. The revelations, and their related publicity, have been a healthy exercise, making the American public aware of what enlightened people throughout the world already knew, that CIA operations had plumbed the depths of assassination, meddlesome covert wars, and the compulsive recruitment of foreign officials to commit treason on our behalf; activities which, if they did not border on international terrorism, certainly impressed their victims as harsh and cruel, whatever their bureaucratic authentication and national security justification in Washington.


2021 ◽  
Vol 14(63) (1) ◽  
pp. 167-174
Author(s):  
Constantin Ioan Gliga ◽  

Starting with 2016, the Constitutional Court of Romania issued a series of decisions whereby it repeatedly established that the interference of intelligence services in a criminal prosecution is not allowed, so that the evidence obtained with the help of these structures cannot be used in criminal proceedings, being affected by absolute nullity. This article summarizes the most relevant decisions of the constitutional court in this matter, as well as the recent practice of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, which we hope will signal other courts to ensure unitary jurisprudence at the national level.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Mikael Lohse

One disparate feature between Finnish civilian and military intelligence is their express relationship to national security. The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service prominently declares to be an expert in national security whereas no corresponding public territorial claim has been made by its counterpart – the Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency (FDIA). This observation leads to the question: are the tasks of the FDIA limited solely to the military defence of Finland or has it any more comprehensive role in safeguarding national security. This article aims to examine this question by comparing the provisions governing the purpose of civilian and military intelligence and analysing the provision on the targets of military intelligence. Legal analysis indicate that military intelligence targets are broadly located in the field on national security, both at the core of military activities and in the outer reaches on non-military activities. The FDIA actually has a wide mandate which extends its mission beyond the reaches of civilian intelligence.


Author(s):  
Joseph Oldham

This chapter analyses two series which aimed to present a more authentic portrayal of intelligence activity, embracing a new ‘realism’ grounded in documentary detail and procedure. Special Branch (ITV, 1969-74) focused on the Metropolitan Police unit of the name whose remit centred on issues of national security, the series incorporating the thematic interests of the spy genre into the less heightened generic trains of the police procedural. This chapter explores how this focus converged with a concurrent trend in single plays towards increased location filming on ‘gritty’ 16mm film, with Special Branch’s adoption of this style from its 1973 revamp by Euston Films enhancing to a new narrative interest in international terrorism. This is contrasted with The Sandbaggers (ITV, 1978-80), a series focused on the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) which made an alternative claim to ‘realism’ through mounting an unprecedented examination of the bureaucracies underpinning intelligence activity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-134
Author(s):  
Mariusz Antoni Kamiński

The article presents an analysis of the legal status, organization and powers of the special services of the Republic of Estonia. The author presents the mission and tasks of the Estonian Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitsei), the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (Välisluureamet) and the Military Intelligence Centre (Luurekeskus). The article show the historical aspect of the Estonian special services and their location in the structure of state organs responsible for national security. In addition, the author presents a surveillance system on the activities of intelligence and counterintelligence services.


Subject Bill C-59 and Canadian national security legislation. Significance Canada’s governing Liberals have introduced Bill C-59, omnibus national security legislation that promises to be the most significant overhaul of the national security and intelligence architecture since the creation of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984. The proposed legislation follows through on a campaign promise by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to remove unpopular elements from Bill C-51, a legacy of the Conservative government of former Prime Minister Stephen Harper that drew criticism on rights grounds for sweeping powers granted to law enforcement and intelligence to assiste counterterrorism efforts. Impacts Privacy concerns will be a persistent obstacle to Ottawa increasing cyber cooperation with the United States. The bureaucratic overhaul is likely to improve the efficacy of surveillance operations and intelligence analysis. China following through on its recent pledge not to hack Canadian commercial secrets probably depends on bilateral ties warming.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document