scholarly journals The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties

1969 ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Stephen Allan Scott

Of the plan suggested by its title (intended to embrace amongst other things some treatment of the Canadian BiU of Rights and relevant aspects of the distribution of legislative authority) this paper as delivered is confined to single part dealing with the rule of law. Roncarelli v. Duplessis, probably the single most celebrated of the Supreme Court's decisions, is chosen as the source of four themes. Each involves conflict between the individual's rights and liberties and governmental power. The author argues that lawful governmental action especially competent legislation and anything which is authorized by competent legislation is damnum sine injuria. Some of the harshest consequences of legislative supremacy have however been mitigated by various common law rules, notably those governing natural justice, the prerogative remedies, mens rea in the criminal law, the condition of reasonable ness implied into at least some statutory powers, and the restriction of subdelegation. The author examines critically the work of the Supreme Court on these subjects, as also on the matter of access to the courts for redress, question central to individual liberty, both as regards the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Canada itself, and that of the other superior courts.

1969 ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
W. S. Tarnopolsky

To what extent has the Supreme Court of Canada tended to promote human rights and protect fundamental freedoms? This question is examined by looking at the bases on which the Supreme Court can protect civil liberties. In decisions prior to 1950 the author finds that the Supreme Court was not protective of "egalitarian" civil liberties. With respect to "political" civil liberties, the author finds the majority judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada of the 1950's inspiring. The enactment of the Canadian Bill of Rights in 1960 provided an important direction to the Court to protect civil liberties. The author feels that the Supreme Court has not yet satisfac torily responded to this direction. However, the Drybones decision recognized the constitutional status of the Bill of Rights and the author supports the argument that it is constitutional instrument.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Patrice Garant ◽  
Sylvio Normand

Administrative Tribunals have jurisdiction to deal with questions of law. In the exercise of such jurisdiction they may sometimes make mistakes in the construction of the statutes, regulations or other instruments. Even in the presence of a privative clause, an inferior tribunal should not be the supreme interpret of the law. It is one of the requirements of the « rule of law » that the Superior Court should have a supervisory « droit de regard ». Traditionally, only errors of law going to jurisdiction were out of the shield of the privative clause ; the Superior Courts used to restrain their intervention only after charactarizing the alleged error as « jurisdictional error of law ». Two difficulties came to arise from the approach about whether there exists an error of jurisdiction or one « merely » of law. Firstly, who can tell whether there is a genuine error of law. Secondly, what criteria transmute in the minds of Superior Court Judges an error into one of jurisdiction. The recent case law convinces us of the necessity of a different approach in order to achieve some clarity in this field of Administrative law. Mr. Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada hints at it in the Nispawin and the New Brunswick Liquor Corporation cases. This approach would put an end to the confusion that still prevail in other Supreme Court cases like Blanco or Labrecque. The distinction between errors of law going to jurisdiction and « merely » errors of law is unrational and so unpracticable that it should be abandoned and replaced by what we suggest in the following lines... Mr. Justice Robert Reid of the Ontario Divisional Court has also expressed the same concern in a remarquable judgment.


Federalism-E ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-113
Author(s):  
Brent Randall

The Constitution Act, 1982, containing the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is seen by many to be a major victory for individual liberty. The Charter is seen as a ground-breaking provision, but it is also at the mercy of interpretation. Like the Constitution containing it, there are many ambiguous terms which inevitably demand application when settling disputes between two parties. This requirement of interpretation can turn the Charter from celebrated to controversial depending on the interests involved. In Canada, provincial and federal legislatures are most often in charge of interpreting the Constitution favourably by creating laws that capture the spirit of the document. If for some reason there is concern with how the Constitution, and Charter, is interpreted through this legislation, the Supreme Court of Canada is the final decision-maker on its validity. This judicial review is the source of much debate, for a couple reasons. First, some take exception to the Supreme Court having the final say on rights issues. Second, when it is applied in such a way [...]


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


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