scholarly journals The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law

1969 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
David Phillip Jones

The speaker observed that the Supreme Court of Canada has not been innovative Os approach to Administrative Law, although the fact that Canada has written constitution and the U.K. has not should provide fertile area for distinctive Canadian contributions in Administrative Law. Although the Roncarelli decision required the Court to look at policy in protecting individual rights against the state, the Court has generally failed to formulate policy and clear precedent and has not yet evolved coherent body of Administrative Law.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 213
Author(s):  
Budi Suhariyanto

Diskresi sebagai wewenang bebas, keberadaannya rentan akan disalahgunakan. Penyalahgunaan diskresi yang berimplikasi merugikan keuangan negara dapat dituntutkan pertanggungjawabannya secara hukum administrasi maupun hukum pidana. Mengingat selama ini peraturan perundang-undangan tentang pemberantasan tindak pidana korupsi tidak merumuskan secara rinci yang dimaksudkan unsur menyalahgunakan kewenangan maka para hakim menggunakan konsep penyalahgunaan wewenang dari hukum administrasi. Problema muncul saat diberlakukannya Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2014 dimana telah memicu persinggungan dalam hal kewenangan mengadili penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) antara Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dengan Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi. Pada perkembangannya, persinggungan kewenangan mengadili tersebut ditegaskan oleh Peraturan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 4 Tahun 2015 bahwa PTUN berwenang menerima, memeriksa, dan memutus permohonan penilaian ada atau tidak ada penyalahgunaan wewenang (termasuk diskresi) dalam Keputusan dan/atau Tindakan Pejabat Pemerintahan sebelum adanya proses pidana. Sehubungan tidak dijelaskan tentang definisi dan batasan proses pidana yang dimaksud, maka timbul penafsiran yang berbeda. Perlu diadakan kesepakatan bersama dan dituangkan dalam regulasi tentang tapal batas persinggungan yang jelas tanpa meniadakan kewenangan pengujian penyalahgunaan wewenang diskresi pada Pengadilan TUN.Discretion as free authority is vulnerable to being misused. The abuse of discretion implicating the state finance may be prosecuted by both administrative and criminal law. In view of the fact that the law on corruption eradication does not formulate in detail the intended element of authority abuse, the judges use the concept of authority abuse from administrative law. Problems arise when the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 triggered an interception in terms of justice/ adjudicate authority on authority abuse (including discretion) between the Administrative Court and Corruption Court. In its development, the interception of justice authority is affirmed by Regulation of the Supreme Court Number 4 of 2015 that the Administrative Court has the authority to receive, examine and decide upon the appeal there is or there is no misuse of authority in the Decision and / or Action of Government Officials prior to the criminal process. That is, shortly before the commencement of the criminal process then that's when the authority of PTUN decides to judge the misuse of authority over the case. In this context, Perma No. 4 of 2015 has imposed restrictions on the authority of the TUN Court in prosecuting the abuse of discretionary authority.


Author(s):  
G. Edward White

Volume 2 of this series devoted several chapters to the emergence of what it called “guardian review” on the Supreme Court, a posture in which justices acted as guardians of individual rights against restrictions by the state. This volume contains several chapters exploring the replacement of that posture with “bifurcated review,” featuring a deferential attitude toward some restriction of individual rights and aggressive scrutiny of others. This chapter describes the evolution from guardian to bifurcated review on the Court and matches it to changes in the Court’s internal decision-making protocols from the 1940s through to the 1970s.


Refuge ◽  
2002 ◽  
pp. 15-22
Author(s):  
Audrey Macklin

In Suresh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Ahani v. MCI, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that removing a refugee accused of terrorism to a country where he or she would face a substantial risk of torture or similar abuse would virtually always violate the individual’s rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the Court deserves praise for vindicating fundamental human rights over competing claims of national security, coming so close on the heels of September 11, the victory is in certain respects more apparent than real. Given the strong endorsement of judicial deference to the exercise of Ministerial discretion in national security matters, the Court leaves the state wide scope to circumvent the spirit of the judgment while adhering to its letter.


1969 ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
D. H. Clark

The Supreme Court of Canada's contribution to the jurisprudence of administra tive law has been weak and fitful, erratic and lacking in attention to the principles of its own previous decisions. Failure to articulate points of distinction between its decisions has led to uncertainty in the law. The speaker suggested that the insufficiency of the Court's reasoning and the inadequacy of its citation might be reduced if judgments were more often delivered by more members of the Court thus increasing the individual research and writing of the Court so that its earlier fcmons would be kept in view and the case law developed more coherently. Furthermore, the Court should foUow the House of Lords in not considering itself bound by ds own decisions. The speaker regretted the Court's tendency to take mechanically conceptualise approach to substantive administrative law issues- if Canadian courts are to keep pace with those of other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Canada cannot continue to use outworn mumbo-jumbo as substitute for identifyltZtJ «»*"*»* societal interests that are the stuff of /hefPe?kfr aho discussed and compared the contributions of the House of Lords and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Although it has fewer members the House of Lords has more dissenters in administrative law decisions than the Supreme Court of Canada, (whereas the Privy Council until 1966 could not have dissent). While the S.C.C. has been inconsistent and weak, the Privy Council has been consistent and weak. Although there have been occasional achievements, between 1951 and 1971 the Privy Council rendered series of regressive decisions that impaired coherent development of the administrative law in England and in the Commonwealth. ReidZhh^ i*' f" H0USe °f Lof* under the influenc* of the late Lord h^'^nuJf has enjoyed as most creative °n TegreSSiVe period inPrivy relation Council to public decisions> law si™ However *• earlyhaknZd 1960's mnnt rxiicc ft ££Icrt has*eenperfo


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-221
Author(s):  
Azzahrawi Azzahrawi ◽  
Husni Djalil ◽  
Zahratul Idami

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana wewenang Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara dalam menyelesaikan sengketa kepegawaian setelah upaya administratif beserta permasalahan/kendala dan upaya mengatasi permasalahan/kendala tersebut. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian Yuridis Normatif yaitu penelitian yang mengkaji studi dokumen, yakni menggunakan berbagai data sekunder seperti Peraturan Perundang-undangan, teori hukum dan beberapa pendapat para ahli serta menggunakan analisis kualitatif yakni dengan menjelaskan data-data yang ada dengan kata-kata atau pernyataan bukan dengan angka-angka. Hasil dari penelitian ini dapat disimpulkan dengan telah disahkannya UU AP telah melahirkan paradigma baru dalam penyelesaian sengketa kepegawaian setelah melalui upaya administratif berupa perubahan kewenangan/kompetensi absolut dari yang semula merupakan kewenangan PT TUN menjadi kewenangan PTUN ditinjau dari pembagian sistem hukum formil materil, undang-undang dalam perspektif ilmu hukum, dan asas preferensi hukum. Kendala/ permasalahannya seperti akan lamanya proses berperkara yaitu Pengadilan tingkat pertama, banding dan kasasi. Kemudian belum dibentuknya Peraturan Pelaksana dari ketentuan Pasal 129 UU ASN, akan terjadi pemeriksaan ganda terhadap sengketa kepegawaian dimaksud antara PT TUN Jakarta dengan PTUN Jakarta. upaya untuk mengatasi kendala tersebut, seperti Mahkamah Agung mengeluarkan Peraturan Mahkamah Agung untuk mengisi kekosongan hukum terhadap masalah tersebut, kemudian agar Pemerintah segera membentuk Peraturan Pelaksana dari Pasal 129 UU ASN, serta Pemerintah dan DPR melakukan revisi terhadap UU Peratun agar disesuaikan kembali dengan UU AP sebagai hukum materil dari Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara.This study aims to determine how the authority of the State Administrative Court in resolving staff disputes after administrative efforts along with problems / obstacles and efforts to overcome these problems / obstacles. This study uses a juridical normative research method that is research that examines the study of documents, which uses a variety of secondary data such as legislation, legal theory and some opinions of experts and uses qualitative analysis by explaining existing data with words or statements not by numbers. The results of this study can be concluded with the ratification of the AP Law has given birth to a new paradigm in the settlement of personnel disputes after administrative efforts in the form of absolute authority / competency changes from what was originally the authority of PT TUN under the authority of the Administrative Court in terms of formal legal system distribution in the perspective of law, and the principle of legal preference. Constraints / problems such as the length of the litigation process are the first court, appeal and cassation. Then the implementation of the Implementing Regulations from the provisions of Article 129 of the ASN Law has not been established, there will be a double examination of the personnel dispute referred to between PT TUN Jakarta and the PTUN Jakarta. efforts to overcome these obstacles, such as the Supreme Court issued a Supreme Court Regulation to fill the legal vacuum on the issue, then the Government immediately formed an Implementing Regulation of Article 129 of the ASN Law, and the Government and Parliament revised the Administrative Law to be re-adjusted to the AP Law as material law of the State Administrative Court.


1969 ◽  
pp. 717
Author(s):  
Alice Woolley

This article examines disclosure rules for administrative tribunals in light of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Stinchcombe. The pre- and post-Stinchcombe administrative law cases relating to document disclosure are discussed with a view to determining the effect that Stinchcombe has had on the administrative process. It is argued that Stinchcombe has had a significant impact on judicial and legislative opinions regarding the importance of document disclosure on procedural fairness in administrative decision-making. However, the application of Stinchcombe in administrative law cases has been neither complete nor unanimous. The appropriateness of the principles of Stinchcombe in the context of proceedings before an administrative tribunal are discussed with specific regard to proceedings before the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark P Mancini

In an upcoming set of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada will review its approach to the standard of review of administrative action. In this paper, the author suggests that the Court must go back to the foundation of judicial review in redesigning the standard of review, namely, the task of courts to police the legal boundaries of the administrative body. To do so, courts must authentically interpret the legislative grant of authority to the administrative decision-maker, particularly to determine the appropriate intensity of review. To that end, the author suggests that the Court should discard two myths that have pervaded modern administrative law: (1) that administrative decisionmakers should be granted deference based on purported expertise in matters of statutory interpretation; and (2) that jurisdictional questions exist separately from questions of law. The myths may impose a different standard of review than the one discernible with the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. The author argues that these court-created devices should not exist at the expense of the constitutionally prescribed duty of the courts to exercise their policing function and engage in genuine statutory interpretation to determine the appropriate standard of judicial review in a given case.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Patrice Garant ◽  
Sylvio Normand

Administrative Tribunals have jurisdiction to deal with questions of law. In the exercise of such jurisdiction they may sometimes make mistakes in the construction of the statutes, regulations or other instruments. Even in the presence of a privative clause, an inferior tribunal should not be the supreme interpret of the law. It is one of the requirements of the « rule of law » that the Superior Court should have a supervisory « droit de regard ». Traditionally, only errors of law going to jurisdiction were out of the shield of the privative clause ; the Superior Courts used to restrain their intervention only after charactarizing the alleged error as « jurisdictional error of law ». Two difficulties came to arise from the approach about whether there exists an error of jurisdiction or one « merely » of law. Firstly, who can tell whether there is a genuine error of law. Secondly, what criteria transmute in the minds of Superior Court Judges an error into one of jurisdiction. The recent case law convinces us of the necessity of a different approach in order to achieve some clarity in this field of Administrative law. Mr. Justice Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada hints at it in the Nispawin and the New Brunswick Liquor Corporation cases. This approach would put an end to the confusion that still prevail in other Supreme Court cases like Blanco or Labrecque. The distinction between errors of law going to jurisdiction and « merely » errors of law is unrational and so unpracticable that it should be abandoned and replaced by what we suggest in the following lines... Mr. Justice Robert Reid of the Ontario Divisional Court has also expressed the same concern in a remarquable judgment.


2009 ◽  
pp. 277-284
Author(s):  
Michael A. Johnston

In Mann the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the police have the power to detain individuals, albeit briefly, for investigative purposes. The Court also supplemented this power with the power to conduct protective searches incident to these investigative detentions (PSIIDs). While the Court made it clear that the power to conduct these searches was not incident to every investigative detention, this power should, nevertheless, be regarded dubiously. The conditions required to conduct a PSIID are lower than those required for a peace officer to make an arrest without a warrant under s. 495 of the Criminal Code for violations of ss. 884 or 905 of the Code. Allowing the police to wield both of these weapons against “crime” augments police power to engage in warrantless searches, and concomitantly decreases individual rights. The recent decision of the Saskatchewan Provincial Court, Youth Justice Court, in C.J.F., illustrates the corrosive effect that Mann and its PSIIDs can have “on the right of individuals to walk the streets free from state interference.” C.J.F. challenges us to ensure that Mann is being properly applied, but it also challenges us to understand the effect of having PSIIDs.


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