scholarly journals Judicial Nullification of Statutes under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982-1988

1969 ◽  
pp. 396 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. L. Morton ◽  
G. Solomon ◽  
I. McNish ◽  
D. W. Poulton

This study assesses the effect of the Charter of Rights on legislative policy-making. Unlike earlier studies limited to the Charter decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, this study identifies and analyzes all reported federal and provincial Court of appeal decisions from 1982 through 1988 in which a statute was declared invalid, in whole or in part. The authors discuss which Charter rights result in the most ' 'nullifications "of statutes, and judicial activism under the Charter, using a statistical analysis to support their assertions. The study also finds that the Charter has had a greater substantive effect on provincial jurisdiction, than on federal creating a tension between provincial rights and minority rights which can be moderated or exacerbated by different modes of judicial interpretation.

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-516
Author(s):  
Denis Lemieux

In this paper, the author deals with the legal foundations of judicial control over errors of law allegedly committed by administrative authorities. The paper also considers the scope of error of law on the face of the record as a ground of review. More specifically, the author has examined all the decisions rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal, the Federal Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada in 1980 and 1981 where there was an allegation of error of law. From this statistical analysis, the author describes and explains the different, and seemingly contradictory, results achieved by these different jurisdictions. The author adds some comments on the constitutionality of privative clauses excluding judicial review of non-jurisdictional errors of law.


1969 ◽  
pp. 861
Author(s):  
Peter McCormick

This paper reports the results of a statistical survey of the success rates of appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada. Appeals from all provinces were examined, but in his analysis Professor McCormick focuses on the Alberta Court of Appeal. The variables he discusses include the geographic and political composition of the Supreme Court, the mix of cases from different areas of the law, the length of experience of Court of Appeal judges, and the presence or absence of dissenting opinions.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Chin

Proprietary estoppel provides one of equity’s most powerful remedies. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which arises when one party acts on the reliance of the promise of another. The promise and corresponding reliance creates a quasi-contract with reliance acting as an alternative to the consideration usually required in contracts. Proprietary estoppel is distinct from other equitable estoppels in that a proprietary estoppel can act as a ‘sword’ and form the basis of a cause of action. If all of the parts of proprietary estoppel are made out, a court can modify or create property rights to satisfy the equity.With regard to the Canadian experience, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently noted that proprietary estoppel has received “somewhat uneven treatment in Canada.” It is within this context that the Court of Appeal for British Columbia split on the proper scope for the Supreme Court of Canada. In Cowper-Smith v Morgan, the Supreme Court of Canada has both clarified the test for — and arguably expanded the scope of — proprietary estoppel in the context of promises exchanged between children over their mother’s care during her lifetime. The fact that a party lacks an interest in the disputed property at the time of the promise does not negate the obligation of fulfilling the promise. Instead, when the party responsible for the expectation has or acquires sufficient interest in the property, proprietary estoppel will attach to that interest and protect the equity. This article will discuss the law of proprietary estoppel in other jurisdictions and how the Supreme Court of Canada has infused this remedy with greater flexibility to satisfy the equity.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 425
Author(s):  
Edith Maria Barbosa RAMOS ◽  
Pedro Trovão do ROSÁRIO ◽  
Sara Barros Pereira de MIRANDA

RESUMOA presente pesquisa por escopo analisar os fenômenos da judicialização e do ativismo judicial a partir das experiências da Suprema Corte do Canadá e do Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro. Observou-se que, em ambos os países, tem havido, nas últimas décadas, uma contínua expansão da autoridade do Poder Judiciário e da sua atuação em temáticas de natureza política até então abordadas apenas pelos Poderes Legislativo e Executivo, o que pode ser evidenciado a partir da análise das decisões proferidas pelas Cortes Supremas dos dois países. Apesar das diferenças na arquitetura constitucional, ambas as Cortes atuam como condutoras do processo de expansão alcance do poder de suas estruturas judiciárias. O presente artigo foi desenvolvido a partir de levantamento bibliográfico em artigos obtidos em diferentes bancos de dados e indexadores, publicados na integra em português e inglês, acessados de forma gratuita. Foram selecionadas revistas científicas na área do Direito Constitucional Comparado com extratos elevados, qualis A e B. Utilizou-se, ainda, dados constantes em documentos oficiais e na legislação pertinente com recorte epistemológico e científico fundado na construção teórica contemporânea dos Direitos Fundamentais. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Judicialização; Ativismo Judicial; Suprema Corte do Canadá; Supremo Tribunal Federal brasileiro. ABSTRACTThis research by scope analyzes the phenomena of judicialization and judicial activism from the experiences of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Brazilian Supreme Court. It has been observed that, in both countries, there has been, in the last decades, a continuous expansion of the authority of the Judiciary Power and its action in themes of a political nature hitherto addressed only by the Legislative and Executive Powers, which can be evidenced by from the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Courts of both countries. Despite differences in constitutional architecture, both courts act as drivers of the process of expanding the power of their judicial structures. This article was developed from a bibliographic survey in articles obtained in different databases and indexers, published in full in Portuguese and English, accessed for free. Scientific journals were selected in the area of Constitutional Law Compared with high extracts, qualis A and B. It was also used data in official documents and relevant legislation with epistemological and scientific basis based on the contemporary theoretical construction of Fundamental Rights. KEYWORDS: Judicialization; Judicial activism; Supreme Court of Canada; Brazilian Supreme Court.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2006
Author(s):  
Sanjeev Anand

The topic of judicial activism in Canada generates considerable disagreement. At a recent conference, retired Supreme Court of Canada Justice John Major stated that “there is no such thing as judicial activism in Canada.”1 In 2001, speaking in his capacity as the Canadian Alliance’s Justice critic, the current federal Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Vic Toews, told Parliament that the Supreme Court has “engaged in a frenzy of constitutional experimentation that resulted in the judiciary substituting its legal and societal preferences for those made by the elected representatives of the people . . . [producing] legal and constitutional anarchy.”2 One prominent constitutional scholar fears that the debate on judicial activism in Canada has begun to produce excessive judicial deference that allows legislatures and officials to act without scrutiny by the judiciary concerning the effects of state action on vulnerable minorities.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah ◽  
Amir Pichhadze

Abstract Rules targeting specific known schemes are not the only tools available in the battle against tax avoidance. Legal systems also use measures that apply generally. The U.S. for example has tended to rely heavily on general doctrines. One such doctrine which is discussed in part 2 of this chapter is the “economic substance” doctrine. Yet as Xiong and Evans recently pointed out “although such judicial doctrines can be used to deal with various aspects of complicated tax abuse judges tended sometimes to limit and sometimes to enlarge the scope of jurisprudential interpretation leading to substantial uncertainty and risk.” One way to limit the discretionary power of judges and overcome the uncertainty apparent in their judgments is by formalizing the doctrines as the US has done by codifying the “economic substance” doctrine in 2010. As explained in part 2 of this chapter a limitation of the “economic substance” doctrine whether it is established judicially or codified by statute may be its focus on the taxpayer’s intentions as the basis for attacking tax avoidance. Part 3 of this chapter goes on to explain that the U.S. could overcome this limitation by adopting a statutory General Anti-Abuse Rule (“GAAR”). GAARs also impose generally applicable limits on what constitutes acceptable (reasonable) tax arrangements. But they do so based on whether the arrangements are consistent with the legislature’s intentions as they were conveyed in the tax provision which the taxpayer is relying on for achieving the tax advantage in question. As Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”) explained “by confining legitimate tax avoidance to schemes that are not inconsistent with the policy underlying the statutory provision invoked by the taxpayer GAAR effectively limits the scope of the principle in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster… that ‘[e]very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be’.” Based on Canada’s experience with the GAAR parts 4 and 5 identify and explain the nexus between statutory interpretation and legislative drafting and the implications of this nexus on the application of a GAAR in the U.S. should Congress choose to take this route. Part 4 identifies that while the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has recognized the need to apply a purposive interpretation of Canada’s GAAR in order to ascertain parliament’s intentions in the relevant tax provision the court has also held that it will only give effect to those intentions which were clearly conveyed by the relevant provision and will not invent a legislative intention which parliament has failed to convey. Part 5 notes that such judicial restraint has also been taken by the U.S. Supreme Court and therefore a similar approach could be expected by the U.S. courts should Congress adopt a GAAR. Therefore it would be up to Congress as it is similarly up to Canada’s Parliament to carefully and clearly draft its legislative intentions otherwise the effectiveness of a GAAR would be undermined.


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