Conversion of Transcendental Function into Imprecise Function

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 501-512
Author(s):  
Kangujam Priyokumar Singh ◽  
Sahalad Borgoyary
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Function

Design of variable precision transcendental function automatic generator

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiangwei Hao ◽  
Jinchen Xu ◽  
Shaozhong Guo ◽  
YuanYuan Xia
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Function ◽  
Variable Precision

scholarly journals The Earth and Pregivenness in Transcendental Phenomenology

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52
Author(s):  
Denis Džanić
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Transcendental Function ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The World

Abstract The doctrine of the pregivenness of the world features prominently in Husserl’s numerous phenomenological analyses and descriptions of the role the world plays in our experience. Properly evaluating its function within the overall system of transcendental phenomenology is, however, by no means a straightforward task, as evidenced by many manuscripts from the 1930s. These detail various epistemological and metaphysical difficulties and potential paradoxes encumbering the notion of the pre-given world. This paper contends that some of these difficulties can be alleviated by revisiting Husserl’s late concept of the earth and, more specifically, disclosing its transcendental function in the constitution of pregivenness. To test this claim, I turn to Husserl’s 1931 manuscript describing the paradox of “the originary acquisition of the world.” I argue that the paradox is dissolved by introducing the transcendental-phenomenological concept of the earth.

I Think, I Am Mad. Derrida, Gaslight and the Irony of the Cogito

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-93
Author(s):  
Dirk Setton
Keyword(s):  
Active Form ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Central Point ◽  
Transcendental Function ◽  
Stanley Cavell ◽  
The Core ◽  
A Value ◽  
Female Protagonist ◽  
History Of ◽  
Supreme Principle

At the climax of George Cukor's Gaslight, a film melodrama from 1944, the female protagonist utters the phrase ‘I am mad’ which Stanley Cavell takes to reveal her Cogito. As such, the formula seems to be a perfect exemplification of Derrida's central point in Cogito and the History of Madness, namely that there is ‘a value and a meaning of the Cogito’, detectable in Descartes's Mediations, which welcomes madness as its genuine and necessary possibility. But how can we conceive of the ‘I think’—the supreme principle of transcendental philosophy constituting the objectivity of cognition and experience—as embracing unreason as its own condition? This article attempts to highlight a quasi-transcendental interpretation of Derrida's answer to this question: deconstruction reveals a certain irony at the core of the primary text of transcendental philosophy. I argue that the formula ‘I am mad’ contains the decisive key to the argument: the irony of the Cogito consists in the fact of its double transcendental functioning—a transcendental function in the ‘middle’ form and a transcendental function in the active form.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document