scholarly journals "Sufficient to Have Stood, Though Free to Fall": Free Will in John Milton's Paradise Lost

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Martineau

In Book I of Paradise Lost, John Milton (1608-1674) asserts his intent to “justifie the wayes of God to men” (Paradise Lost1 I 26), paving the way for a revolutionary discussion of human nature, divinity, and the problem of evil, all couched in an epic retelling of Satan’s fall from grace, his temptation of Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden, as recounted in the Book of Genesis. In his treatment of the biblical account, Milton necessarily broaches a variety of subjects which were both relevant during his time and remain relevant in ours. Among these topics, and certainly one of the most compelling, is the matter of human free will.

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Han-luen Kantzer Komline

This chapter introduces the most significant debates surrounding Augustine’s understanding of the will (uoluntas), the hybrid methodology employed in this work, and the thesis that Augustine articulates a theologically differentiated notion of will. Is Augustine’s notion of will original in the history of Western philosophy? Can his affirmation of free will be sustained given his approach to the problem of evil, foreknowledge, predestination, and grace? How does the concept of free will fit, or fail to fit, within the larger scope of Augustine’s thought? Traditional questions in the literature are adumbrated along the way to show the fruitfulness of a theological account.


PMLA ◽  
1920 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-225
Author(s):  
William Haller

We do not grow less certain, as time goes on, that Milton's idea of the divine nature fails to satisfy some of our deepest religious feelings. We require of theology that it be logical; we require also that it be humane. It may become mystical; but when reason fails, theology must not become illogical; and when reason demands, it must not become inhumane. Milton's God is either inconsistent or cruel or both, but he is not a mystery. Hence Professor Erskine, desiring to find the poet humane, can well argue that the idea of death in Paradise Lost undergoes a distinct change, but hence on the other hand Professor Stoll, desiring to find him consistent, can just as well argue, falling back upon the convenient notion of predestination, that there is no change where the change was intended from the beginning. Yet however we argue, Milton fails as a theologian by attempting to reduce the whole mystery of human nature to a formula and arriving at a dilemma. Pain is in itself an evil which it is the ineffable hope of mankind to destroy. The experience of pain may be used for its elimination, and the end is good, but pain is none the less evil. Man's supreme experience is not in causing but in destroying it. What spiritual satisfaction we could find without this experience is a mystery, but we arrive only at confusion when we say that evil and the cause of it, without ceasing to be evil, are good because without them we should be without the experience. Man at his best seeks to accomplish bis ends with as little pain as possible; God should be nothing short of infinitely more humane than man. Milton's omnipotent beneficence can not or will not do for man what man would do for himself if he were Milton's God. The trouble is, of course, with the whole Calvinistic system of thought. The asserter of eternal providence proves more than we wish to believe. He sinks the ship to dampen the sails. He starts up a snake in order to gain credit for killing it. He blackens the moral character of God in order to dispose of the problem of evil.


Open Theology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Brian C. Macallan

AbstractThe nature of suffering and the problem of evil have been perennial issues for many of the world’s religious traditions. Each in their own way has sought to address this problem, whether driven by the all too present reality of suffering or from philosophical and religious curiosities. The Christian tradition has offered numerous and diverse responses to the problem of evil. The free-will response to the problem of evil, with its roots in Augustine, has dominated the landscape in its attempt to justify evil and suffering as a result of the greater good of having free will. John Hick offers a ‘soul-making’ response to the problem of evil as an alternative to the free will response. Neither is effective in dealing with two key issues that underpin both responses – omnipotence and omniscience. In what follows I will contrast a process theological response to the problem of evil and suffering, and how it is better placed in dealing with both omnipotence and omniscience. By refashioning God as neither all-knowing nor all-powerful, process theodicy moves beyond the dead ends of both the free will and soul-making theodicy. Indeed, a process theodicy enables us to dismount the omnibus in search of a more holistic, and realistic, alternative to dealing with the problem of evil and suffering.


Metaphysica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Maller

Abstract Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.


Author(s):  
Dilan Tuysuz

John Milton, in his epic poem Paradise Lost, describes the expulsion of Adam and Eve from heaven, leading to the beginning of the oldest struggle. However, the representation of the devil in Milton's work, which is considered responsible for all evil in the world, is striking. The fact that Milton's devil's temptation has taken precedence over the story of expulsion of Adam and Eve is similar to Batman being overshadowed by the evil character Joker. Batman, who has many virtues and positive qualities as a superhero, has not impressed the audience as much as wicked Joker. But what makes the bad characters attractive to the reader/audience in Milton's Satan and the Joker? Is the Joker mentally ill? Is there a rebellion like the Satan's behind the Joker's malicious actions or is it possible to talk about a different motivation? The aim of this chapter is to explore the answers to these and similar questions by taking a journey through the psychology of evil. Thus, it will be possible to understand whether our admiration of bad characters is a reflection of the darkness within us.


Kinesic Humor ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 25-50
Author(s):  
Guillemette Bolens

John Milton plays with his readers’ embodied cognition. Reading Paradise Lost triggers complex perceptual simulations that are fascinatingly conflicting at the level of sensorimotricity. The carefully crafted effects thus elicited lead to a possible experience of humor. Kinesic incongruities in Paradise Lost are studied in this chapter to show how critics and expert readers respond to them, and to suggest that such effects are correlated with Milton’s investment in the notion of free will. The fact that Milton was able to create suspense in a plot known by all is addressed in relation to surprisingly dynamic gestures and the impact they may have on the ways in which readers conceive of the Fall of humankind.


1972 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen T. Davis

In this paper I shall discuss a certain theodicy, or line of argument in response to the problem of evil, viz, the so-called ‘free will defence’. What I propose to do is defend this theodicy against an objection that has been made to it in recent years.


Augustinianum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-102
Author(s):  
Jonathan Farrugia ◽  

The Homilies on the Beatitudes are believed to be Gregory of Nyssa’s earliest existing homilies, dating most probably from the Lenten season of 378. In them we can clearly see, although still at an early stage, his thoughts on the problem of evil in the world and its effects on human nature. Reading the homilies from this angle, one can show his original ideas on the introduction of sin in human nature, on the state of the man enslaved by sin and on sin’s effects on him. Gregory also gives some useful and practical suggestions as to how sin can be overcome. Even though in later homilies he goes more deeply into these themes, and sometimes his thought develops and points to different conclusions, it is here in this first set of homilies that we start to see his ideas on sin and redemption taking shape.


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