scholarly journals ReliaQuest: Behind Enemy Lines

10.28945/3916 ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 001-020
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
New Technology ◽  
The United States ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Customer Data ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Security Officer ◽  
Personally Identifiable Information ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Dark Web

It was late on a Friday afternoon. The ReliaQuest Security Operations Center was busy as usual, but nothing was out of the ordinary. ReliaQuest Chief Technology Officer, Joe Partlow, was in his office working on a new technology innovation when his cell phone rang. It was the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) for ABC Company, one of ReliaQuest’s clients–a company with millions of customers across the United States. ABC Company’s CISO had a crisis on his hands. He had just gotten word from his public relations staff that a journalist had called asking for a comment about a supposed leak of millions of customer records containing personally identifiable information (PTT) that could potentially be used to steal identities. Apparently, the data was listed “for sale” on the “dark web” portion of the Internet by an anonymous hacker. The CISO wanted ReliaQuest’s help figuring out whether the data had, in fact, been stolen. If so, who stole it, and how? And what could be done now to re-procure the data lost? The journalist had given the company a 24-hour window before he said he would post a story. There was also the question of whether the supposed data leak was legitimate at all. ABC Company’s security team had not been able to verify that any of their systems had been breached, and there seemed to be no way to inspect the supposed stolen data without purchasing it from the anonymous hacker–something the company was not comfortable doing on its own. The situation was urgent. The prospect of alleged customer data floating around the dark web was deeply troubling to the CISO and to Joe, yet he knew that finding the underlying cause of the situation could require members of the ReliaQuest team to use tactics outside the scope of work formally agreed upon by ReliaQuest and ABC Company. Joe also knew that if the breach was real, any tactics to identify and secure the data that ReliaQuest used could be subject to discovery in a criminal case. Moreover, Joe worried that if the breach was real and had somehow happened while under ReliaQuest’s watch, the incident could create a public relations crisis not only for ABC Company, but also for ReliaQuest. Joe was at a high stakes crossroad for making a decision and time was of the essence. ReliaQuest prided itself on team members’ willingness to do whatever it took to make security possible for customers. Nonetheless, Joe needed to decide: How far should ReliaQuest go to verify the breach? How would they find the underlying cause of the breach? How would they recover stolen data? And who should he consult with both within and outside of ReliaQuest to solve the problem while protecting stakeholders?

scholarly journals Behind Enemy Lines

10.28945/3928 ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 12
Author(s):  
Jonathan Elder ◽  
Nicole Jacobson ◽  
Natalie Remsen ◽  
Kim Wilmath
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
New Technology ◽  
The United States ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Customer Data ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Security Officer ◽  
Security Services ◽  
Security Operations ◽  
Dark Web

A client of a security services firm has received an email from the dark web demanding a ransom or it will start selling data it has stolen from the client. The client as asked for the firm’s assistance in paying the ransom. How should the company proceed? It was late on a Friday afternoon. The ReliaQuest Security Operations Center was busy as usual, but nothing was out of the ordinary. ReliaQuest Chief Technology Officer, Joe Partlow, was in his office working on a new technology innovation when his cell phone rang. It was the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) for ABC Company, one of ReliaQuest’s clients–a company with millions of customers across the United States. ABC Company’s CISO had a crisis on his hands. He had just gotten word from his public relations staff that a journalist had called asking for a comment about a supposed leak of millions of customer records containing personally identifiable information (PTT) that could potentially be used to steal identities. Apparently, the data was listed “for sale” on the “dark web” portion of the Internet by an anonymous hacker. The CISO wanted ReliaQuest’s help figuring out whether the data had, in fact, been stolen. If so, who stole it, and how? And what could be done now to re-procure the data lost? The journalist had given the company a 24-hour window before he said he would post a story. There was also the question of whether the supposed data leak was legitimate at all. ABC Company’s security team had not been able to verify that any of their systems had been breached, and there seemed to be no way to inspect the supposed stolen data without purchasing it from the anonymous hacker–something the company was not comfortable doing on its own. The situation was urgent. The prospect of alleged customer data floating around the dark web was deeply troubling to the CISO and to Joe, yet he knew that finding the underlying cause of the situation could require members of the ReliaQuest team to use tactics outside the scope of work formally agreed upon by ReliaQuest and ABC Company. Joe also knew that if the breach was real, any tactics to identify and secure the data that ReliaQuest used could be subject to discovery in a criminal case. Moreover, Joe worried that if the breach was real and had somehow happened while under ReliaQuest’s watch, the incident could create a public relations crisis not only for ABC Company, but also for ReliaQuest. Joe was at a high stakes crossroad for making a decision and time was of the essence. ReliaQuest prided itself on team members’ willingness to do whatever it took to make security possible for customers. Nonetheless, Joe needed to decide: How far should ReliaQuest go to verify the breach? How would they find the underlying cause of the breach? How would they recover stolen data? And who should he consult with both within and outside of ReliaQuest to solve the problem while protecting stakeholders?

Leadership and Crisis Management (DRAFT)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad W. Butcher
Keyword(s):  
Crisis Management ◽  
Situational Awareness ◽  
Time Pressure ◽  
Healthcare Providers ◽  
Military Medicine ◽  
The United States ◽  
Aviation Industry ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Team Members ◽  
The Military

Medical errors were recently identified as the third leading cause of death in the United States. Many of these errors result from deficiencies in nontechnical skills (NTS), including effective communication and appropriate task delegation. Rapid response teams (RRTs) operate in error-prone, high-stakes environments where elevated clinical risk, substantial time pressure, and the need to perform multiple actions in parallel coexist. Borrowing from the aviation industry and the military, medicine is placing a growing emphasis on instructing healthcare providers, particularly members of teams, in the NTS of crisis management. Barriers to developing these skills can be overcome through encouraging standardization and practice using realistic simulation. When directing a team in the care of a deteriorating patient, RRT leaders must introduce team members and their roles, maintain an assertive yet inclusive tone, practice closed loop communication, control the crowd, maintain situational awareness, promote a flattened hierarchy, and perform regular debriefing sessions.

scholarly journals Shining a Light on Policing of the Dark Web: An Analysis of UK Investigatory Powers

2020 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 407-426
Author(s):  
Gemma Davies
Keyword(s):  
New Technology ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
New Techniques ◽  
Codes Of Practice ◽  
The Law ◽  
Available Technology ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Tools And Techniques ◽  
Dark Web

The dark web and the proliferation of criminals who have exploited its cryptographic protocols to commit crimes anonymously has created major challenges for law enforcement around the world. Traditional policing techniques have required amendment and new techniques have been developed to break the dark web’s use of encryption. As with all new technology, the law has been slow to catch up and police have historically needed to use legislation which was not designed with the available technology in mind. This paper discusses the tools and techniques police use to investigate and prosecute criminals operating on the dark web in the UK and the legal framework in which they are deployed. There are two specific areas which are examined in depth: the use of covert policing and hacking tools, known in the UK as equipment interference. The operation of these investigatory methods within the context of dark web investigations has not previously been considered in UK literature, although this has received greater analysis in the United States and Australia. The effectiveness of UK investigatory powers in the investigation of crimes committed on the dark web are analysed and recommendations are made in relation to both the law and the relevant Codes of Practice. The article concludes that while the UK has recently introduced legislation which adequately sets out the powers police can use during online covert operations and when hacking, the Codes of Practice need to specifically address the role these investigative tools play in dark web investigations. Highlighted as areas of particular concern are the risks of jurisdiction forum shopping and hacking overseas. Recommendations are made for reform of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to ensure clarity as to when equipment interference can be used to search equipment when the location of that equipment is unknown.

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations

2020 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
New Technology ◽  
The United States ◽  
Grey Zone ◽  
Post Cold War ◽  
Asymmetric Warfare ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leadership

This book explores contemporary civil-military relations in the United States. Much of the canonical literature on civil-military relations was either written during or references the Cold War, while other major research focuses on the post-Cold War era, or the first decade of the twenty-first century. A great deal has changed since then. This book considers the implications for civil-military relations of many of these changes. Specifically, it focuses on factors such as breakdowns in democratic and civil-military norms and conventions; intensifying partisanship and deepening political divisions in American society; as well as new technology and the evolving character of armed conflict. Chapters are organized around the principal actors in civil-military relations, and the book includes sections on the military, civilian leadership, and the public. It explores the roles and obligations of each. The book also examines how changes in contemporary armed conflict influence civil-military relations. Chapters in this section examine the cyber domain, grey zone operations, asymmetric warfare and emerging technology. The book thus brings the study of civil-military relations into the contemporary era, in which new geopolitical realities and the changing character of armed conflict combine with domestic political tensions to test, if not potentially redefine, those relations.

scholarly journals The COVID Army: Experiences from the Deployment of Non-Hospitalist Physician Volunteers during the 2020 COVID Pandemic

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Kevin Hauck ◽  
Katherine Hochman ◽  
Mark Pochapin ◽  
Sondra Zabar ◽  
Jeffrey A Wilhite ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New York City ◽  
Medical Center ◽  
The United States ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Front Line ◽  
Clinical Leadership ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Medical Centers ◽  
Hospitalist Physician

Abstract Objective New York City was the epicenter of the outbreak of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. As a large, quaternary care medical center, NYU Langone Medical Center was one of many New York medical centers that experienced an unprecedented influx of patients during this time. Clinical leadership effectively identified, oriented, and rapidly deployed a “COVID Army”, consisting of non-hospitalist physicians, to meet the needs of this patient influx. We share feedback from our providers on our processes and offer specific recommendations for systems experiencing a similar influx in the current and future pandemics. Methods In order to assess the experiences and perceived readiness of these physicians (n=183), we distributed a 32-item survey between March and June of 2020. Thematic analyses and response rates were examined in order to develop results. Results Responses highlighted varying experiences and attitudes of our front-line physicians during an emerging pandemic. Thematic analyses revealed a series of lessons learned, including the need to: (1) provide orientations, (2) clarify roles/ workflow, (3) balance team workload, (4) keep teams updated on evolving policies, (5) make team members feel valued, and (6) ensure they have necessary tools available. Conclusions Lessons from our deployment and assessment are scalable at other institutions.

Biosurveillance: A Modern Look

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
James Lee Brooks
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Homeland Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
First Century ◽  
Direct Result ◽  
Current State ◽  
Twenty First Century ◽  
Security Operations

AbstractThe early part of the twenty-first century saw a revolution in the field of Homeland Security. The 9/11 attacks, shortly followed thereafter by the Anthrax Attacks, served as a wakeup call to the United States and showed the inadequacy of the current state of the nation’s Homeland Security operations. Biodefense, and as a direct result Biosurveillance, changed dramatically after these tragedies, planting the seeds of fear in the minds of Americans. They were shown that not only could the United States be attacked at any time, but the weapon could be an invisible disease-causing agent.

The Undergraduate Marketing Research Course: Two Decades of Change

2020 ◽  
pp. 027347532096050
Author(s):  
Eileen Bridges
Keyword(s):  
Data Collection ◽  
Data Analytics ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Marketing Research ◽  
Customer Data ◽  
Critical Gap ◽  
The Past ◽  
Data Collection And Analysis ◽  
Marketing Data ◽  
Observational Techniques

This article looks back over the past two decades to describe how teaching of undergraduate marketing research has (or has not) changed. Sweeping changes in technology and society have certainly affected how marketing research is designed and implemented—but how has this affected teaching of this important topic? Although the purpose of marketing research is still to better understand target customer needs, the tools are different now: customer data are typically collected using technology-based interfaces in place of such instruments as mailed, telephone, or in-person surveys. Observational techniques collect more data electronically rather than requiring a human recorder. Similarly, sampling has changed: sample frames are no longer widely used. Many of these changes are not yet fully discussed in marketing research courses. On the other hand, there is increasing interest in and availability of courses and programs in marketing data analytics, which teach specialized skills related to analysis and interpretation of electronic databases. Perhaps even more importantly, new technology-based tools permit greater automation of data collection and analysis, and presentation of findings. A critical gap is identified in this article; specifically, effort is needed to better integrate the perspectives of data collection and data analysis given current research conditions.

Media coverage of the unfolding crisis of domestic terrorism in the United States, 1990–2020

2021 ◽  
pp. 2046147X2199601
Author(s):  
Diana Zulli ◽  
Kevin Coe ◽  
Zachary Isaacs ◽  
Ian Summers
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Relations ◽  
Crisis Management ◽  
Media Coverage ◽  
Television News ◽  
News Coverage ◽  
The United States ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Domestic Terrorism ◽  
Definitional Uncertainty

Public relations research has paid considerable attention to foreign terrorist crises but relatively little attention to domestic ones—despite the growing salience of domestic terrorism in the United States. This study content analyzes 30 years of network television news coverage of domestic terrorism to gain insight into four theoretical issues of enduring interest within the literature on news framing and crisis management: sourcing, contextualization, ideological labeling, and definitional uncertainty. Results indicate that the sources called upon to contextualize domestic terrorism have shifted over time, that ideological labels are more often applied on the right than the left, and that definitional uncertainty has increased markedly in recent years. Implications for the theory and practice of public relations and crisis management are discussed.

Development of an Industry Test Facility and Qualification Process for ILI Technology Evaluation and Enhancements: Performance Evaluation Phase

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Cazenave ◽  
Ming Gao ◽  
Hans Deeb ◽  
Sean Black
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Technology Development ◽  
New Technology ◽  
Test Facility ◽  
Technology Evaluation ◽  
Team Members ◽  
Integrity Assessment ◽  
Evaluation Phase ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Pull Tests

The project “Development of an Industry Test Facility and Qualification Processes for in-line inspection (ILI) technology Evaluation and Enhancements” aims to expand knowledge of ILI technology performance and identify gaps where new technology is needed. Additionally, this project also aims to provide ILI technology developers, researchers and pipeline operators a continuing resource for accessing test samples with a range of pipeline integrity threats and vintages; and inline technology test facilities at the Technology Development Center (TDC) of Pipeline Research Council International, Inc. (PRCI), a PRCI managed facility available for future industry and PHMSA research projects. An ILI pull test facility was designed and constructed as part of this project based on industry state-of-the-art and opportunities for capability improvement. The major ILI technology providers, together with pipeline operator team members, reviewed the TDC sample inventory and developed a series of ILI performance tests illustrating one of multiple possible research objectives, culminating in 16-inch and 24-inch nominal diameter test strings. The ILI technology providers proposed appropriate inspection tools based on the types of the integrity threats in the test strings, a series of pull tests of the provided ILI tools were performed, and the technology providers delivered reports of integrity anomaly location and dimensions for performance evaluation. Quantitative measures of detection and sizing performance were confidentially disclosed to the individual ILI technology providers. For instances where ILI predictions were outside of claimed performance, the vendors were given a limited sample of actual defect data to enable re-analysis, thus demonstrating the potential for improved integrity assessment with validation measurements. In this paper, an evaluation of the ILI data obtained from repeated pull-through testing on the 16 and 24-inch pipeline strings at the TDC is performed. The resulting data was aligned, analyzed, and compared to truth data and the findings of the evaluation are presented.

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