Philosophie als Abwandlung des Seins

2006 ◽  
Vol 2006 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-84
Author(s):  
Jacek Filek
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
Philosophical Thinking ◽  
Basic Notion ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Will ◽  
First Philosophy

The history of philosophy is a history of the basic paradigms of philosophical thinking. These paradigms are marked out by the changing ways of experiencing being. Philosophy „declines“ being. Expressing this more grammatico, philosophy conjugates the infinitive „to be“. The first word of the first First Philosophy is „is“ - this is the „antiquity“ of philosophizing, the objective paradigm, the philosophy of objectivity, for which reason is the dominant human faculty and truth is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the past. The first word of the second First Philosophy is „I am“ - this is the „modernity“ of philosophizing, the subjective paradigm, the monological philosophy of subjectivity, for which the will is the dominant human faculty and freedom is the primary notion. The time of this paradigm is the future. The first word of the third First Philosophy is „you are“ - this is „the now“ of philosophizing, the dialogical paradigm, the philosophy of „the other“, for which feeling is the dominant faculty and responsibility is the primary notion. The basic notion of this new paradigm of thinking is responsibility, and its time is the present. These paradigms, however, are not in conflict with one another; rather, in showing the various aspects of being they help us to experience its fullness. The full experience of being can therefore be summarized in a triad of notions: truth - freedom - responsibility. However, what responsibility consists of remains to be determined.

scholarly journals Progress and Historical Reflection in Philosophy

2018 ◽  
pp. 51-68
Author(s):  
Thomas Grundmann
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Past ◽  
Systematic Philosophy ◽  
History Of ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
The One ◽  
Historical Reflection ◽  
A Minor ◽  
Over Time

What is the epistemic significance of reflecting on a discipline’s past for making progress in that discipline? The author assumes that the answer to this question negatively correlates with that discipline’s degree of progress over time. If and only if a science is progressive, then what people have thought and argued in the past in that discipline ceases to be up to date. This chapter distinguishes different dimensions of disciplinary progress and subsequently argue that veritic progress, that is, collective convergence to truth, is the most important dimension for disciplines with scientific ambitions. It then argues that, on the one hand, veritic progress in philosophy is more significant than many current philosophers believe, but that, on the other hand, it also has severe limitations. The author offers an explanation of these limitations that suggests that the history of philosophy should play some role, though only a minor one, in systematic philosophy.

scholarly journals Teorías analíticas de las emociones: el debate actual y sus precedentes históricos

2008 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
The Past ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One ◽  
Historical Developments

RESUMENDurante los últimos años, la filosofía analítica ha centrado su interés en la temática de las emociones y se han elaborado las más diversas teorías. En este artículo me propongo, por un lado, exponer las principales líneas de investigación actuales sobre las emociones y desarrollar los argumentos en favor y en contra cada una de ellas con el fin de perfilar mi propia posición; por otro lado, voy a presentar los desarrollos históricos precedentes a las teorías analíticas mostrando que la historia de la filosofía no ha relegado las emociones al olvido.PALABRAS CLAVEEMOCIÓN, FILOSOFÍA ANALÍTICA, TEORÍAS DEL SENTIR, TEORÍAS COGNITIVISTAS.ABSTRACTEmotions are one of the topics that have caught the attention of analytical philosophy during the past years, and philosophers have developed different theories in this field. In this article, I shall present the main lines of investigation in the current debate on emotions and explain the arguments in favour and against each of them in order to build up my own position on the one hand, and, present the historical developments previous to the analytical theories, showing that the history of philosophy has always had an interest in emotions as a topic on the other hand.KEY WORDSEMOTION, ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY, FEELING THEORIES, COGNITIVISTIC THEORIES

Error and the Will

Philosophy ◽  
1963 ◽  
Vol 38 (144) ◽  
pp. 136-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Evans
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Theories Of Truth ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Will ◽  
Concepts Of Knowledge ◽  
Definition Of

Throughout the history of philosophy there has been a sustained interest in the concepts of knowledge, truth and meaning; interest in the concepts of error, falsity and nonsense, on the other hand, has been intermittent and spasmodic. Error, for example, has suffered at the expense of knowledge to such an extent that sometimes its very existence has been denied, or it has been explained away as being merely the absence of or privation of knowledge; many theories of truth are so constructed that no place can be found for falsity, and theories about what constitutes making sense pay, on the whole, little heed to what constitutes nonsense. In this paper I hope to do something to redress the balance so far as error is concerned. My remarks are prompted by the hope that, just as we may best understand health through the study of disease, so a consideration of error or failure may throw light on knowledge or success. It is clearly not very informative to say of error, falsity and nonsense that they are merely the absence of knowledge, truth and sense; indeed it is just as laconic as a proposed medical definition of disease as the absence of health.

scholarly journals ‘n Kykie na kopstukke. Filosofie op Potchefstroom die afgelope eeu (1917-2017). Deel 3: die uitbouers

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Barend van der Walt
Keyword(s):  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Past Century ◽  
Present Contribution ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Cross ◽  
Personal Interests

ABSTRACT A peep-hole on big guns; philosophy at Potchefstroom during the past century (1917-2017). Part 3: the elaborators This article is the third in a series of four which outlines the history of philosophy at Potchefstroom during more than a century. Firstly, two main professors, F. Postma and S.O. Los, who taught philosophy up to about 1917 received attention (cf. Van der Walt, 2017). After this first period of reconnoitring followed a second of systematisation by Proff H.G. Stoker and J.A. Taljaard (cf. Van der Walt, 2018). The present contribution covers the third period, viz. that of the further elaboration in various directions of a Christian-reformational philosophy. At the hand of their academic backgrounds, personal interests and publications the following seven heads of the Department of Philosophy (later School of Philosophy) march past: Proff B. Duvenage, N.T. van der Merwe, Pieter G.W. du Plessis, M. Elaine Botha, Johannes J. Venter, followed by an interim without a departmental head, Pieter J.J.S. Potgieter and Michael F. Heyns. This article is aligned with the framework of an extensive evaluative conclusion about the history of philosophy at Potchefstroom during more than a century as reviewed in this series. The fourth and final contribution will discuss the growing tension in the School has, by 2016, arrived at the cross-roads. SAMEVATTING In ʼn reeks van vier artikels is hierdie die derde wat die hooflyne van die geskiedenis van filosofie op Potchefstroom oor meer as ʼn eeu beskrywe (vgl. Van der Walt, 2017 en 2018 vir die vorige twee). Nadat op ʼn tydperk van filosofiese verkenning (tot ongeveer 1917) gelet is, is twee sisteembouers uit die tweede periode bekyk. Nou word nog sewe profiele van hulle opvolgers ten tonele gevoer, wat as verteenwoordigers van ʼn derde periode van die uitbouing van ʼn Christelike filosofie beskou kan word. Die volgende figure passeer die revue: (1) Benoon Duvenage (departementshoof vanaf 1974 tot 1980); (2) Nicolaas Theodor van der Merwe (vanaf ongeveer 1957 dosent en vanaf 1980 tot 1986 departementshoof); (3) Pieter G.W. du Plessis (dosent vanaf 1957 tot 1965 aan die PU verbonde en tussen 1988 en 1989 waarnemende departementshoof); (4) Marthina Elaine Botha (vanaf 1969 dosent en vanaf 1990 tot 1995 departementshoof; (5) Johannes Jacob Venter (vanaf 1970 dosent aan die PU, na ʼn tydperk (1979-1974) by die Universiteit van Fort Hare weer terug aan die PU en vanaf 1996 tot 1998 departementshoof; (6) Vanaf 1999 tot 2001 verloor filosofie sy selfstandigheid deurdat dit demoveer word tot slegs ʼn vakgroep binne een van die nuutgestigte skole, die Skool vir Sosiale en Owerheidstudies waarvan prof Willie van Wyk die direkteur was. (7) Pieter Jacobus Johannes Stephanus Potgieter (vanaf 2001 tot 2008 direkteur van die nuwe Skool vir Filosofie); (8) Michael F. Heyns (vanaf 2002 dosent in Filosofie en vanaf 2009 tot op datum direkteur van die Skool). Hierdie artikel word afgesluit met ʼn breedvoerige evaluerende terugskouing op die geskiedenis van filosofie op Potchefstroom gedurende meer as ʼn eeu. Die laaste (vierde) bydrae bespreek die groeiende spanning (sedert ongeveer 2010) en die huidige krisis in die Skool vir Filosofie.

The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic ‘One’

1928 ◽  
Vol 22 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 129-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. R. Dodds
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
Greek Thought ◽  
History Of

The last phase of Greek philosophy has until recently been less intelligently studied than any other, and in our understanding of its development there are still lamentable lacunae. Three errors in particular have in the past prevented a proper appreciation of Plotinus' place in the history of philosophy. The first was the failure to distinguish Neoplatonism from Platonism: this vitiates the work of many early exponents from Ficinus down to Kirchner. The second was the belief that the Neoplatonists, being ‘mystics,’ were necessarily incomprehensible to the plain man or even to the plain philosopher. To have encouraged the persistence of this superstition in the nineteenth century is the least pardonable of Creuzer's many sins. The third was the chronological confusion involved in the ascription to Saint Paul's contemporary of the works of the pretended Dionysius Areopagita, which contain a fully-developed Neoplatonic theology. Though the fraud had been exposed by Scaliger, these writings continued down to the beginning of the nineteenth century (and in certain clerical circles down to our own day) to be used as evidence that the ‘Nsoplatonic trinity’ was an inferior imitation of the Christian one. When this false trail was at length abandoned the fashion for orientalizing explanations persisted in another guise: to the earliest historians of Neoplatonism, Simon and Vacherot, the school of Plotinus was (in defiance of geographical facts) ‘the school of Alexandria,’ and its inspiration was mainly Egyptian. Vacherot says of Neoplatonism that it is ‘essentially and radically oriental, having nothing of Greek thought but its language and procedure.’ Few would be found to-day to subscribe to so sweeping a pronouncement; but the existence of an important oriental element in Plotinus' thought is still affirmed by many French and German writers.

scholarly journals Deleuze’s History of Philosophy as Creativity

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-257
Author(s):  
A . A. Sanzhenakov
Keyword(s):  
Negative Attitude ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ordinary Sense ◽  
Specific Nature ◽  
Historical Method ◽  
The Past ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
History Of

The article is devoted to the attempt to reveal the specific nature of Deleuze’s work on the history of philosophy. For this purpose the author analyzes the historical method of Deleuze from two angles. First, he explores the Deleuzean point of view on the history of philosophy. Second, he presents commentators’ account on the work of Deleuze on the history of philosophy. It is shown that, in the opinion of the French philosopher, the history of philosophy in the ordinary sense is a repressive discipline which needs to be overcome. On the other hand, it is shown that the Deleuzean negative attitude towards the history of philosophy and some philosophers of the past arises from his anti-Platonism and an attempt to build an alternative line of metaphysics. In general, the history, according to Deleuze, should not aim to preserve the past (to be a doxography), but, on the contrary, should provide the conditions for creativity.

La ética del Otro: una introducción al pensamiento de Emmanuel Lévinas

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Carlos Alvaréz Teijeiro
Keyword(s):  
Interpersonal Relationships ◽  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Radical Change ◽  
The Other ◽  
Western Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Implications ◽  
Essential Question ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
First Philosophy

Emmanuel Lévinas, the philosopher of ethics par excellence in the twentieth century, and by own merit one of the most important ethical philosophers in the history of western philosophy, is also the philosopher of the Other. Thereby, it can be said that no thought has deepened like his in the ups and downs of the ethical relationship between subject and otherness. The general objective of this work is to expose in a simple and understandable way some ideas that tend to be quite dark in the philosophical work of the author, since his profuse religious production will not be analyzed here. It is expected to show that his ideas about the being and the Other are relevant to better understand interpersonal relationships in times of 4.0 (re)evolution. As specific objectives, this work aims to expose in chronological order the main works of the thinker, with special emphasis on his ethical implications: Of the evasion (1935), The time and the Other (1947), From the existence to the existent (1947), Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority (1961) and, last, Otherwise than being, or beyond essence (1974). In the judgment of Lévinas, history of western philosophy starting with Greece, has shown an unusual concern for the Being, this is, it has basically been an ontology and, accordingly, it has relegated ethics to a second or third plane. On the other hand and in a clear going against the tide movement, our author supports that ethics should be considered the first philosophy and more, even previous to the proper philosophize. This novel approach implies, as it is supposed, that the essential question of the philosophy slows down its origin around the Being in order to inquire about the Other: it is a philosophy in first person. Such a radical change of perspective generates an underlying change in how we conceive interpersonal relationships, the complex framework of meanings around the relationship Me and You, which also philosopher Martin Buber had already spoken of. As Lévinas postulates that ethics is the first philosophy, this involves that the Other claims all our attention, intellectual and emotional, to the point of considering that the relationship with the Other is one of the measures of our identity. Thus, “natural” attitude –husserlian word not used by Lévinas- would be to be in permanent disposition regarding to the meeting with the Other, to be in permanent opening state to let ourselves be questioned by him. Ontology, as the author says, being worried about the Being, has been likewise concerned about the Existence, when the matter is to concern about the particular Existent that every otherness supposes for us. In conclusion it can be affirmed that levinasian ethics of the meeting with the Other, particular Face, irreducible to the assumption, can contribute with an innovative looking to (re)evolving the interpersonal relationships in a 4.0 context.

Same Address, Different Doors: Post-Heritage Deconstruction of the Heritage Household in Upstairs Downstairs in the 1970s and 2010s

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Abbiss
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Social Structures ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
War Narrative ◽  
Critical History ◽  
The Social ◽  
Fourth Series ◽  
History Of ◽  
Multiple Episodes

This article offers a ‘post-heritage’ reading of both iterations of Upstairs Downstairs: the LondonWeekend Television (LWT) series (1971–5) and its shortlived BBC revival (2010–12). Identifying elements of subversion and subjectivity allows scholarship on the LWT series to be reassessed, recognising occasions where it challenges rather than supports the social structures of the depicted Edwardian past. The BBC series also incorporates the post-heritage element of self-consciousness, acknowledging the parallel between its narrative and the production’s attempts to recreate the success of its 1970s predecessor. The article’s first section assesses the critical history of the LWT series, identifying areas that are open to further study or revised readings. The second section analyses the serialised war narrative of the fourth series of LWT’s Upstairs, Downstairs (1974), revealing its exploration of female identity across multiple episodes and challenging the notion that the series became more male and upstairs dominated as it progressed. The third section considers the BBC series’ revised concept, identifying the shifts in its main characters’ positions in society that allow the series’ narrative to question the past it evokes. This will be briefly contrasted with the heritage stability of Downton Abbey (ITV, 2010–15). The final section considers the household of 165 Eaton Place’s function as a studio space, which the BBC series self-consciously adopts in order to evoke the aesthetics of prior period dramas. The article concludes by suggesting that the barriers to recreating the past established in the BBC series’ narrative also contributed to its failure to match the success of its earlier iteration.

Same Address, Different Doors: Post-Heritage Deconstruction of the Heritage Household in Upstairs Downstairs in the 1970s and 2010s

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Abbiss
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Social Structures ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Past ◽  
War Narrative ◽  
Critical History ◽  
The Social ◽  
Fourth Series ◽  
History Of ◽  
Multiple Episodes

This article offers a ‘post-heritage’ reading of both iterations of Upstairs Downstairs: the LondonWeekend Television (LWT) series (1971–5) and its shortlived BBC revival (2010–12). Identifying elements of subversion and subjectivity allows scholarship on the LWT series to be reassessed, recognising occasions where it challenges rather than supports the social structures of the depicted Edwardian past. The BBC series also incorporates the post-heritage element of self-consciousness, acknowledging the parallel between its narrative and the production’s attempts to recreate the success of its 1970s predecessor. The article’s first section assesses the critical history of the LWT series, identifying areas that are open to further study or revised readings. The second section analyses the serialised war narrative of the fourth series of LWT’s Upstairs, Downstairs (1974), revealing its exploration of female identity across multiple episodes and challenging the notion that the series became more male and upstairs dominated as it progressed. The third section considers the BBC series’ revised concept, identifying the shifts in its main characters’ positions in society that allow the series’ narrative to question the past it evokes. This will be briefly contrasted with the heritage stability of Downton Abbey (ITV, 2010–15). The final section considers the household of 165 Eaton Place’s function as a studio space, which the BBC series self-consciously adopts in order to evoke the aesthetics of prior period dramas. The article concludes by suggesting that the barriers to recreating the past established in the BBC series’ narrative also contributed to its failure to match the success of its earlier iteration.

Acta Fluens – Generatives Handeln und Improvisation im Jazz

2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-60
Author(s):  
Davide Sparti
Keyword(s):  
Walter Benjamin ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Human Existence ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Future ◽  
History Of

Obwohl jede menschliche Handlung mit einem gewissen Grad an Improvisation erfolgt, gibt es kulturelle Praktiken, bei denen Improvisation eine überwiegende Rolle spielt. Um das Risiko zu vermeiden, einen zu breiten Begriff von Improvisation zu übernehmen, konzentriere ich mich im vorliegenden Beitrag auf den Jazz. Meine zentrale Frage lautet, wie Improvisation verstanden werden muss. Mein Vorgehen ist folgendes: Ich beginne mit einem Vergleich von Improvisation und Komposition, damit die Spezifizität der Improvisation erklärt werden kann. Danach wende ich mich dem Thema der Originalität als Merkmal der Improvisation zu. Zum Schluss führe ich den Begriff affordance ein, um die kollektive und zirkuläre Logik eines Solos zu analysieren. Paradigmatisch wird der Jazzmusiker mit dem Engel der Geschichte verglichen, der nur auf das Vergangene blickt, während er der Zukunft den Rücken zugekehrt hat, und lediglich ihr zugetrieben wird. Weder kann der Improvisierende das Material der Vergangenheit vernachlässigen noch seine genuine Tätigkeit, das Improvisieren in der Gegenwart und für die Zukunft, aufgeben: Er visiert die Zukunft trotz ihrer Unvorhersehbarkeit über die Vermittlung der Vergangenheit an.<br><br>While improvised behavior is so much a part of human existence as to be one of its fundamental realities, in order to avoid the risk of defining the act of improvising too broadly, my focus here will be upon one of the activities most explicitly centered around improvisation – that is, upon jazz. My contribution, as Wittgenstein would say, has a »grammatical« design to it: it proposes to clarify the significance of the term »improvisation.« The task of clarifying the cases in which one may legitimately speak of improvisation consists first of all in reflecting upon the conditions that make the practice possible. This does not consist of calling forth mysterious, esoteric processes that take place in the unconscious, or in the minds of musicians, but rather in paying attention to the criteria that are satisfied when one ascribes to an act the concept of improvisation. In the second part of my contribution, I reflect upon the logic that governs the construction of an improvised performance. As I argue, in playing upon that which has already emerged in the music, in discovering the future as they go on (as a consequence of what they do), jazz players call to mind the angel in the famous painting by Klee that Walter Benjamin analyzed in his Theses on the History of Philosophy: while pulled towards the future, its eyes are turned back towards the past.

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