scholarly journals Does Lebanon possess the capabilities to defend itself from cyber-theats? Learning from Estonia's experience

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kristofas Barakat

The growing danger of cyber-threats has forced many states to develop and strengthen their cyber-security capabilities. The complex nature of cyber-threats has a profound impact on traditional international relations, as many states today consider cyberspace as the greatest challenge to their national security. Research literature on cyberspace and cyber-threats is particularly limited in the case of Lebanon, despite Lebanon’s interesting cyber-threats history. The domination of traditional security dilemmas have restricted Lebanon from developing a successful cyber-security. The lack of attention and development for cyber-security has made Lebanon an appealing target for various actors to conduct their cyber-operations. The objective of the thesis is to determine whether Lebanon has the ability to defend itself from cyber-threats in spite of a missing cyber-security policy. The thesis offers an analysis of Lebanon’s current conditions with regard to cyber-security at various levels. The thesis employs the international legal framework on cybercrime, the Budapest Convention, in order to assess Lebanon’s capabilities to counter cyber-threats. Furthermore, this study utilizes Estonia, a small Baltic nation considered as one of the leaders in the field, as a comparative case to further examine Lebanon’s cyber-security and identify areas that would bolster Lebanon’s capabilities.

2014 ◽  
pp. 471-514
Author(s):  
Catherine B. Lotrionte

This chapter discusses the nature of cyber threats against government and private computer systems, describing some steps the government has taken and the challenges involved in protecting those systems. The chapter argues that a national security approach for cyber security policy is the most promising option for preventing these cyber threats while operating within the domestic legal framework. After a review of the President's constitutional authorities to protect the nation from traditional threats, the chapter concludes that the President has some power to monitor Internet communications in transit within the United States when the communications threaten the welfare of the nation. The chapter recommends that this authority be augmented by Congressional action through legislation. The President's powers in cyber security, even given Congressional support, however, are still restrained by the protections the Fourth Amendment provides for traditional forms of communication and individual privacy. Although there is limited Fourth Amendment precedent in the area of cyber security, the well-established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements, based on consent, special governmental needs and the reasonableness of the search or seizure, provide a legal basis for executive branch action to protect critical infrastructures and their computer systems. As the Courts have long held, these exceptions allow the government to conduct searches or seizures without being bound by all of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. If the government develops its cyber security policy in line with these exceptions, this chapter argues the government can both protect critical computer systems and operate within Fourth Amendment doctrine that recognizes the legitimacy of privacy in electronic communications.


Author(s):  
Olivera Injac ◽  
Ramo Šendelj

This chapter gives explanation on theoretical framework of the national security policy and strategy. Moreover, it analyzes selected countries approaches to cyber security in national policy and how countries build their capacities to face with risks, and address objectives in some cyber security policies. Also, in this chapter are described different sorts and sources of cyber threats, techniques of cyber attacks and frequently used tools (software and hardware) by cyber attackers. In addition, according with Symantec's and Kaspersky's annual report about Internet security threats for 2014, were analyzed the most important cyber threats and attacks during 2013. Furthermore, the chapter shows organization structure of cyber security system of Montenegro, statistical analysis of users activities in cyber space and cyber incidents that happened in Montenegro during 2014.


2021 ◽  
pp. 84-94
Author(s):  
Mohammed. I. Alghamdi ◽  

The cyber security risks on Intellectual Property (IP) have unfortunately become the center of media attention quite recently. The cyber domain has risen to the front position of national security policy in the United States. This growth has created room for developing a lot of innovative technologies to prevent IP cyber-attacks. Usually, cyber-attacks target private data. But cyber-attacks have recently expanded their threat level to intellectual property. These threats affect companies, people, and even national security. Cyber threats to IP will be victimized by globalization. Hence, this article is aimed to explore existing innovative technologies used to prevent IP cyber-attacks and their future scope. To find out the existing technologies used in the prevention of cyber-attacks, secondary data will be used from recent reports by various public and government organizations, research papers, and news portals, and other relevant sources. Since cyber threats are increasing, a comprehensive, multinational strategy is needed for making better cyber security infrastructure. This strategy would improve international relations, protect international supply chains, innovation, and reduce financial losses.


2016 ◽  
pp. 100-128
Author(s):  
Olivera Injac ◽  
Ramo Šendelj

This chapter gives explanation on theoretical framework of the national security policy and strategy. Moreover, it analyzes selected countries approaches to cyber security in national policy and how countries build their capacities to face with risks, and address objectives in some cyber security policies. Also, in this chapter are described different sorts and sources of cyber threats, techniques of cyber attacks and frequently used tools (software and hardware) by cyber attackers. In addition, according with Symantec's and Kaspersky's annual report about Internet security threats for 2014, were analyzed the most important cyber threats and attacks during 2013. Furthermore, the chapter shows organization structure of cyber security system of Montenegro, statistical analysis of users activities in cyber space and cyber incidents that happened in Montenegro during 2014.


2012 ◽  
pp. 308-351
Author(s):  
Catherine B. Lotrionte

This chapter discusses the nature of cyber threats against government and private computer systems, describing some steps the government has taken and the challenges involved in protecting those systems. The chapter argues that a national security approach for cyber security policy is the most promising option for preventing these cyber threats while operating within the domestic legal framework. After a review of the President’s constitutional authorities to protect the nation from traditional threats, the chapter concludes that the President has some power to monitor Internet communications in transit within the United States when the communications threaten the welfare of the nation. The chapter recommends that this authority be augmented by Congressional action through legislation. The President’s powers in cyber security, even given Congressional support, however, are still restrained by the protections the Fourth Amendment provides for traditional forms of communication and individual privacy. Although there is limited Fourth Amendment precedent in the area of cyber security, the well-established exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements, based on consent, special governmental needs and the reasonableness of the search or seizure, provide a legal basis for executive branch action to protect critical infrastructures and their computer systems. As the Courts have long held, these exceptions allow the government to conduct searches or seizures without being bound by all of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. If the government develops its cyber security policy in line with these exceptions, this chapter argues the government can both protect critical computer systems and operate within Fourth Amendment doctrine that recognizes the legitimacy of privacy in electronic communications.


1989 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-12
Author(s):  
Glenn Hastedt

Courses on international relations, U.S. foreign policy, Soviet foreign policy, and national security policy spend a great deal of time exploring the question of the Soviet or U.S. strategic threat. For all of its centrality to these courses, students often have, difficulty dealing with the issue in anything other than a gut feeling manner. In part, this is due to the highly technical and complex nature of the subject matter, but it is also due to the passive manner in which students are exposed to the subject. This essay presents one way of actively engaging students in the learning process, forcing them to formulate and defend their own view in the form of an individually or collectively produced intelligence estimate.Understanding why U.S. (Soviet) policy makers see a Soviet (U.S.) threat requires an understanding of the process by which threats are established. The most formal and authoritative U.S. government statements on the dimensions of the Soviet strategic threat are found in national intelligence estimates (NIE's). Typically, the intelligence estimating process is broken down into six functional steps: 1) requirement setting, 2) collection, 3) processing, 4) analysis, 5) reporting, and 6) receipt and evaluation by the consumer (Ransom 1970). NIE's are only one kind of finished intelligence produced by the intelligence community. There is no fixed length or format for an intelligence estimate to follow. The Senator Mike Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers (1971) presents a number of estimates on Vietnam that can be used by students as models. Ransom (1970) presents a handy checklist of questions that students as consumers can use to evaluate estimates.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Czosseck ◽  
Rain Ottis ◽  
Anna-Maria Talihärm

At the time of the state-wide cyber attacks in 2007, Estonia was one of the most developed nations in Europe regarding the ubiquitous use of information and communication technology (ICT) in all aspects of society. Relaying on the Internet for conducting a range of business transactions is common practice. But naturally, the more a society depends on ICT, the more it becomes vulnerable to cyber attacks. Unlike other research on the Estonian incident, this paper does not focus on the analysis of the events themselves. Instead, the authors examine Estonia’s cyber security policy and subsequent changes made in response to the cyber attacks. As such, the authors provide a comprehensive overview of the strategic, legal, and organisational changes based on lessons learned by Estonia after the 2007 cyber attacks. The analysis is based on a review of national security governing strategies, changes in the Estonia’s legal framework, and organisations with direct impact on cyber security. The paper discusses six important lessons learned and manifested in actual changes: each followed by a set of cyber security policy recommendations appealing to national security analysts as well as nation states developing their own cyber security strategy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Liu

Abstract What explains variations in the proactiveness of Japanese Prime Ministers (PMs) toward national defense? Although the Japanese Constitution renounces the use of force, leaders sometimes speak assertively over national security. Drawing on competing international relations and Japanese foreign policy theories, this study seeks to quantitatively model and analyze predictors of political rhetoric in PMs’ speeches and statements from 2009 to 2019. Each statement is coded into four sets of binary dependent variables through content analysis and tested against five competing hypotheses. The main finding reveals that leaders become more likely to advocate for specifically assertive national security policy when Chinese vessel intrusion increases, but not when North Korea missile tests and aircraft scrambles increase. Instead of a diversionary use of words, an emboldening effect is evident in rhetoric that evokes responsibility in international defense, moderated by ruling government strength. The findings advance academic understandings of Japanese national security policy messaging and highlight the effect of external threat perception on political rhetoric.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

This critique of Karson K. Thompson’s note, "Not Like an Egyptian: Cybersecurity and the Internet Kill Switch Debate," argues that the U.S. lacks a framework of laws and regulations, "smart" or otherwise, that adequately incentivizes the parties with the greatest capacity to improve our cyber security to do so. It attributes the poor state of U.S. cyber policy to the "bewildering array of overlapping responsibilities" scattered among government offices and departments; the difficult imperative of sharing responsibility among military and civilian authorities; the fact that most of the networks (and the dependent critical infrastructures) that need protecting are in private hands; and the lack of public understanding of the kinds of regulation that are necessary or appropriate. The essay argues that meaningful progress towards an adequate legal framework depends on a broad national debate aimed at defining the public good with regard to cyber-security, and the inevitable trade-offs among security, privacy, productivity, economic growth, organizational flexibility, military effectiveness, government transparency, and accountability that must be confronted in making sensible cyber-security policy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-33
Author(s):  
Ieva Karpavičiūtė

Abstract The paper addresses the security threat perception and securitization of existential threats in Lithuania. It focuses upon the securitization theory and its ability to explain the change of national security agendas as affected by the changes in national identity and existential security threats. It takes into account the internal and external factors that are shaping the objective and subjective national threat perception. The paper applies O. Waever’s securitization theory with an aim to explain how the national security threats are being addressed and perceived in Lithuania. Moreover, the paper is developed against the backdrop of the most recent developments in securitization theory and evolution of its theoretical perceptions of identity, existential threats, and legitimacy. It also discusses the possibility of inclusion of hybrid security threats into an analysis of securitization. The empirical part of the article assesses the most recent security challenges, provides evaluation of changes in national security perception, and portrays the dynamics of national security threats as defined in the National Security Strategies and the Military Doctrine. The paper focuses upon the most recent dynamics in security policy of Lithuania. It also takes into account the hybrid nature of security threats and the reaction to hybrid security elements such as: cyber security, information security, and international terrorism.


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