Public-utility foreman dies after being struck against the protective cab of a tractor - Virginia, December 21, 1995.

This paper examines the similarities and differences between public and private ownership of water utilities, including variations such as corporatisation. In any utility where the asset owner and the asset operator are the same, there are pressures to reduce operations and maintenance costs and capital expenditure to maximise returns. The authors argue that this is the case irrespective of whether such returns are to private shareholders or dividends to government. On the other hand, where the asset owner and the asset operator are separate entities with a clearly defined contractual interface, it is not possible to increase returns by reducing operations and maintenance standards, presuming a properly constructed contract. This is because the performance standards are clearly stipulated in the contract with payment reductions applying for non-performance. Such a model can be put in place irrespective of whether the asset owner is a private company or a public utility. The paper examines the profit incentive applying to private and public sector organisations in models where:the asset owner and the asset operator are the same organisation;models where the asset owner and the asset operator are separate organisations, with the service delivery performance governed by a clearly defined contractual interface. The paper shows why the drivers governing the behaviour of public sector and private sector owners are similar, and how the separation of asset owner and asset operator can be used to ensure that service delivery standards are achieved at the lowest cost, whilst providing full transparency to shareholders, regulators and customers alike. The paper also reviews actual comparative data on service quality and performance under a number of ownership and contractual models, and draws conclusions on the effectiveness of the various asset owner/operator models in terms of service delivery performance and costs.

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Vision 2020: Atlanta Watershed Management’s Roadmap to Become a Leading Public Utility

Proceedings of the Water Environment Federation ◽

10.2175/193864718823773607 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 2018 (1) ◽

pp. 487-495

Author(s):

Kishia L Powell ◽

Andrada Butler

Keyword(s):

Public Utility ◽

Vision 2020

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OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING, ABORIGINAL COST, AND POOLING OF INTERESTS ACCOUNTING

Accounting Historians Journal ◽

10.2308/0148-4184.39.2.45 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 39 (2) ◽

pp. 45-80 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Hugo Nurnberg

Keyword(s):

Public Policy ◽

Financial Reporting ◽

Information Needs ◽

Public Utility ◽

Financial Reports ◽

Policy Makers ◽

Business Combinations ◽

Decision Usefulness ◽

Rate Base ◽

Utility Rate

ABSTRACT Through the years, pooling of interest accounting was criticized as contrary to the decision usefulness objective of financial reporting and potentially misleading to stockholders and creditors, the assumed principal users of financial reports. This paper does not dispute those criticisms. It demonstrates, however, that there were some very good reasons for permitting pooling accounting for certain business combinations when the method was developed in the 1940s. At that time, the basic objectives of financial accounting encompassed stewardship and decision usefulness for multiple users, including public utility regulators and public policy makers. Pooling accounting developed in part to satisfy the information needs of public utility regulators who favored aboriginal (original historical) cost to determine the utility rate base; additionally, it was favored by public policy makers who sought lower utility rates (prices) to foster social and economic goals.

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