scholarly journals Research on the Mechanism of Synergetic Improvement between Accounting Control and Corporate Governance

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Accounting Control

scholarly journals Interconnection of functional subsystems of corporate governance

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Svetlana Sharokhina ◽  
Olga Pudovkina
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Management System ◽  
Enterprise Management ◽  
Corporate Management ◽  
Control Analysis ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Governance Process ◽  
Enterprise Management System ◽  
Accounting Control ◽  
Management Functions

The article discusses the features of corporate governance associated with the distribution of ownership and management functions. The components of corporate governance elements are considered in two directions: from the standpoint of the requirements of the current law; from the position of identifying corporate governance with the overall management system in the enterprise. The necessity of applying a systematic approach to the allocation of management functions is justified and their relationship in the corporate governance system is determined. The authors argue that in analyzing corporate governance, one cannot identify it with the enterprise management system in general and exclude the influence of owners on the corporate governance process. The authors propose from the set of corporate governance functions called the following list of functions arranged according to their priority, ambiguity, essence: planning, organization, accounting, control, analysis, regulation. The article describes the goals of implementing individual corporate governance functions and outlines the relationship of some functions with others. The authors call the features of the implementation of the analytical function associated with the opposite of interests. So, if for the management of the company carrying out analytical calculations should contribute to the scientific justification of management decisions, then carrying out analytical calculations by owners is most often aimed at assessing the effectiveness of the enterprise through the activities of management personnel. It is substantiated that the need to study the analytical subsystem, taking into account the requirements of a system-functional approach, is dictated by the fact that it is a subsystem in the general corporate management system, which has an informational relationship with other functional subsystems and is implemented both by the owners and the management of the enterprise. In the course of the study, it was found that the main feature of corporate governance is associated with the distribution of the overall management system between the enterprise management and its owners. At the same time, certain functions are implemented only by certain corporate governance bodies, while others are inherent to both owners and management.

scholarly journals The Effect Of Internal Control Weakness On Investment Efficiency

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 649-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Jaehong ◽  
Cho Eunjung ◽  
Choi Hyunjung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Accounting System ◽  
Accounting Quality ◽  
Severe Problem ◽  
Internal Accounting Control ◽  
Accounting Control ◽  
Internal Accounting

This paper examines whether material weakness in internal accounting control is negatively associated with investment efficiency in Korea. Since internal accounting control weakness drives poor accounting quality and poor accounting quality exacerbates information asymmetry between firms and outside capital suppliers, managerial investment cannot be monitored effectively which result in over- and/or under- investment. Since internal accounting system is closely related to corporate governance, weak internal accounting control is often associated with poor corporate governance, and this control environment makes it hard to monitor managerial opportunistic behavior, causing abnormal investment such as over- and/or under- investment.  We find that firms with internal accounting control weakness tend to make over- and under- investment. We also find the number of weakness in internal accounting control is negatively related to investment efficiency. In addition, three types of qualified review opinion - overall company level weakness, account-specific weakness and disclaimer review opinion due to scope limitation - are differentially affected to investment efficiency; disclaimer review opinion is present the most severe problem in internal accounting control that drives over- and under- investment. Our findings suggest weak internal accounting control provides poor monitoring to manager and cannot restrain managerial inefficient investment decision. 

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and ERM for SMEs Viability in Italy

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrizia Riva ◽  
Maurizio Comoli ◽  
Ambra Garelli
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Independent Control ◽  
Risk Monitoring ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Family Smes ◽  
Accounting Control

Family Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (Family SMEs) in Italy have been asked by the new Insolvency and Crisis Code (IC-Code) to establish organizational, management and accounting bodies and tools appropriate to their nature and size. They need to be able to face early warning of company’s crisis and potential loss of going concern and to be able to implement strategies provided by the law to recover viability. The peculiarity of the Italian System is the joint existence of two levels of controls. A “downstream” one carried out by Auditors in charge of the accounting control and an “upstream” one carried out by the Supervisory Board in charge for the surveillance of directors’ behaviour. The board of statutory auditors (Collegio Sindacale), which has been defined as the watchdog distinguishing Italian corporate governance system, plays a fundamental role in reaching the goal. Its supervisory activities are played ex-ante over directors and are set with independence and competence. Auditors, instead, operate when everything has already been decided or even implemented concentrating on the accounting issues. The IC-Code sets up new corporate governance rules for a huge number of Family SMEs requiring the appointment of independent control bodies, Board of Statutory Auditors and Auditors and demanding therefore for more attention to risk monitoring and managing.

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