Enabling Radical Innovation Through Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD): The Case of the Internet Routing in Space (IRIS) JCTD

Implementasi BGP dan Resource Public Key Infrastructure menggunakan BIRD untuk Keamanan Routing

Jurnal RESTI (Rekayasa Sistem dan Teknologi Informasi) ◽

10.29207/resti.v5i6.3631 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 5 (6) ◽

pp. 1161-1170

Author(s):

Valen Brata Pranaya ◽

Theophilus Wellem

Keyword(s):

Autonomous Systems ◽

Public Key Infrastructure ◽

Digital Certificate ◽

Public Key ◽

The Internet ◽

Certification Authority ◽

Internet Routing ◽

Internet Connectivity ◽

Routing Security ◽

Bgp Routing

The validity of the routing advertisements sent by one router to another is essential for Internet connectivity. To perform routing exchanges between Autonomous Systems (AS) on the Internet, a protocol known as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is used. One of the most common attacks on routers running BGP is prefix hijacking. This attack aims to disrupt connections between AS and divert routing to destinations that are not appropriate for crimes, such as fraud and data breach. One of the methods developed to prevent prefix hijacking is the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). RPKI is a public key infrastructure (PKI) developed for BGP routing security on the Internet and can be used by routers to validate routing advertisements sent by their BGP peers. RPKI utilizes a digital certificate issued by the Certification Authority (CA) to validate the subnet in a routing advertisement. This study aims to implement BGP and RPKI using the Bird Internet Routing Daemon (BIRD). Simulation and implementation are carried out using the GNS3 simulator and a server that acts as the RPKI validator. Experiments were conducted using 4 AS, 7 routers, 1 server for BIRD, and 1 server for validators, and there were 26 invalid or unknown subnets advertised by 2 routers in the simulated topology. The experiment results show that the router can successfully validated the routing advertisement received from its BGP peer using RPKI. All invalid and unknown subnets are not forwarded to other routers in the AS where they are located such that route hijacking is prevented.

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APT

Fog Computing ◽

10.4018/978-1-5225-5649-7.ch007 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 158-182

Author(s):

Dan Jen ◽

Michael Meisel ◽

Daniel Massey ◽

Lan Wang ◽

Beichuan Zhang ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Performance Evaluation ◽

Service Providers ◽

The Internet ◽

Global Routing ◽

Internet Routing ◽

Internet Address ◽

Routing Table ◽

The Cost ◽

Edge Networks ◽

Extensive Performance

The global routing system has seen a rapid increase in table size and routing changes in recent years, mostly driven by the growth of edge networks. This growth reflects two major limitations in the current architecture: (a) the conflict between provider-based addressing and edge networks' need for multihoming, and (b) flat routing's inability to provide isolation from edge dynamics. In order to address these limitations, we propose A Practical Tunneling Architecture (APT), a routing architecture that enables the Internet routing system to scale independently from edge growth. APT partitions the Internet address space in two, one for the transit core and one for edge networks, allowing edge addresses to be removed from the routing table in the transit core. Packets between edge networks are tunneled through the transit core. In order to automatically tunnel the packets, APT provides a mapping service between edge addresses and the addresses of their transit-core attachment points. We conducted an extensive performance evaluation of APT using trace data collected from routers at two major service providers. Our results show that APT can tunnel packets through the transit core by incurring extra delay on up to 0.8% of all packets at the cost of introducing only one or a few new or repurposed devices per AS.

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Identifying Recurrence Behaviour in the Underlying BGP Traffic

International Journal of Information Communication Technology and Applications ◽

10.17972/ijicta20184142 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 4 (1) ◽

pp. 34-47

Author(s):

Bahaa Qasim Al-Musawi ◽

Philip Branch

Keyword(s):

Statistical Analysis ◽

Routing Protocol ◽

Autonomous Systems ◽

Border Gateway Protocol ◽

The Internet ◽

Internet Routing ◽

Periodic Behaviour ◽

Linear And Nonlinear ◽

The Stability

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an Internet routing protocol responsible for exchanging network reachability information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). Monitoring and mining BGP traffic are important aspects to understand and improve the stability of the Internet. However, identifying the characteristics of BGP traffic is much harder than it seems at a first glance where BGP traffic has been identified as complex, voluminous, and noisy. In this paper, we show that BGP traffic can be understood as an aggregation of oscillations of different frequencies from different ASes. Using linear and nonlinear statistical analysis, we show that BGP traffic shows recurrent behaviour. The source of this behaviour is unsynchronised periodic behaviour from a set of ASes.

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Combatting internet time shifters

The Project Repository Journal ◽

10.54050/prj10008011 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

pp. 8-11

Author(s):

Michael Schapira

Keyword(s):

Border Gateway Protocol ◽

The Internet ◽

Data Traffic ◽

Internet Routing ◽

Routing Security ◽

Bank Of England

Combatting internet time shifters Arguably, the internet’s biggest security hole is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which establishes routes between the organisational networks that make up the internet (e.g. Google, Facebook, Bank of England, Deutsche Telekom, AT&T). The insecurity of the internet’s routing system is constantly exploited to steal, monitor, and tamper with data traffic. Yet, despite many years of Herculean efforts, internet routing security remains a distant dream. The goal of the SIREN project is to propose and investigate novel paradigms for closing this security hole.

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