scholarly journals Habermas, Discourse Ethics, and Normative Validity

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-166
Author(s):  
Dennis de Vera ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Normative Validity

Die Wirklichkeit des Sittlichen

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Kersting
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Hermeneutic Approach ◽  
The Given ◽  
Moral Convictions

Within the Kantian ethics consciousness of the moral principle is a fact of reason which cannot be grounded in any antecedent data, empirical or rational. Hegel however argues that the fact of reason is necessarily embedded in the fact of „Sittlichkeit“, that a pure reason is an empty and chimerical construction, that moral knowledge is unavoidably rootet in the contingent moral convictions of the given cultural and social environment. This essay defends Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral philosophy and – by generalizing Hegel’s hermeneutic approach – sketches the outlines of an explicatory concept of ethics which contradicts the scientistic understanding of moral philosophy characteristic for Kant, the utilitarianism and the supporters of discourse ethics likewise.

Legitimacy, Democracy, and Justice

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Forst
Keyword(s):  
Basic Concepts ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Normative Content ◽  
Normative Validity

This chapter attempts to provide a reflexive answer to the question of the relationship between the three basic concepts of political normativity. These concepts are: legitimacy, democracy, and justice. It is commonly assumed that these three concepts are arranged in order of increasing normative content: the concept of legitimacy is thought to involve less extensive normative investments than that of democracy, whereas justice, by contrast, is not only regarded as the highest political good but also seems to be in rivalry with the concept of democracy and to go beyond legitimacy. In addition, “reflexivity” here is taken as the ability to ascertain the ultimate justifying reasons for the claim to normative validity. This is not only a theoretical but also a practical virtue, since practices and institutions can exhibit reflexivity insofar as they adopt a critical stance on their justifiability.

Globalizing Feminist Ethics

Hypatia ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison M. Jaggar
Keyword(s):  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
The Other ◽  
Discourse Community ◽  
Feminist Ethics ◽  
Small Communities ◽  
Local Contexts ◽  
Global Discourse ◽  
Open Discussion ◽  
The One

The feminist conception of discourse offered below differs from classical discourse ethics. Arguing that inequalities of power are even more conspicuous in global than in local contexts, I note that a global discourse community seems to be emerging among feminists, and I explore the role played by small communities in feminism's attempts to reconcile a commitment to open discussion, on the one hand, with a recognition of the realities of power inequalities, on the other.

scholarly journals The paradox of imperfect duty in Kant's moral philosophy: A problem in 'applying' ethics'

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 540-564
Author(s):  
Phillip Richter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Imperfect Duty ◽  
Helping Others ◽  
Metaphysics Of Morals

The Applied Ethics debate has not yet sufficiently clarified what application of ethics exactly is. The issue of application is considered to be especially problematic in Kantian ethics or in discourse ethics. This article describes the concept of applying ethics in Kant. In discussing the duty of helping others and the theory of its application in Metaphysics of Morals it is shown that a strict separation of justification and application in ethical theory results in the paradox of imperfect duty. The paradox says that the duty to help others would be fulfilled without ever being fulfilled in action. To overcome the paradox it is necessary to form submaximes of helping, which are not arbitrarily but instructed by a theory of casuistry. This casuistry, if it is considered as a doctrine of application in Kantian ethics, can overcome the paradox of imperfect duty. However, the casuistry can overcome this paradox only if it is understood as a philosophy of prudence, which can be found in Aristotle or Descartes.

Discourse Ethics and Nature

1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angelika Krebs
Keyword(s):  
Discourse Ethics
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