scholarly journals Argument from Psychological Difference: Why It Makes Sense to Be a Scientific Realist Than an Instrumentalist

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-197
Author(s):  
Vida Mia Valverde ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonia Michelle Dalkin ◽  
Rebecca J. L. Hardwick ◽  
Catherine A. Haighton ◽  
Tracy L. Finch

Abstract Background Realist approaches and Normalization Process Theory (NPT) have both gained significant traction in implementation research over the past 10 years. The aim of this study was therefore to explore how the approaches are combined to understand problems of implementation, to determine the degree of complementarity of the two approaches and to provide practical approaches for using them together. Methods Systematic review of research studies combining Realist and NPT approaches. Realist methodology is concerned with understanding and explaining causation, that is, how and why policies, programmes and interventions achieve their effects. NPT is a theory of implementation that explains how practices become normalised. Databases searched (January 2020) were ASSIA, CINAHL, Health Research Premium Collection via Proquest (Family Health Database, Health & Medical Collection, Health Management Database, MEDLINE, Nursing & Allied Health Database, Psychology Database, Public Health Database) and PsycARTICLES. Studies were included if the author(s) stated they used both approaches: a scientific Realist perspective applying the principles of Pawson and Tilley’s Realist Evaluation or Pawson’s Realist Synthesis and Normalization Process Theory either solely or in addition to other theories. Two authors screened records; discrepancies were reviewed by a third screener. Data was extracted by three members of the team and a narrative synthesis was undertaken. Results Of 245 total records identified, 223 unique records were screened and 39 full-text papers were reviewed, identifying twelve papers for inclusion in the review. These papers represented eight different studies. Extent and methods of integration of the approaches varied. In most studies (6/8), Realist approaches were the main driver. NPT was mostly used to enhance the explanatory power of Realist analyses, informing development of elements of Contexts, Mechanisms and Outcomes (a common heuristic in realist work). Authors’ reflections on the integration of NPT and Realist approaches were limited. Conclusions Using Realist and NPT approaches in combination can add explanatory power for understanding the implementation of interventions and programmes. Attention to detailed reporting on methods and analytical process when combining approaches, and appraisal of theoretical and practical utility is advised for advancing knowledge of applying these approaches in research. Systematic review registration Not registered.


Author(s):  
P. Kyle Stanford

This chapter seeks to explore and develop the proposal that even our best scientific theories are not (as the scientific realist would have it) accurate descriptions of how things stand in otherwise inaccessible domains of nature but are instead simply powerful conceptual tools or instruments for engaging practically with the world around us. It describes a number of persistent challenges facing any attempt to apply the American Pragmatists’ global conception of all ideas, beliefs, theories, and cognitions quite generally as such tools or instruments to only a restricted class or category of such entities (such as our best scientific theories) instead. It then seeks to overcome these challenges by regarding scientific instrumentalism as simply applying the scientific realist’s own attitude toward a theory like Newtonian mechanics to even the most empirically successful and instrumentally powerful theory we have in any given scientific domain.


Author(s):  
Howard Sankey

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 562-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam R C Humphreys

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.


2014 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 272-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annabel Jackson

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that both the processes and outcomes of advocacy can be evaluated in ways that can help with learning and accountability. The paper reviews the literature on evaluating advocacy, with a particular focus on development work, and describes an example of the systematic evaluation of the Business Environment Strengthening in Tanzania-Advocacy Component business advocacy programme in Tanzania. Design/methodology/approach – The evaluation uses a Scientific Realist methodology to give a disaggregated, contextual analysis of advocacy, asking the typically Scientific Realist question: “What works for whom in what circumstances?” Complementary methods are being applied longitudinally over a five-year period and include stakeholder interviews, business surveys, diagnostic tools and learning seminars. Findings – The paper argues that advocacy evaluation is no more complex or difficult than other aspects of development. Rigorous, cost-effective methods can be developed, so long as clear conceptualisation is carried out as an initial step. Systematic analysis of influencing tactics and capacity building demonstrates the relative skill of the advocacy organisations and allows the funder to see intermediate indicators of progress which are otherwise invisible. Practical implications – Consistent conceptualisation and measurement allow comparison over time, and between different types of projects and organisations. Integrating methods with the operation of campaigns or programmes allows the evaluator to give feedback in real time and minimise the burden on evaluands. Originality/value – The paper is based on original research/evaluation. The field is heavily concentrated on social change. The paper makes a contribution by providing an example of advocacy evaluation in the field of business advocacy and economic development. In addition, the example extends the field of advocacy evaluation by considering the systematic evaluation of a whole programme of individual advocacy projects.


Author(s):  
Uskali Mäki

The special challenge the philosophy of economics must meet is to provide a scientific realist account that is realistic of a discipline that deals with a complex subject matter and operates with highly unrealistic models. Unrealisticness in economic models must not constitute an obstacle to realism about those models. This article gives a selective and somewhat abstract summary of its author's thinking about economics, outlined from two perspectives: first historical and autobiographical, then systematic and comparative. The first angle helps understand motives and trajectories of ideas against their backgrounds in intellectual history. The story of this article turns out to have both unique and generalizable aspects. The second approach outlines some of the key concepts and arguments as well as their interrelations in this chapter's philosophy of economics, with occasional comparisons to other views. More space is devoted to this second perspective than to the first.


Dialogue ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 606-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bas C. van Fraassen

There are a number of dimensions to the realism-nominalism controversy. The topics of debate comprise: necessary connections and causality, dispositions and counterfactuals, space and time, the existence of abstract entities and mathematical objects, the existence of the theoretical entities of science. On all these except the last, Sellars takes a non-realist line: and on all these except the last, I agree with him to the extent that I presently have an opinion on them. But Sellars is a scientific realist, encapsulating this realism in the dictum: “to have good reason for holding a theory is ipso facto to have good reason for holding that the entities postulated by the theory exist” ([2], p. 91).


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