scholarly journals Twelve Years a Terror: U.S. Impact in the 12-Year Civil War in El Salvador

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cara McKinney

This essay explores the impacts of the United States government and military in the civil war in El Salvador in a comprehensive historical study. Through the presence of monetary aid, a disregard for the human rights of people in El Salvador, and the presence of U.S. trained soldiers at the then School of Americas and the current Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the U.S. prolonged and augmented the negative effects of the Salvadoran Civil War.

Author(s):  
Katherine K. Reist

The attempt of United States government personnel in postwar China to effect an end to the resumption of the civil war by offering military training and support to both sides foundered on the assumptions of both the Nationalists and Communists that each would be victorious in the conflict. Nonetheless an American military training mission was authorized. The American goal was to establish a democratic, economically viable nation with a modern military to offset the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia.The goals of the Nationalist government did not necessarily align with those of the United States, although support and aid were continuously sought. However, the Nationalist political and organizationalstructure was difficult to adapt to American models even when the Chinese saw an advantage in doing so. For reasons explored in this chapter, the mission failed.


2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-110
Author(s):  
Cynthia Nicoletti

Confined alone in a cell in New York's Fort Lafayette in the heat of the summer of 1865, former Confederate naval secretary Stephen R. Mallory had little to do but reflect on the fate of the defeated Confederacy. Convinced that his life might be forfeit if the United States government made good on its threat to try him for treason, Mallory composed a lengthy letter to President Andrew Johnson petitioning for a pardon and seeking to explain his views on the demise of the Confederacy and the fate of the states' right to secede from the Union. While Mallory stressed his opposition to disunion in 1861, on the grounds of its inexpediency, he admitted that he had placed loyalty to his state above his duty as a citizen of the United States. He had “regarded the commands of my state as decisive of my path of duty; and I followed where she led.” Nonetheless, Mallory went on to disclaim his belief in the principle of secession in very striking terms, describing the death of secession in the crucible of the Civil War as the result of a trial by battle. Mallory never specifically denied secession's constitutionality; instead, he told Johnson that because he “recognize[ed] the death [of the Confederacy] as the will of Almighty God, I regard and accept His dispensation as decisive of the questions of slavery and secession.”


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (01) ◽  
pp. 127-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard Champney ◽  
Paul Edleman

AbstractThis study employs the Solomon Four-Group Design to measure student knowledge of the United States government and student knowledge of current events at the beginning of a U.S. government course and at the end. In both areas, knowledge improves significantly. Regarding knowledge of the U.S. government, both males and females improve at similar rates, those with higher and lower GPAs improve at similar rates, and political science majors improve at similar rates to non-majors. Regarding current events, males and females improve at similar rates. However, those with higher GPAs and political science majors improve more than others.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


Slavic Review ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 276-288 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin M. Weissman

In March 1921 Lenin predicted, “If there is a harvest, everybody will hunger a little and the government will be saved. Otherwise, since we cannot take anything from people who do not have the means to satisfy their own hunger, the government will perish.“ By early summer, Russia was in the grip of one of the worst famines in its history. Lenin's gloomy forecast, however, was never put to the test. At almost the last moment, substantial help in the form of food, clothing, and medical supplies arrived from a most unexpected source —U.S. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.Hoover undertook the relief of Soviet Russia not as an official representative of the United States government but as the head of a private agency —the American Relief Administration (A.R.A.).


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