scholarly journals Radioactive contaminated soil removal from the sites of the former Azgir nuclear test site

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. G. Gilmanov ◽  
E. Z. Akhmetov
Keyword(s):  
Contaminated Soil ◽  
Soil Removal ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test

Microwave vitrification of uranium-contaminated soil for nuclear test site and chemical stability

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (10) ◽  
pp. 13334-13339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shunzhang Chen ◽  
Xiaoyan Shu ◽  
Hexi Tang ◽  
Xueli Mao ◽  
Chen Xu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Stability ◽  
Contaminated Soil ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test

Glycophorin A Somatic Cell Mutations in a Population Living in the Proximity of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site

2004 ◽  
Vol 162 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carita Lindholm ◽  
Brian P. Murphy ◽  
William L. Bigbee ◽  
Rakhmetkaji I. Bersimbaev ◽  
Maj A. Hultén ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Somatic Cell ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Glycophorin A ◽  
Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site

Radiological Implications of Inhaled 239Pu and 241Am in Dusts at the Former Nuclear Test Site in Maralinga

1992 ◽  
Vol 63 (6) ◽  
pp. 641-650 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. N. Stradling ◽  
J. W. Stather ◽  
S. A. Gray ◽  
J. C. Moody ◽  
M. Ellender ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test

P008 AML1/RUNX1 point mutations are frequent in MDS/AML among the residents of Semipalatinsk near former USSR nuclear test site

2007 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. S44
Author(s):  
A. Kimura ◽  
N. Chaizhunussova ◽  
Z. Dinara ◽  
H. Harada ◽  
Y. Harada
Keyword(s):  
Point Mutations ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Former Ussr

Study of low-magnitude seismic events near the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site

1997 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 1563-1575
Author(s):  
Frode Ringdal
Keyword(s):  
Monitoring Network ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
P Wave ◽  
Scaling Effects ◽  
Underground Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Nuclear Explosions ◽  
Novaya Zemlya ◽  
Source Scaling ◽  
Low Magnitude

Abstract A study of available seismic data shows that all but one of the 42 known underground nuclear explosions at Novaya Zemlya have been detected and located by stations in the global seismic network. During the past 30 years, only one seismic event in this area has been unambiguously classified as an earthquake (1 August 1986, mb = 4.3). Several other small events, most of which are thought to be either chemical explosions or aftereffects of nuclear explosions, have also been detected. Since 1990, a network of sensitive regional arrays has been installed in northern Europe in preparation for the global seismic monitoring network under a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). This regional network has provided a detection capability for Novaya Zemlya that is shown to be close to mb = 2.5. Three low-magnitude events have been detected and located during this period, as discussed in this article: 31 December 1992 (mb = 2.7), 13 June 1995 (mb = 3.5), and 13 January 1996 (mb = 2.4). To classify the source types of these events has proved very difficult. Thus, even for the mb = 3.5 event in 1995, we have been unable to provide a confident classification of the source as either an earthquake or explosion using the available discriminants. A study of mb magnitude in different frequency bands shows, as expected, that the calculation of mb at regional distances needs to take into account source-scaling effects at high frequencies. Thus, when comparing a 4 to 8 or 8 to 16 Hz filter band to a “teleseismic” 2 to 4 Hz band, the smaller events have, relatively speaking, significantly more high-frequency energy (up to 0.5 mb units) than the larger events. This suggests that a P-wave spectral magnitude scale might be appropriate. The problem of accurately locating small events using a sparse array network is addressed using the 13 January 1996 event, which was detected by only two arrays, as an illustrative example. Our analysis demonstrates the importance of using accurately calibrated regional travel-time curves and, at the same time, illustrates how array processing can be used to identify an interfering phase from a local disturbance, thereby avoiding location errors due to erroneous phase readings.

scholarly journals Radioecological Monitoring of Adjacent Territories to the Former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, East Kazakhstan

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (4.36) ◽  
pp. 323
Author(s):  
Sergazy Duyssembaev ◽  
Ainur Serikova ◽  
Shyngys Suleimenov ◽  
Nurgul Ikimbayeva ◽  
Assel Zhexenayeva ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Specific Activity ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
Plant Water ◽  
Beta Particles ◽  
Radiometric Measurements ◽  
Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site ◽  
Radioecological Monitoring ◽  
East Kazakhstan ◽  
Permissible Levels

This paper presents the results of complex radioecological monitoring of the territories, which are situated near the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, East Kazakhstan region.  The radiometric measurements showed that the concentration of radon and beta particles are below the permissible levels. EROA values of a radon in rooms fluctuates from 44 Bq/m3 to 195 Bq/ m3. The measured values of fluency of betta-particles in all the studied points are less than 10 freq/ min*cm2. A specific activity of radionuclides, such as Am-241, Cs-137 and  Pu – 239/240  in soils, plant, water, meat and milk were evaluated.   

scholarly journals A Multi-Technology Analysis of the 2017 North Korean Nuclear Test

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Gaebler ◽  
Lars Ceranna ◽  
Nima Nooshiri ◽  
Andreas Barth ◽  
Simone Cesca ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Monitoring System ◽  
Body Wave ◽  
Test Site ◽  
Nuclear Test ◽  
International Monitoring System ◽  
Seismic Stations ◽  
Technology Analysis ◽  
Tnt Equivalent ◽  
International Monitoring ◽  
Strong Surface

Abstract. On September 3rd 2017 official channels of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced the successful test of a thermonuclear device. Only seconds to minutes after the alleged nuclear explosion at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in the mountainous region in the country's northeast at 03:30:02 (UTC) hundreds of seismic stations distributed all around the globe picked up strong and distinct signals associated with an explosion. Different seismological agencies reported body wave magnitudes of well above 6.0, consequently estimating the explosive yield of the device in the order of hundreds of kilotons TNT equivalent. The 2017 event can therefore be assessed being multiple times larger in energy than the two preceding events in January and September 2016. This study provides a multi-technology analysis of the 2017 North Korean event and its aftermath using a wide array of geophysical methods. Seismological investigations locate the event within the test site at a depth of approximately 0.8 km below surface. The radiation and generation of P- and S-wave energy in the source region is significantly influenced by the topography of the Mt. Mantap massif. Inversions for the full moment tensor of the main event reveal a dominant isotropic component accompanied by significant amounts of double couple and compensated linear vector dipole terms, confirming the explosive character of the event. Analysis of the source mechanism of an aftershock that occurred around eight minutes after the test in the direct vicinity suggest a cavity collapse. Measurements at seismic stations of the International Monitoring System result in a body wave magnitude of 6.2, which translates to an yield estimate of around 400 kilotons TNT equivalent. The explosive yield is possibly overestimated, since topography and depth phases both tend to ehance the peak amplitudes of teleseismic P-waves. Interferometric Synthetic-Aperture-Radar analysis using data from the ALOS-2 satellite reveal strong surface deformations in the epicenter region. Additional multispectral optical data from the Pleiades satellite show clear landslide activity at the test site. The strong surface deformations generated large acoustic pressure peaks, which were observed as infrasound signals with distinctive waveforms even in distances of 400 km. In the aftermath of the 2017 event atmospheric traces of the fission product 133Xe have been detected at various locations in the wider region. While for 133Xe measurements in September 2017 the Punggye-ri test site is disfavored as source by means of atmospheric transport modeling, detections in October 2017 at the International Monitoring System station RN58 in Russia indicate a potential delayed leakage of 133Xe at the test site from the 2017 North Korean nuclear test.

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