Research on relational contract mechanisms of inter-enterprise: based on R&D cooperation

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen Jie
Keyword(s):  
Relational Contract

Factors affecting transaction costs in megaprojects: a qualitative comparative analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dedong Wang ◽  
Hui Li ◽  
Yongqiang Lu
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Qualitative Comparative Analysis ◽  
Asset Specificity ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Relational Contract ◽  
Factors Influencing ◽  
Project Costs

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the factors influencing the transaction costs (TCs) in megaprojects to provide a basis for controlling project costs.Design/methodology/approachThis study selects six factors influencing the TCs in megaprojects from the perspective of TC theory and relational contract theory (RCT) through literature review. On the basis of crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), this study tests combined factors influencing the TCs and the interaction between them.FindingsResults show that in megaprojects, TCs are affected by combination factors. The combination of asset specificity, uncertainty, transaction frequency and trust and the combination of asset specificity, reputation and trust will control TCs in certain situations. In the configuration leading to high project TCs, the combination of environmental and behavioral uncertainties is a necessary condition.Originality/valueThis paper fills up the research gap in the field of megaproject TCs, and researchers can focus on this field in the future.

Is bribing a good strategy? Imbalanced interdependence and hazard of opportunism in bribery

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ho Wook Shin ◽  
Jinsil Kim ◽  
Seung-hyun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Variable ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Resource Dependence ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Relational Contract ◽  
Current Resource ◽  
The Government ◽  
A Current

PurposeIn fragile institutional environments, firms often have no choice but bribery as the means to access the services monopolized by the government. Corrupt government officials whose resources are valuable to many different firms can easily find other firms willing to offer bribes. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how this imbalanced interdependence exposes the bribing firm to the hazard of opportunism from the bribed officials.Design/methodology/approachThis study draws on World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data and the instrumental variable (IV) Probit estimator with Heckman correction for the potential selection bias.FindingsThe authors find that the more firms depend on bribery to acquire governmental resources, the severer the level of opportunism they encounter from the government officials. In addition, the authors find that although the presence of a legal alternative to bribery reduces the level of a corrupt government official's opportunism that a bribing firm experiences, the more firms depend on bribery despite the presence of a legal alternative, the higher the level of the corrupt official's opportunism that the firm will experience. Finally, the authors find that establishing a relational contract with government officials reduces the hazard of opportunism.Originality/valueThe study contributes to the resource dependence literature by finding that a greater imbalance in the interdependence between two parties in bribery exposes the more dependent party to a larger hazard of opportunism. The finding that an ineffective alternative to a current resource provider would not strengthen but weaken a resource seeker's bargaining power expands the literature. The authors also contribute to the corruption research by showing the significant strategic, not legal, risk to bribing firms of engaging in bribery, which to date has not been sufficiently discussed.

scholarly journals 關係契約視野下的婚姻家庭

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-44
Author(s):  
Dan HAN
Keyword(s):  
Family Life ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Marriage And Family ◽  
Relational Contract ◽  
Digital Commons

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.According to relational contract theory, the parties in a marriage and family should not only respect the independence and autonomy of the parties, but also shape the unity of the parties. This constitutes a paradox of modern marriage and family. Contractual intimacy can be expressed in many forms, and can even be expressed freely without form. However, the phenomena of marriage and family life are by no means merely contracts of relations; they are just as much about ideas as about facts.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 69 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.

Strategic Management of International Subcontracting

2010 ◽  
pp. 1924-1934
Author(s):  
Yue Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Strategic Management ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
International Business ◽  
Multinational Enterprises ◽  
Cost Model ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Complex Nature ◽  
Relational Contract

Research on international subcontracting has been policy-oriented and industry-focused. There is a lack of understanding of the phenomenon from strategic management and international business perspectives. This article conceptualizes international subcontracting as a type of relational contract formed by buyers and suppliers from different countries, aiming to facilitate the sourcing of products or components with buyer-specific requirements. It builds a transaction cost model for studying the strategic choice of international subcontracting as an intermediate governance structure, sitting between arm’s length outsourcing arrangement and vertically integrated multinational enterprises (MNEs). A set of propositions are developed to aid future empirical research and to provide managers with some guidelines for organizing supply chain across borders. The model also allows managers to examine the complex nature of a range of subcontracting relationships and identify the specific mechanisms that can be used to preserve and manage the dyadic principal-subcontractor exchanges.

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