scholarly journals Cournot equilibrium in case of (-1)-concave price function

Mathematica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (84) (2) ◽  
pp. 138-145
Author(s):  
Detelina Kamburova ◽  
◽  
Rumen Marinov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Price Function

Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Von Mouche ◽  
Takashi Sato
Keyword(s):  
Large Class ◽  
Cost Functions ◽  
Uniqueness Problem ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Price Function ◽  
Convex Cost ◽  
Equilibrium Uniqueness ◽  
Price Flexibility

We consider the equilibrium uniqueness problem for a large class of Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and a proper price function [Formula: see text] with decreasing price flexibility. This class allows for (at [Formula: see text]) discontinuous industry revenue and in particular for [Formula: see text]. The paper illustrates in an exemplary way the Selten–Szidarovszky technique based on virtual backward reply functions. An algorithm for the calculation of the unique equilibrium is provided.

scholarly journals Modeling Post-Liberalized European Gas Market Concentration—A Game Theory Perspective

Forecasting ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Hassan Hamie ◽  
Anis Hoayek ◽  
Hans Auer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
Parametric Method ◽  
Linear Complementarity Problems ◽  
Market Concentration ◽  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Gas Markets ◽  
Gas Market ◽  
Equilibrium Test ◽  
Non Parametric

The question of whether the liberalization of the gas industry has led to less concentrated markets has attracted much interest among the scientific community. Classical mathematical regression tools, statistical tests, and optimization equilibrium problems, more precisely non-linear complementarity problems, were used to model European gas markets and their effect on prices. In this research, the parametric and nonparametric game theory methods are employed to study the effect of the market concentration on gas prices. The parametric method takes into account the classical Cournot equilibrium test, with assumptions on cost and demand functions. However, the non-parametric method does not make any prior assumptions, a factor that allows greater freedom in modeling. The results of the parametric method demonstrate that the gas suppliers’ behavior in Austria and The Netherlands gas markets follows the Nash–Cournot equilibrium, where companies act rationally to maximize their payoffs. The non-parametric approach validates the fact that suppliers in both markets follow the same behavior even though one market is more liquid than the other. Interestingly, our findings also suggest that some of the gas suppliers maximize their ‘utility function’ not by only relying on profit, but also on some type of non-profit objective, and possibly collusive behavior.

What Determines Port Wine Prices?

2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Couto Viana ◽  
Lúcia Lima Rodrigues
Keyword(s):  
Jel Classification ◽  
Hedonic Price ◽  
Port Wine ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Firm Reputation ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Price Function ◽  
Hedonic Price Function ◽  
Port Wines

AbstractIn this study, we estimate a cross-sectional hedonic price function for Port wines in order to determine the price influence of several Port wine characteristics. Drawing on a large sample of more than 14,000 sales from the biggest Port wine firms we find that market prices can be explained by objective characteristics such as age, type of Port and type of brand appearing on the bottle label and subjective characteristics such as firm reputation. The Port type is the main price determinant. (JEL Classification: C21, Q11)

scholarly journals On nonparametric estimation of a hedonic price function

2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 894-901 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry Haupt ◽  
Joachim Schnurbus ◽  
Rolf Tschernig
Keyword(s):  
Nonparametric Estimation ◽  
Hedonic Price ◽  
Price Function ◽  
Hedonic Price Function

scholarly journals Maturity, Indebtedness, and Default Risk

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (6) ◽  
pp. 2674-2699 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satyajit Chatterjee ◽  
Burcu Eyigungor
Keyword(s):  
Standard Deviation ◽  
Default Risk ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
External Debt ◽  
Equilibrium Price ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Price Function ◽  
Output Ratio ◽  
Novel Method

We advance quantitative-theoretic models of sovereign debt by proving the existence of a downward sloping equilibrium price function for long-term debt and implementing a novel method to accurately compute it. We show that incorporating long-term debt allows the model to match Argentina's average external debt-to-output ratio, average spread on external debt, the standard deviation of spreads, and simultaneously improve upon the model's ability to account for Argentina's other cyclical facts. We also investigated the welfare properties of maturity length and showed that if the possibility of self-fulfilling rollover crises is taken into account, long-term debt is superior to short-term debt. (JEL E23, E32, F34, O11, O19)

Unequal Treatment of Identical Agents in Cournot Equilibrium

1999 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen W Salant ◽  
Greg Shaffer
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Unequal Treatment ◽  
Marginal Costs ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Antitrust Regulation

Oligopoly models where prior actions by firms affect subsequent marginal costs have been useful in illuminating policy debates in areas such as antitrust regulation, environmental protection, and international competition. We discuss properties of such models when a Cournot equilibrium occurs at the second stage. Aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the marginal-cost sum. Therefore, unless the cost of inducing second-stage asymmetry more than offsets this reduction in production costs, the private and social optima are asymmetric. (JEL D43, L13, L40)

Cournot equilibrium: modern techniques applied to an old problem

2008 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 601-616
Author(s):  
Bernardo K. Pagnoncelli ◽  
Miguel A. K. Schnoor ◽  
Carlos F. B. Palmeira ◽  
Rafael Cayres
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Equilibrium

Network games; adaptations to Nash-Cournot equilibrium

1996 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sjur Didrik Flåm ◽  
Charles Horvath
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Equilibrium ◽  
Network Games
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document