scholarly journals BATNA: Perceived leverage through positive illusion in conflicts

2019 ◽  
pp. 16-32
Author(s):  
Prachi Bhatt ◽  
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 623-631 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben M. Tappin ◽  
Ryan T. McKay

Most people strongly believe they are just, virtuous, and moral; yet regard the average person as distinctly less so. This invites accusations of irrationality in moral judgment and perception—but direct evidence of irrationality is absent. Here, we quantify this irrationality and compare it against the irrationality in other domains of positive self-evaluation. Participants ( N = 270) judged themselves and the average person on traits reflecting the core dimensions of social perception: morality, agency, and sociability. Adapting new methods, we reveal that virtually all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation. Inconsistent with prevailing theories of overly positive self-belief, irrational moral superiority was not associated with self-esteem. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral superiority is a uniquely strong and prevalent form of “positive illusion,” but the underlying function remains unknown.


2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 524-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir J. Konečni

AbstractRather than being a genuine adaptation, “positive illusions” are examples of doxastically uncommitted policies implemented at both the individual and societal levels. Even when they are genuine misbeliefs, most positive illusions are not evolved but ephemeral – a phenomenon limited to a particular social and economic moment. They are essentially a consumer response to messages from the pop-psychology industry in the recently terminated era of easy credit.


1998 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN M. MARTZ ◽  
JULIE VERETTE ◽  
XIMENA B. ARRIAGA ◽  
LINDA F. SLOVIK ◽  
CHANTE L. COX ◽  
...  

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Machin ◽  
Robin Dunbar

For the majority of people, two key non-kin figures form part of the central support clique that resides at the centre of their social network. These are the best friend and the romantic partner, and both play distinct roles which are of benefit to the individual concerned. However, while the romantic partner will always have been chosen in the context of the mating market, we do not know whether the selection of a best friend occurs within a similar market of competition and assessment. This study used real self-rated attribute data for participants and their best friends and romantic partners to explore: (1) whether best friendships operate within a mating market; (2) whether, once established, they show evidence for positive illusion, projection or competition; and (3) whether assortative mating is present. Further, we considered whether the sex of the best friend relative to the participant influences these results. We found that same-sex best friends have an acknowledged role linked to social connectedness and behaviour, that for same-sex best friends both male and female participants show evidence for homophily or projection rather than mate competition, that neither male nor female participants appear to view cross-sex best friends as potential mates, and that the evidence for ‘assortative mating’ is stronger within best friendships than romantic partnerships regardless of best friend sex. Our results imply that despite a culture of commitment and monogamy, male participants display behaviours within their romantic partnerships which suggest they are still active within the mating market. In contrast, for both sexes the best friendship is unaffected by the mating market and the stability and contentment that characterises best friendships is underpinned by a degree of similarity stronger than that within the romantic partnership.


2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (6) ◽  
pp. 529-529
Author(s):  
Gary F. Marcus

AbstractThe mere fact that a particular aspect of mind could offer an adaptive advantage is not enough to show that that property was in fact shaped by that adaptive advantage. Although it is possible that the tendency towards positive illusion is an evolved misbelief, it it also possible that positive illusions could be a by-product of a broader, flawed cognitive mechanism that itself was shaped by accidents of evolutionary inertia.


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