scholarly journals Money and Velocity During Financial Crisis: From the Great Depression to the Great Recession

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (1503) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Anderson ◽  
◽  
Michael Bordo ◽  
John V. Duca ◽  
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...  
2016 ◽  
Vol 106 (5) ◽  
pp. 538-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoffer Koch ◽  
Gary Richardson ◽  
Patrick Van Horn

In the boom before the Great Depression, capital requirements for commercial banks were low and fixed. Bankers faced double liability. Failing banks were not bailed out. During the boom before the Great Recession, capital requirements were proportional to risk-weighted assets. Bankers faced limited liability. Banks deemed too big to fail received bailouts. During the 1920s, the largest banks increased capital levels as asset prices rose. During the boom from 2002 to 2007, the largest institutions kept capital levels near regulatory minimums. Our results suggest more market discipline would have induced the largest U.S. banks to hold greater capital buffers prior to the financial crisis of 2008.


2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 227-229

Judit Temesvary of Hamilton College reviews, “Financial Crises, 1929 to the Present” by Sara Hsu. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores and analyzes the events, causes, and outcomes of crises from the Great Depression to the Great Recession. Discusses the financial system and roots of crisis; the 1930s and 1940s—the Great Depression and its aftermath; the 1950s through the 1970s—the intercrisis period; the 1980s—emerging markets debt default crises; the early 1990s—advanced countries crises; the mid-1990s—the Mexican crisis and the Asian financial crisis; the late 1990s and the early 2000s—the Russian financial crisis, the Brazilian financial crisis, and the Argentine crisis; the late 2000s—the Great Recession of 2008; and preventing future crises. Hsu is Assistant Professor of Economics at the State University of New York, New Paltz.”


Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis ◽  
Giuseppe Telesca

Why were elite bankers and financiers demoted from ‘masters’ to ‘servants’ of society after the Great Depression, a crisis to which they contributed only marginally? Why do they seem to have got away with the recent crisis, in spite of their palpable responsibilities in triggering the Great Recession? This chapter provides an analysis of the differences between the bankers of the Great Depression and their colleagues of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century—regarding their position within, and attitude towards the firm, work culture, mental models, and codes of conduct—complemented with a scrutiny of the public discourse on bankers and financiers before and after the two crises. The authors argue that the (relative) mildness of the Great Recession, compared to the Great Depression, has contributed to preserve elite bankers’ and financiers’ status, income, wealth, and influence. Yet, the long-term consequences of their loss of reputational capital are difficult to assess.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 36-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albrecht Ritschl

AbstractThe Great Recession of 2008 hit the international economy harder than any other peacetime recession since the Great Contraction after 1929. Soon enough, analogies with the Great Depression were presented, and conclusions were drawn regarding the political response to the slump. This paper is an attempt to sort out real and false analogies and to present conclusions for policy. Its main hypothesis is that the Great Recession resembles the final phase of the Great Contraction between 1931 and 1933, characterized by a fast spreading global financial crisis and the breakdown of the international Gold Standard. The same is also true of the political responses to the banking problems occurring in both crises. The analogy seems less robust for the initial phase of the Great Depression after 1929. The monetary policy response to the Great Recession largely seems to be informed by the monetary interpretation of the Great Depression, but less so by the lessons from the interwar financial crises. As in the Great Depression, policy appears to be on a learning curve, moving away from a mostly monetary response toward mitigating counterpart risk and minimizing interbank contagion.


2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-129
Author(s):  
Eloi Laurent

Put together, my remarks constitute an unsubtle attempt at rendering explicit the elegant implicit comparisons between the Great Depression and today’s “Great recession” that make Alan Brinkley’s article an insightful delight for the reader. At the end of his paper, Brinkley points out to some similarities between the two crises. In the brief following comment, I will push forward his conclusion but on a somewhat different path: in my view, if the consequences of the Great Depression and the “Great Recession” have so far been quite different, their causes appear to be in many respects alike, or at least parallel.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 63-67
Author(s):  
Peter Buell Hirsch

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether the behavior of brands during the Great Depression held lessons for the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic. Design/methodology/approach A review of brand marketing and advertising from the 1920s and 1930s. Findings There are many learnings from the Great Depression that are instructive for today’s brand marketers dealing with COVID-19. Research limitations/implications The review of the literature is not comprehensive and the findings are subjective. Practical implications Today’s brands can learn a great deal from the 1930s such as to take advantage of opportunities and avoid mistakes in today’s difficult environment. Social implications By handling today’s challenges skillfully, brands can refresh relationships with consumers overwhelmed with choices. Originality/value Though there was some commentary on this subject following the Great Recession of 2009, there has been little written about the lessons in brand marketing in the current situation.


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