scholarly journals Population Intermediate Outcomes of Diabetes Under Pay-for-Performance Incentives in England From 2004 to 2008

Diabetes Care ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Vaghela ◽  
M. Ashworth ◽  
P. Schofield ◽  
M. C. Gulliford
2006 ◽  
Vol 63 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 49S-72S ◽  
Author(s):  
Tammie A. Nahra ◽  
Kristin L. Reiter ◽  
Richard A. Hirth ◽  
Janet E. Shermer ◽  
John R. C. Wheeler

2013 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-507
Author(s):  
Darrell J. Bosch ◽  
James W. Pease ◽  
Robert Wieland ◽  
Doug Parker

Policymakers are concerned about nitrogen and phosphorus export to water bodies. Exports may be reduced by paying farmers to adopt practices to reduce runoff or by paying performance incentives tied to estimated run-off reductions. We evaluate the cost-effectiveness of practice and performance incentives for reducing nitrogen exports. Performance incentives potentially improve farm-level and allocative efficiencies relative to practice incentives. However, the efficiency improvements can be undermined by baseline shifts when growers adopt crops that enhance the performance payments but cause more pollution. Policymakers must carefully specify rules for performance-incentive programs and payments to avoid such baseline shifting.


2018 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
pp. 2167-2184
Author(s):  
Alina Peluso ◽  
Paolo Berta ◽  
Veronica Vinciotti

Author(s):  
James C. Robinson ◽  
Stephen M. Shortell ◽  
Diane R. Rittenhouse ◽  
Sara Fernandes-Taylor ◽  
Robin R. Gillies ◽  
...  

This paper measures the extent to which medical groups experience external pay-for-performance incentives based on quality and patient satisfaction and the extent to which these groups pay their primary care and specialist physicians using similar criteria. Over half (52%) of large medical groups received bonus payments from health insurance plans in the period 2006–2007 based on measures of quality and patient satisfaction. Medical groups facing external pay-for-performance incentives are more likely to pay their primary care physicians (odds ratio [OR] 4.5; p<.001) and specialists (OR 2.5; p=.07) based on quality and satisfaction. Groups facing capitation payment incentives to control costs are more likely to pay member physicians on salary and less likely to pay based on productivity (p<.001 for primary care; p<.05 for specialists) than groups paid by insurers on a fee-for-service basis.


2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (6) ◽  
pp. e41-e45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Unützer ◽  
Ya-Fen Chan ◽  
Erin Hafer ◽  
Jessica Knaster ◽  
Anne Shields ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 33-48

The extant literature on pay for performance (PFP) compensation either focuses on factors dealing with the implementation of those programs, or the viability of PFP as a universal ‘best practice’. Alternatively we suggest that different organizational culture types align with unique firm competencies, and are supported by specific pay systems. We contend that a ‘clan’ culture might best foster the employee competencies of adaptability, innovation and technical expertise, and best be supported by a skill-based pay (SBP) compensation system. Alternatively, a ‘market’ culture might best foster the competencies of customer orientation and performance orientation, and be best supported by PFP.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document