scholarly journals The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association's Response to the International Auditing and Assurance Standard's Board's Invitation to Comment: Enhancing Audit Quality in the Public Interest

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. C1-C25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine E. Earley ◽  
Karen L. Hooks ◽  
Jenifer R. Joe ◽  
Paul W. Polinski ◽  
Zabihollah Rezaee ◽  
...  

SUMMARY: On December 17, 2015, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued an Invitation to Comment entitled Enhancing Audit Quality in the Public Interest: A Focus on Professional Skepticism, Quality Control and Group Audits (hereafter, the ITC). The ITC highlights the IAASB's discussions regarding the three separate, but related, topics: professional skepticism, quality control, and group audits, in order to solicit feedback on these topics from various stakeholders. The ITC also discusses potential standard-setting activities the IAASB could participate in to enhance audit quality. The comment period ended on May 16, 2016. This commentary summarizes the contributors' views on selected questions posed in the ITC. Data Availability: The invitation to comment (as of May 23, 2016) is available at: https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/IAASB-Invitation-to-Comment-Enhancing-Audit-Quality.pdf

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. C1-C10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denise Dickins ◽  
Marcus M. Doxey ◽  
Marshall A. Geiger ◽  
Christine Nolder ◽  
Pamela B. Roush

SUMMARY On November 9, 2017, the Monitoring Group (MG) overseeing international auditing standards issued a request for comment on its consultation paper (CP), Strengthening the Governance and Oversight of the International Audit-Related Standard-Setting Boards in the Public Interest. The CP presents a broad array of proposals to reform and restructure the three current auditing standard-setting groups it oversees (International Accounting and Assurance Standards Board [IAASB], International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants [IESBA], and International Accounting Education Standards Board [IAESB]). The CP suggests combining the three boards into a single board, and solicited public comment on the following areas: (1) key areas of overall concern, (2) guiding principles, (3) options for reform of the standard-setting boards, (4) options for the Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB), (5) role of the monitoring group, (6) administration, including Standard-Setting Board staff, (7) process considerations, and (8) funding. The comment period ended on February 9, 2018. This commentary summarizes the participating committee members' views on selected questions for respondents posed by the MG. Data Availability: The concept release, including questions for respondents, is available at: https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD586.pdf


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. C15-C27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith L. Jones ◽  
Jagadison K. Aier ◽  
Duane M. Brandon ◽  
Tina D. Carpenter ◽  
Lisa M. Gaynor ◽  
...  

SUMMARY In August 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) issued a concept release to solicit public comment on the potential direction of a proposed standard-setting project on means to enhance auditor independence, objectivity, and professional skepticism. The Concept Release sought comments on and explores in detail the possibility of mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB provided for a 121-day exposure period (from August 16 to December 14, 2011) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the concept release. The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below (dated December 13, 2011) to the PCAOB on PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 37: PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation. Data Availability: Information about and access to the release are available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/Release_2011-006.pdf


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. C1-C14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph F Brazel ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Shawn Davis ◽  
Steven M Glover ◽  
Diane J Janvrin ◽  
...  

SUMMARY Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) issued a concept release to solicit public comment on the potential direction of a proposed standard-setting project on the content and form of reports on audited financial statements. The objective of the concept release was to discuss several alternatives for changing the auditor's reporting model that could increase its transparency and relevance to financial statement users, while not compromising audit quality. To that end, the alternatives included (1) a supplement to the auditor's report, in which the auditor would be required to provide additional information about the audit and the company's financial statements (an “Auditor's Discussion and Analysis”), (2) required and expanded use of emphasis paragraphs in the auditor's report, (3) auditor reporting on information outside the financial statements, and (4) clarification of certain language in the auditor's report. The PCAOB provided for a 102-day exposure period (from June 21 to September 30, 2011) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2011-003, Concept Release on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Standards Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements. Data Availability: Information about and access to the release is available at: http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket034/Concept_Release.pdf


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Tyler Williams ◽  
W. Mark Wilder

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB; Board) maintains that constituent feedback plays an essential and dynamic role in its audit standard-setting process. We examine a major source of constituent feedback, responses to standard-setting questions, using a sample drawn from the original proposals of fourteen PCAOB auditing standards. We find that after receiving comment letter feedback to the standard-setting questions, the Board revises approximately half of its guidance tied to those questions before it finalizes auditing standards-a finding consistent with the Board's assertion that it carefully considers constituent perspectives as it develops new regulation. We also explore the related comment letters of eight professional auditing firms subject to the PCAOB's annual inspection program and discover varying levels of opposition to and support for the PCAOB's proposed authoritative guidance. We observe PCAOB revision to authoritative guidance highly contested by the firms in more than three-fourths of cases of standard-setting questions and PCAOB non-revision to guidance highly supported by the firms in more than ninety percent of cases.


2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. C1-C9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veena Looknanan Brown ◽  
Paul J. Coram ◽  
Sean A. Dennis ◽  
Denise Dickins ◽  
Christine E. Earley ◽  
...  

SUMMARY On July 16, 2018, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (the Board or IAASB) issued a request for comment on its Exposure Draft, Proposed International Standard on Auditing 315 (Revised): Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement and Proposed Consequential and Conforming Amendments to Other ISAs (ED-315). Major enhancements proposed include explicit recognition of the auditor's use of automated tools and techniques, requiring an understanding of an auditee's use of information technology relevant to financial reporting, acknowledging the influence of an entity's complexity on the audit plan, and increasing the emphasis on the need for professional skepticism. The comment period ended on November 2, 2018. This commentary summarizes the participating committee members' views on selected questions posed by the IAASB. Data Availability: ED-315, including questions for respondents, is available at: https://www.ifac.org/publications-resources/exposure-draft-isa-315-revised-identifying-and-assessing-risks-material.


Author(s):  
Michael Murphy

Abstract The prosecutorial independence of the Attorney General (AG) is a firmly established constitutional convention in Canada, but it is also an evolving convention, subject to ongoing contestation and debate. This article is a contribution to that debate. It defends a normative constitutional framework wherein the AG’s authority to make final decisions in matters of criminal prosecution is balanced against a corresponding duty to consult with cabinet and the prime minister on the public interest implications of prosecutorial decisions when the circumstances warrant. Within this normative framework, respectful contestation and debate amongst ministers, the prime minister, and the AG in determining the public interest merits of prosecution is welcomed, even encouraged, and if conducted with the requisite integrity, objectivity, and transparency, it is regarded not as a threat but as a valuable check and balance on AG independence and an indispensable form of quality control on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 17-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen D. Blay ◽  
Eric S. Gooden ◽  
Mark J. Mellon ◽  
Douglas E. Stevens

SUMMARY After considering a proposal to require the engagement partner's signature on the audit report (PCAOB 2009), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board chose instead to only require the disclosure of the engagement partner's name (PCAOB 2015). We make predictions regarding the effects of the two proposed requirements using insights from social norm theory, and test those predictions using an experimental audit market setting found in the literature. We find that both requirements reduce misreporting when compared to a control setting with neither requirement present. We also document that the signature requirement generates an incremental reduction in misreporting when added to the disclosure requirement. Finally, we provide evidence that these effects are driven by participants with higher sensitivity to social norms. This theory and evidence supports the new identity disclosure requirement at the PCAOB and helps explain the existence of signature requirements in many non-U.S. countries. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the authors upon request.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document