How Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances Can Impact Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. P29-P35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Association Network ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Selection

SUMMARY This article summarizes “Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees” (Bills, Cunningham, Myers 2015), which examines the association between small audit firm membership in an association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as an “association”), audit quality, and audit fees. We find that small audit firm association members provide higher-quality audits and charge higher fees than small audit firms that are not members of an association. When compared to similarly sized clients audited by the Big 4, we find that member firms provide audit quality similar to the Big 4 firms, but member firms charge lower fees than their Big 4 counterparts. We caution that these results may not be generalizable to the largest Big 4 clients for which there is not a similarly sized client audited by our sample of small audit firms. We infer audit quality from Public Company Accounting Oversight Board inspections, restatement announcements, and discretionary accruals. Our findings should be of interest to audit committees in charge of auditor selection and to small audit firms interested in the benefits of association membership.

Small Audit Firm Membership in Associations, Networks, and Alliances: Implications for Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 767-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Lauren M. Cunningham ◽  
Linda A. Myers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Matched Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Association Member ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Control Samples

ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the benefits of membership in an accounting firm association, network, or alliance (collectively referred to as “an association”). Associations provide member accounting firms with numerous benefits, including access to the expertise of professionals from other independent member firms, joint conferences and technical trainings, assistance in dealing with staffing and geographic limitations, and the ability to use the association name in marketing materials. We expect these benefits to result in higher-quality audits and higher audit fees (or audit fee premiums). Using hand-collected data on association membership, we find that association member firms conduct higher-quality audits than nonmember firms, where audit quality is proxied for by fewer Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection deficiencies and fewer financial statement misstatements, as well as less extreme absolute discretionary accruals and lower positive discretionary accruals. We also find that audit fees are higher for clients of member firms than for clients of nonmember firms, suggesting that clients are willing to pay an audit fee premium to engage association member audit firms. Finally, we find that member firm audits are of similar quality to a size-matched sample of Big 4 audits, but member firm clients pay lower fee premiums than do Big 4 clients. Our inferences are robust to the use of company size-matched control samples, audit firm size-matched control samples, propensity score matching, two-stage least squares regression, and to analyses that consider changes in association membership. Our findings should be of interest to regulators because they suggest that association membership assists small audit firms in overcoming barriers to auditing larger audit clients. In addition, our findings should be informative to audit committees when making auditor selection decisions, and to investors and accounting researchers interested in the relation between audit firm type and audit quality.

The Market Premium for Audit Partners with Big 4 Experience

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandra B. Zimmerman ◽  
Kenneth L. Bills ◽  
Monika Causholli
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Second Tier ◽  
Market Premium

This study investigates how non-Big 4 firm audit partners’ Big 4 experience is valued by the audit market. The Big 4 audit firms have differentiated themselves as nationally recognized firms for whose services companies are willing to pay a premium. It is unclear, however, whether this reputation follows individual auditors when they move to a non-Big 4 audit firm. We find that audit fees are higher for non-Big 4 audit partners with Big 4 experience with the fee premium ranging from 17 to 26 percent depending on the extent of experience when they are employed by small audit firms but find no evidence of a fee premium for Big 4 experience at the second-tier audit firms. Furthermore, in additional analyses, we do not find strong, consistent evidence that audit quality is higher for clients of non-Big 4 audit partners with Big 4 experience than their counterparts without Big 4 experience.

scholarly journals Audit Firm Size, Audit Fee, Audit Reputation and Audit Quality: The Case of Listed Companies in Vietnam

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ngoc Kim Pham ◽  
Hung Nguyen Duong ◽  
Tin Quang Pham ◽  
Nga Thi Thuy Ho
Keyword(s):  
Firm Size ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms

Audit quality is considered as an essential factor affecting the reliability of financial information. The aim of this study is to assess the effects of audit firm characteristics, including audit reputation, audit fees and audit firm size, on audit quality. A sample of 192 companies listed on Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange for the period of 2006-2014 was selected. Multiple regression was used to analyze the data. The findings show that Big 4 auditors in Vietnam provide high audit quality than non-Big 4 auditors. Interestingly, in Vietnam context, except for the audit firms in the Big 4 group, the findings suggest that smaller audit firms provide better audit quality. Additionally, the results reveal that the more audit fees the auditors receive, the lower audit quality they provide. The critical role of audit quality has attracted significantly scholarly attention, however, prior studies have mainly focused on firms in developed countries. Little is known about audit quality in an emerging economy context such as Vietnam. This study adds to the limited number of studies on audit quality of listed companies in emerging economies. 

The Effect of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation on Audit Quality and Audit Fees: Empirical Evidence from the Korean Audit Market

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 167-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soo Young Kwon ◽  
Youngdeok Lim ◽  
Roger Simnett
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

SUMMARY: Using a unique setting in which mandatory audit firm rotation was required from 2006–2010, and in which both audit fees and audit hours were disclosed (South Korea), this study provides empirical evidence of the economic impact of this policy initiative on audit quality, and the associated implications for audit fees. This study compares both pre- and post-policy implementation and, after the implementation of the policy, mandatory long-tenure versus voluntary short-tenure rotation situations. Where audit firms were mandatorily rotated post-policy, we observe that audit quality (measured as abnormal discretionary accruals) did not significantly change compared with pre-2006 long-tenure audit situations and voluntary post-rotation situations. Audit fees in the post-regulation period for mandatorily rotated engagements are significantly larger than in the pre-regulation period, but are discounted compared to audit fees for post-regulation continuing engagements. We also find that the observed increase in audit fees and audit hours in the post-regulation period extends beyond situations where the audit firm was mandatorily rotated, suggesting that the introduction of mandatory audit firm rotation had a much broader impact than the specific instances of mandatory rotation. Data Availability: Most of the financial data used in the present study are available from the KIS Value Database. The data for audit hours and fees were drawn from statements of operating results filed with the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) in Korea.

Audit Firms as Networks of Offices

2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 211-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott E. Seavey ◽  
Michael J Imhof ◽  
Tiffany J. Westfall
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Management ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Network Effects ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Network Connectedness ◽  
Partner Knowledge ◽  
Office Level

SUMMARY Prior audit research suggests that most, if not all, audit quality can be explained at the office level. However, the question remains of whether office-level audit quality is contingent on how individual offices relate to the firm as a whole. Motivated by theories of knowledge management, organizational learning, and networks, we posit that individual offices are connected to their audit network through partner knowledge sharing and oversight, which impact office-level audit quality. We interview Big 4 audit partners and learn that knowledge sharing between partners in different offices is common and intended to aid in the provision of audit services. Using network connectedness to proxy for knowledge sharing and oversight between offices of the same firm, we document that more connected offices are associated with fewer client restatements and lower discretionary accruals. We additionally find that network effects are magnified when accounting treatments are more complex and require greater auditor judgement.

The Effect of Office Changes within Audit Firms on Clients' Audit Quality and Audit Fees

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-99
Author(s):  
Carl W. Hollingsworth ◽  
Terry L. Neal ◽  
Colin D. Reid
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Additional Analysis ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Audit Partner Rotation

SUMMARY While prior research has examined audit firm and audit partner rotation, we have little evidence on the impact of within-firm engagement team disruptions on the audit. To examine these disruptions, we identify a unique sample of companies where the audit firm issuing office changed but the audit firm did not change and investigate the effect of these changes on the audit. Our results indicate that companies that have a change in their audit firm's issuing office exhibit a decrease in audit quality and an increase in audit fees. In additional analysis, we partition office changes into two groups—client driven changes and audit firm driven changes. This analysis reveals that client driven changes are more likely to result in a higher audit fee while audit quality is unchanged. Conversely, audit firm driven changes do not result in a higher audit fee but do experience a decrease in audit quality.

Overseeing the external audit function: Evidence from audit committees’ reported activities

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Bratten ◽  
Monika Causholli ◽  
Valbona Sulcaj
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Composite Measure ◽  
External Audit ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks ◽  
Prior Literature ◽  
External Auditor

Recently, in response to calls for more transparency, many firms have begun reporting the activities undertaken by their audit committees in overseeing the work of the external auditor. We use a composite measure of audit committees’ reported oversight activities for a sample of S&P 1500 firms and examine the extent to which these reported activities are associated with audit quality. We find that when firms’ audit committees report exerting strong oversight, they have higher audit quality as proxied by audit fees, discretionary accruals, the likelihood of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks, and restatements. We also find that the market reacts positively to reports indicating strong oversight, consistent with perceptions of higher audit quality. This study extends prior literature on audit committees by introducing a new comprehensive measure of audit committees’ reported oversight activities and sheds light on how these activities map into audit quality.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Audit quality following the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s operation

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 927-946
Author(s):  
She-Chih Chiu ◽  
Chin-Chen Chien ◽  
Hsuan-Chu Lin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Univariate Analysis ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Big Four

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the transition from self-regulation to heteronomy has changed the gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors. Design/methodology/approach This study analyzes publicly held companies in the USA between 1999 and 2012 using univariate analysis, multivariate analysis and quantile regression analysis. Audit quality is measured with discretionary accruals. Findings This study shows an insignificant difference in audit quality between the clients of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors after Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) began its operations. In the analysis of the effects of PCAOB inspections on the audit quality of audit firms that are inspected annually and triennially, the findings show that the inspections have more positive effects when carried out annually. This suggests that the frequency of inspection is positively associated with audit quality. Overall, these results provide evidence that recent improvements in audit quality have been caused by changes in regulatory standards. Originality/value The paper provides three major original contributions. First, the authors add to the literature on audit quality by further demonstrating a reduced gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms due to heteronomy. Secondly, this study contributes to the debate as to whether independent inspections on audit firms are beneficial or not and suggests that the PCAOB inspections help increase audit quality. Finally, the results of this work contribute to the growing literature examining discretionary accruals.

scholarly journals FAR Research Project: The loss of talent: a threat for audit quality?

2017 ◽  
Vol 91 (9/10) ◽  
pp. 268-273
Author(s):  
Isabella Grabner ◽  
Judith Künneke ◽  
Frank Moers
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Recent Survey ◽  
New Professionals ◽  
Research Project ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Labor Inputs

The main priority of the audit industry is to maintain and improve audit quality. While audit quality has been an important topic in both accounting academia and practice, there is still a lack of understanding of what drives audit quality. Given that people are the most valuable asset an audit firm has, we focus on examining the labor inputs as a driver of audit quality. Specifically, we argue that a key threat for audit quality that so far has been largely neglected is the loss of talent across the hierarchy. A well-known problem for audit firms is that they invest enormous resources in new professionals only to have many with talent leave (Patten, 1995; Vera-Muñoz, Ho & Chow, 2006; ACCA & ACRA, 2012). A recent survey by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants finds that only about 38% are satisfied with their career and only 35% plan to stay beyond three years, with no significant differences across Big 4 and midtier firms (ACCA and ACRA, 2012).

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document