scholarly journals Budgeting Audit Time: Effects of Audit Step Frame and Verifiability

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eldar M. Maksymov ◽  
Mark W. Nelson ◽  
William R Kinney
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Time Budgets ◽  
Sufficient Time ◽  
Time Effects ◽  
Performance Quality ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Level 3 ◽  
Practice Audit ◽  
Audit Program

ABSTRACT Auditors must ensure that their audit plans budget sufficient time for key audit steps. Research has shown that insufficient audit time budgets can be detrimental to audit quality. We examine whether framing audit steps negatively (e.g., assess whether management's assumptions are not appropriate) increases time budgets—particularly for steps in which the auditor perceives that performance quality is less verifiable, and thus most at risk of being performed with low quality. First, we report the results of analyses indicating that, in practice, audit steps are predominantly framed positively, potentially resulting in smaller time budgets. We then report the results of an experiment in which 50 experienced audit managers budget time for an audit program that tests a Level-3 fair-value estimate. Prior research and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections indicate that this is a challenging audit area, vulnerable to allegations of low audit quality. The results support our predictions and suggest that reframing audit steps negatively would increase audit time budgets—an audit quality indicator—particularly for less-verifiable steps.

Auditor Task-Specific Expertise: The Case of Fair Value Accounting

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jaehan Ahn ◽  
Rani Hoitash ◽  
Udi Hoitash
Keyword(s):  
Work Experience ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Value Relevance ◽  
National Level ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Disclosure Quality ◽  
Level 3 ◽  
Office Level ◽  
Level 2

ABSTRACT PCAOB inspections repeatedly indicate deficiencies in audits of fair-value (FV) estimates, prompting regulators to improve the related auditing standards. We predict that auditor task-specific FV expertise, gained from work experience during the audit of FV measurements, can contribute to higher audit quality. Utilizing FV-related restatements and comment letters, we find that expertise in auditing Level 3 FV estimates at the office level is associated with greater FV audit quality. Level 2 FV expertise or national level FV expertise is not associated with higher FV audit quality. Following the receipt of a comment letter, we further find that auditor FV expertise is associated with lower comment letter remediation costs and higher FV disclosure quality. Finally, we find that the value relevance of Level 3 FV disclosures increases with the extent of auditor FV expertise. Collectively, our results highlight that auditor fair value expertise contributes to the credibility and usefulness of FV disclosures.

An Anatomy of the Level 3 Fair Value Hierarchy's Discount

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuel Bagna ◽  
Giuseppe Di Martino ◽  
Davide Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Fair Value ◽  
Level 3

The Impact of the PCAOB Triennial Inspection Process on Inspection Year and Non-Inspection Year Audits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
William L Buslepp
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Learned Behavior ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
One Year ◽  
The Impact

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspects auditors with fewer than 100 publicly held clients, once every three years (i.e., triennial inspection). In doing so, the PCAOB may inspect any audit engagement within the three-year window, including audits completed only months earlier ("inspection year" audits) and audits with at least a one-year, if not two-year lag ("non-inspection year" audits). We theorize the triennial inspection process affects audit quality levels, whereby auditors impose higher (lower) audit quality during inspection years (non-inspection years). We find clients of triennially inspected auditors have significantly lower levels of accruals during inspection years. Further, this change can be attributed to additional audit effort expended during inspection years. Finally, we find some evidence this is a learned behavior developed after the initial round of inspections. Our evidence suggests auditors opportunistically increase (decrease) audit quality during inspection (non-inspection) years in response to the triennial inspection process.

Integration of Fraud Risk in the Risk of Material Misstatement and the Effect on Auditors' Planning Decisions

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. A52-A79
Author(s):  
Velina K. Popova
Keyword(s):  
Data Availability ◽  
Risk Environment ◽  
Major Area ◽  
Audit Planning ◽  
Fraud Risk ◽  
Planning Decisions ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Study Participants ◽  
Audit Program ◽  
Planning Judgments

ABSTRACT Prior research finds that although auditors assess fraud risk accurately, they generally fail to adjust audit procedures appropriately. The most recent Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections in 2016 still identify response to risks of material misstatement (RMM) as a major area of inspection focus and cite it as a recurring audit deficiency. In this study, participants assess RMM and make audit-planning judgments in a high/low fraud risk environment using either a traditional source-based representation of RMM (i.e., based on inherent, control, and fraud risk) or a newer type-based representation of RMM (i.e., based on error and fraud risk). The results indicate that while auditors in both groups show similar sensitivity to risk, the type-based group of auditors are better able modify their audit plans by using more procedures that are new to a standard audit program and assigning more experienced staff to address high fraud risk. Data Availability: Contact the author.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Fair Value Accounting and Earnings Persistence: Evidence from International Banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daifei (Troy) Yao ◽  
Majella Percy ◽  
Jenny Stewart ◽  
Fang Hu
Keyword(s):  
Strong Association ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Institutional Factors ◽  
Earnings Persistence ◽  
Legal Enforcement ◽  
International Banks ◽  
Level 3 ◽  
Fair Value Measurements ◽  
Level 2

ABSTRACT Using hand-collected data from a sample of 210 international banks during the period 2009 to 2013, we investigate whether fair value exposure, the proportion of financial assets measured at fair values, is associated with earnings persistence and whether the reliability of fair value measurements influences earnings persistence. We also examine whether the association between fair value measurements and earnings persistence is a function of institutional factors such as legal enforcement, the audit environment, and country-level auditor industry expertise. Results suggest that the use of fair values for balance sheet financial instruments enhances earnings persistence. Also, we find that the nondiscretionary fair value Level 1 assets (measured with observable inputs) are positively associated with earnings persistence, whereas the Level 2 assets (measured with indirectly observable inputs) and Level 3 assets (measured using unobservable inputs) are not associated with earnings persistence. We provide further evidence that there is a strong association between factors reflecting countrywide institutional structures and the predictive power of fair values based on discretionary measurement inputs (Level 2 and Level 3 assets) and we find that the moderating effect from these institutional factors is greater for Level 3 assets than for Level 2 assets. Additional tests suggest that the association between fair value estimates and earnings persistence is moderated by the classification of fair value assets (that is, through profit and loss versus other comprehensive income) and the reliability of fair value estimates.

Fair value accounting, earnings management, and the case of bargain purchase gain

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-253
Author(s):  
Steven Lilien ◽  
Bharat Sarath ◽  
Yan Yan
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Fair Value Accounting ◽  
Market Returns ◽  
Accounting Earnings ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Level 3 ◽  
Accounting Earnings Management

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between bargain purchase gains (BPGs) booked by the acquirer and smoothing of acquirers’ earning performance across time. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a sample of 122 bargain purchase acquisitions in non-financial industries from 2009 to 2012 and a pair-match control group of 122 goodwill acquisitions. Findings The authors find that BPGs, and in particular, the Level-3 fair value estimates of intangible assets acquired, have consistently been used to smooth earnings but that such smoothing activities are not associated with long-term market returns. Originality/value This study is the first one to investigate bargain purchase acquisitions in a broad range of non-financial industries and suggests that managers are using the valuation of intangibles to avoid unfavorable earnings even though these valuations are not credible to investors.

Comments by the Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association on the PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter No. 31: PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. C11-C15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Brazel ◽  
James Bierstaker ◽  
Paul Caster ◽  
Brad Reed
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Exposure Period ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Accounting Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Supervision Practices

SUMMARY: Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB” or “Board”) issued a release to address, in two ways, issues relating to the responsibilities of a registered public accounting firm and its supervisory personnel with respect to supervision. First, the release reminds registered firms and associated persons of, and highlights the scope of, Section 105(c)(6) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”), which authorizes the Board to impose sanctions on registered public accounting firms and their supervisory personnel for failing to supervise reasonably an associated person who has violated certain laws, rules, or standards. Second, the release discusses and seeks comment on conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6) and, through increased accountability, lead to improved supervision practices and, consequently, improved audit quality. The PCAOB provided for a 91-day exposure period (from August 5, 2010, to November 3, 2010) for interested parties to examine and provide comments on the conceptual approaches to rulemaking that might complement the application of Section 105(c)(6). The Auditing Standards Committee of the Auditing Section of the American Accounting Association provided the comments in the letter below to the PCAOB on the PCAOB Release No. 2010-005, Application of the “Failure to Supervise” Provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Solicitation of Comment on Rulemaking Concepts.

scholarly journals Integration of Internal Control and Financial Statement Audits: Are Two Audits Better than One?

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Shefchik Bhaskar ◽  
Joseph H. Schroeder ◽  
Marcy L. Shepardson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Auditor Judgment ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Better Than

ABSTRACT The quality of financial statement (FS) audits integrated with audits of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) depends upon the quality of ICFR information used in, and its integration into, FS audits. Recent research and PCAOB inspections find auditors underreport existing ICFR weaknesses and perform insufficient testing to address identified risks, suggesting integrated audits—in which substantial ICFR testing is required—may result in lower FS audit quality than FS-only audits. We compare a 2007–2013 sample of small U.S. public company firm-years receiving integrated audits (accelerated filers) to firm-years receiving FS-only audits (non-accelerated filers) and find integrated audits are associated with higher likelihood of material misstatements and discretionary accruals, consistent with lower FS audit quality. We also find evidence of (1) auditor judgment-based integration issues, and (2) low-quality ICFR audits harming FS audit quality. Overall, results suggest an important potential consequence of integrated audits is lower FS audit quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

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