The Effects of Prior Manager-Auditor Affiliation and PCAOB Inspection Reports on Audit Committee Members' Auditor Recommendations

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Veena L. Brown ◽  
Julia L. Higgs
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Likert Scale ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Selection Decisions ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditor Selection ◽  
One Year

ABSTRACT This study investigates (1) the extent to which audit committee members (ACM) of small publicly traded companies utilize Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports in their auditor selection recommendations when management recommends hiring the auditor, and (2) whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's mandated one-year cooling-off period mitigates independence concerns of ACM resulting from a prior management-auditor affiliation in the same auditor selection context. We use financially literate professional participants as proxies for ACM who make a Likert-scale based recommendation for hiring the auditor. Our study manipulates a hypothetical, triennially inspected auditor's inspection results (favorable/unfavorable) as an auditor competence indicator and a prior management-auditor affiliation (present/absent) as an auditor independence indicator. We document that participants incorporate the inspection results into their selection recommendations, that prior affiliation negatively impacts ACMs' selection recommendations, and that auditor independence effects are contingent upon auditor competence. More specifically, auditor independence impacts auditor selection decisions only when auditor competence is favorable.

scholarly journals The Effects of Manager-Auditor Affiliation and PCAOB Inspection Reports on Audit Committee Members' Auditor Selection

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. P1-P10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veena L. Brown
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Management Measures ◽  
Selection Decisions ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
Auditor Selection

SUMMARY This article summarizes the “The Effects of Prior Manager-Auditor Affiliation and PCAOB Inspection Reports on Audit Committee Members' Auditor Recommendations” (Abbott, Brown, and Higgs 2016), who investigate the extent to which audit committee members (ACM) of small public companies consider auditors' Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports and/or the auditors' prior affiliation with management in their auditor hiring decisions. The authors find participants (the study's proxy for ACM) incorporate the inspection report, as well as the auditor's prior affiliation with management into their selection decision. Specifically, an auditor's prior affiliation with management negatively impacts his/her chances of being selected by the audit committee. To the extent inspection results measure auditors' competence and prior affiliation with management measures auditor independence, the authors find auditor independence influences auditor selection decisions only when an auditor is deemed competent. In this paper, I discuss the implications of Abbott et al.'s (2016) findings for auditors, public companies, audit committees, and regulators/policymakers interested in understanding whether and how major aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are being implemented within corporate governance.

Auditor Independence: A Focus on the SEC Independence Rules

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey A. Gramling ◽  
Vassilios Karapanos
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Background Information ◽  
Instructional Resources ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Securities Laws

Auditor independence is an important underpinning of the federal securities laws. These laws require that registrants' financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) be audited by independent public accountants. The focus on independence for public company auditors was increased in light of the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to strengthen auditor independence. These instructional resources provide background information on the current SEC auditor independence rules. After becoming familiar with these rules, you will have the opportunity to complete several case scenarios that address: (1) hypothetical settings that may represent violations of the SEC independence rules, (2) possible actions that an audit committee might take when it determines that the SEC independence rules may have been violated, and (3) possible alternatives to the current SEC independence rules that could achieve the desired public policy goals of objective audits and investor confidence.

scholarly journals A Proposed Supplemental Teaching Model For Enhancing Students Understanding Of Sarbanes Oxley

2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-62
Author(s):  
James Specht ◽  
Albert Kagan ◽  
Scott D. Maanum
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Students ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Entry Level ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Auditing Standards ◽  
Approach To Teaching

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 brought about major changes in how accounting firms conduct audits of publicly traded companies. Corporate officials have additional responsibilities in the areas of internal controls and financial reports. In addition there is a new organization responsible for established auditing standards for publicly traded companies, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Accordingly, there are new requirements and responsibilities for auditors of publicly traded companies. In effect, the emergence of separate auditing standards for publicly traded companies and for companies that are not publicly traded is creating two distinct fields of auditing. These changes require a different approach to teaching auditing to accounting students. This article proposes one approach to teaching these significant changes for entry level auditors.

scholarly journals When the PCAOB Talks, Who Listens? Evidence from Stakeholder Reaction to GAAP-Deficient PCAOB Inspection Reports of Small Auditors

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence J. Abbott ◽  
Katherine A. Gunny ◽  
Tracey Chunqi Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Quality Signals ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Inspection Process ◽  
Auditor Reporting

SUMMARY: Section 104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB conducts inspections of registered public accounting firms that provide audits for publicly traded companies. The results of the inspection process are summarized in publicly available reports at the PCAOB website. Using these reports, we categorize the inspection reports into three levels of increasing severity: clean, GAAS-deficient, and GAAP-deficient. We examine the potential use of GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection reports as perceived audit quality signals for the clients of GAAP-deficient auditors that are inspected on a triennial basis by the PCAOB. Our investigation is predicated on the notion that audit quality is generally not directly observable. Thus, the clients of these auditors may seek to signal their desire for audit quality by dismissing their GAAP-deficient auditors. Our results suggest that the clients of GAAP-deficient, triennially inspected auditors are more likely to dismiss these auditors in favor of triennially inspected auditors that are not GAAP-deficient. In addition, we find that greater agency conflicts, the presence of an independent and expert audit committee, and outside blockholdings magnify this effect. Interestingly, we find no evidence that the clients use GAAP-deficient reports to procure a subsequent-year audit fee discount or more favorable going-concern auditor reporting treatment. Our evidence indicates that PCAOB inspection reports created heterogeneity in auditor brand name among a group of non-Big N/non-national auditors that did not previously exist and are universally treated by prior research as “other auditors.”

scholarly journals A One Year Forecasting Project For Publicly Traded Companies

2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (9) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Fred Petro
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Team Member ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Accounts Receivable ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Income Statement ◽  
History Of ◽  
One Year

This project is intended to teach students to apply the material covered in their first graduate accounting course. This is accomplished by applying the material to an actual company selected by each team. The project is described as follows: The project includes a computerized spreadsheet preparation of a master budget forecast for an actual publicly traded company for one year into the future. . The dates depend upon when the annual reports are prepared for your company. The forecast begins the day following the last available published annual report. The forecast does not comprise any actual numbers regardless of when the actual annual or quarterly statements are prepared for the company selected. The actual balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow from the preceding year are included with the forecasted balance sheet, income statement and statement of cash flow. The company must have a physical inventory, and accounts receivable from sales. The company may not be one in which any team member(s) are employed. The forecast will include the following items:1. Introduction, including the history of the company and a description of the company plan and policies as given in the project2. Sales budget (twelve months).3. Schedule of purchases (twelve months).4. Schedule of collection of credit sales (accounts receivable) and cash sales (twelve months).5. Cash budget (twelve months).6. An Income statement (for the current year and the projected year).7. A Balance sheet (for the current year and the projected year).8. A Statement of cash flow (for the current year and the projected year).9. Cost-profit-volume analysis (twelve months).10. Conclusion and recommendations

scholarly journals Influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Financial Reporting Quality: An Overview of EU Firms Cross-Listed in the USA

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ujkan Bajra ◽  
Rrustem Asllanaj
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa

Abstract This paper investigate whether compliance with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) Sect. 302 (financial reporting) and 404 (internal controls) enhances financial reporting quality (FRQ). This study focuses on EU publicly traded companies that are cross-listed in the US markets. Using a novel approach with respect to operationalization of the SOX, the empirical research integrated into this paper advances the understanding of financial reporting quality for both practitioners and policymakers. The study argues that financial reporting quality increased after SOX entered into force but, notably, we find that FRQ improves with compliance with SOX302 but not with SOX404. Examination of the latter relationship at the subsection level also reveals that compliance with certain SOX requirements is not satisfactory. We find that three out of six subsections of SOX302 are directly associated with financial reporting, while subsections (1), (5) and (6) of SOX302 are not related with FRQ, indicating that the management team, albeit not entirely, provides a reliable financial reporting systems. We also find that compliance with some SOX404’s subsections has been relatively low (i.e. subsections (1) and (3) of SOX404)), suggesting that corporations have not established and are not maintaining suitable internal control systems over financial reporting.

scholarly journals Audit committees in West Indian states

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-33
Author(s):  
Anthony R. Bowrin
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
West Indian ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Indian States ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Industry Affiliation

This study describes the regulatory framework governing audit committees (AC) of publicly traded companies in the West Indies and examines the extent to which the provisions of these AC regulations are similar to the International Federation of Accountants guidelines for AC. Also, it examines the actual AC policies of publicly traded West Indian firms and determines whether they vary systematically with industry affiliation or firm size. The sample comprised companies traded on Barbados, Jamaica Stock Exchange, and Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchanges in 2002. Larger companies and those in the financial industry provided better audit committee disclosures than their smaller counterparts and those in non-financial industries.

scholarly journals What Drives Auditor Selection?

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. A26-A42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Dreike Almer ◽  
Donna R. Philbrick ◽  
Kathleen Hertz Rupley
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Selection Process ◽  
Information Source ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Selection Decision ◽  
Auditor Selection ◽  
View Management

SUMMARY This study provides evidence on the factors that currently impact audit committee members' selection of external auditors. Using a two-stage approach, we survey and interview public company audit committee members (ACMs), and find evidence that management continues to provide input into the decision process even as SOX regulations require audit committees to take responsibility for the auditor selection decision. ACMs view management as an important information source when they assess the proposing audit partner's reputation for accessibility, timeliness, and ability to liaise with the firm's national technical office, as well as the proposing audit firm's technical and industry expertise. Results of this study can help firms be more competitive in the audit bidding process, inform policy makers when considering whether to impose further audit committee regulations, and aid academics in ensuring an up-to-date understanding of the audit committee's role in the auditor selection process.

Do Former Audit Firm Partners on Audit Committees Procure Greater Nonaudit Services from the Auditor?

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vic Naiker ◽  
Divesh S. Sharma ◽  
Vineeta D. Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Nonaudit Services

ABSTRACT: To address potential threats to auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the audit committee to pre-approve nonaudit services (NAS) procured from the auditor. However, the presence of a former audit firm partner (FAP) affiliated with the current auditor on the audit committee could undermine the audit committee's due diligence over the NAS pre-approval process. To alleviate such concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved a three-year “cooling-off” period for appointing audit firm alumni as independent directors. Our analyses show that the presence of both affiliated and unaffiliated FAPs on audit committees does not lead to greater NAS procured from the auditor; rather, FAPs reduce NAS procured from the auditor. Moreover, NAS decline significantly following the appointment of FAPs to the audit committee. Further tests suggest the three-year cooling-off period may not be warranted and deserves further investigation. Our study raises important implications for regulators, policy makers, corporate boards, and future research. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Using a Movie to Study the COSO Internal Control Framework: An Instructional Case

2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arline Savage ◽  
Carolyn Strand Norman ◽  
Kathryn A. S. Lancaster
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Control Framework ◽  
Accounting Graduates

Following enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (U.S. House of Representatives 2002), public accounting firms and publicly traded companies are much more focused on internal controls. Accordingly, many accounting graduates will be asked to evaluate, document, and perhaps test the adequacy of an organization's internal control structure. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations' (COSO 1992) Internal Control—Integrated Framework is the most widely used tool for this purpose. This instructional case, based on the movie, Rogue Trader, gives students the opportunity to see the consequences of lax corporate governance and weak internal controls at the Barings Bank. Students view the movie and then use the COSO framework to critically analyze the collapse of a well-established financial institution.

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