An Examination of the Effect of Inquiry and Auditor Type on Reporting Intentions for Fraud

2011 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven E. Kaplan ◽  
Kelly Richmond Pope ◽  
Janet A. Samuels

SUMMARY Employee tips are the most common form of initial fraud detection, suggesting that employees frequently are aware of fraud before others professionally charged to detect fraud, such as internal and external auditors. Given the seriousness of fraud to a range of stakeholders, it is important to increase our understanding of the willingness of employees who learn about fraud to report this information to auditors. We conduct an experimental study describing a hypothetical situation involving an employee's discovery of a fraudulent act by his supervisor. Given the hypothetical situation, participants, assuming they were facing the situation, provide their intentions to report fraud to an auditor. The study examines several issues related to participants' intentions to report fraud to auditors. First, we predict and find that participants' reporting intentions to an inquiring auditor are stronger than their reporting intentions to a noninquiring auditor. Second, we predict and find that participants' reporting intentions to an internal auditor are stronger than their reporting intentions to an external auditor. Third, based on contrast coding results, we predict and find that inquiry and auditor type interact to influence reporting intentions. Fourth, we find that reporting intentions for two different types of fraudulent acts, misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting, do not significantly differ, nor does the type of fraudulent act interact with whether the auditor engages in inquiry or the report recipient (e.g., internal versus external auditor). Supplemental analysis provides additional information on the extent to which beliefs differ between the two types of fraudulent acts.

2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven E. Kaplan ◽  
Kelly R. Pope ◽  
Janet A. Samuels

ABSTRACT Only a fraction of employees who discover fraud report this information. Given the serious consequences of fraud, better understanding factors influencing individuals' intentions to report fraud, particularly to a non-anonymous recipient such as a manager, is important. We predict that reporting intentions to a manager will be influenced by attributes of the firm (e.g., whether managerial procedural safeguards are strong or weak), the report recipient (e.g., whether the manager is likeable or unlikeable), and the type of fraud (e.g., misappropriation of assets or fraudulent financial reporting). Results from this experimental study indicate that managerial likeability and the type of fraud, but not managerial procedural safeguards or the interaction with managerial likeability, significantly influence reporting intentions to a manager. We contend that participants are influenced by managerial likeability because it provides specific information about the manager and acts as a signal about how the manager will likely handle a fraud report. These results, consistent with previous research (Robinson, Robertson, and Curtis 2012), suggest that participants make stronger attributions to a person engaging in misappropriation of assets compared to a person engaging in fraudulent financial reporting. Implications of this study to the practitioner and academic communities are discussed.


2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven E. Kaplan ◽  
Kelly Richmond Pope ◽  
Janet A. Samuels

ABSTRACT: Fraudulent activity is often first discovered by employees. Gaining an understanding of how meeting with the transgressor to discuss the apparent fraud (“social confrontation”) influences individuals’ likelihood of reporting fraud to internal recipients is particularly important for various stakeholders interested in the early reporting of fraud. Using an experimental approach, this study provides evidence on the extent to which unsuccessful social confrontation with one’s supervisor regarding apparent fraud influences reporting intentions to two different, but plausible, internal report recipients: the supervisor’s supervisor and an internal auditor. To broaden the generalizability of the findings, the study includes two different fraudulent acts. In the study, participants assume the role of an employee discovering a fraudulent act. The study manipulates two between-participants variables: (1) the presence or absence of unsuccessful social confrontation with the transgressor to discuss the apparent fraud and (2) the type of fraudulent act that apparently occurred (misappropriation of assets or fraudulent financial reporting). The results of the study were consistent with and extend power-related theories of whistleblowing. We find that under unsuccessful social confrontation, one’s reporting intentions to the supervisor’s supervisor are stronger than to an internal auditor. However, reporting intentions to the supervisor’s supervisor are not stronger than to an internal auditor when social confrontation did not occur. The type of fraudulent act did not influence the relation between social confrontation and reporting intentions. Our findings suggest that employees experiencing unsuccessful social confrontation may be more likely to seek out powerful internal report recipients. Thus, audit committees and others with an interest in fostering internal fraud reporting may find it helpful to include social confrontation strategies as part of a broader discussion with employees of responses to the discovery of fraud and make employees fully aware of how to report apparent fraud to senior internal report recipients.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chad M. Stefaniak ◽  
Richard W. Houston ◽  
Robert M. Cornell

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) encourages external auditors to rely on internal auditors to increase the efficiency of lower-risk internal control evaluations (PCAOB 2007). We use post-SOX experimental data to compare the levels and effects of employer (client) identification on the control evaluations of internal (external) auditors. First, we find that internal auditors perceive a greater level of identification with the evaluated firm than do external auditors. We also find some evidence that, ceteris paribus, internal auditors are less lenient than external auditors when evaluating internal control deficiencies (i.e., tend to support management's preferred position to a lesser extent). Further, while we support Bamber and Iyer's (2007) results by finding that higher levels of external auditor client identification are associated with more lenient control evaluations, we demonstrate an opposite effect for internal auditors—higher levels of internal auditor employer identification are associated with less lenient control evaluations. Our results are important because we are the first to capture the relative levels of identification between internal and external auditors, as well as the first to compare directly internal and external auditor leniency, both of which are important in light of AS5. That is, we provide initial evidence that external auditors' increased reliance on internal auditors' work, while increasing audit efficiency, also could improve audit quality by resulting in less lenient internal control evaluations, due, at least in part, to the effects of employer and client identification. Data Availability: Contact the first author.


2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duane M. Brandon

SUMMARY: In the last decade internal auditing services has been a significant area of growth for public accounting firms. Unlike the provision of external audits, the provision of outsourced internal audit services does not prohibit accounting firms from providing the client with additional services. This study investigates some implications of an outsourced internal auditor providing nonaudit services. Specifically, 89 experienced external auditors completed an experiment to investigate whether external auditors will evaluate and rely on an outsourced internal auditor’s work differently when the internal auditor also provides nonaudit services. Results indicate that evaluations of the outsourced internal auditors’ objectivity were negatively affected by the provision of nonaudit services. Further, the differences in objectivity perceptions are tempered by the use of different personnel to provide consulting services. Competence perceptions were not affected. Results also indicate that external auditor reliance on internal audit and suggested audit fees are affected. However, these results do not appear to be tempered by audit and nonaudit staffing decisions.


Wahana ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-130
Author(s):  
Djoko Susanto

The internal audit function, audit committee, and external auditor are three crucial stakeholders of corporate governance that safeguard the quality of financial reporting. In this article, I discuss the interrelationships between these monitoring mechanisms. I also provide insights about what we have learned from academic research about the working relationships between these three governance entities. This article should be of interest to academic researchers as well as to corporate stakeholders, which include management, investors, regulators, and Dewan Komisaris members. Future researchers can make use of this article as they contribute more work in areas related to auditing, monitoring and corporate governance, and financial reporting quality. Insights from this article can also guide corporate stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of the internal audit, audit committee, and external auditors in their organizations.


KEBERLANJUTAN ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 950
Author(s):  
Khusnatul Zulfa ◽  
Amira Bayagub

AbstractThis study aims to examine the influence of externalxpressure, institutionalownership, xfinancial stability, xquality of external auditor, xchange inxauditor, change in director and frequentxnumber of CEO’s picture on the fraudulent financial reporting among the property and real estate firms listed in Indonesia stock exchange during 2014-2016. The data used in this study is secondary data obtained from the firms’ annual report which was accessed through www.idx.co.id. The data analysis method used in this study is multiple linear regression analysis. SPSS ver 2.0 was used to analyze the data. The samples were selected using a non-probability sampling technique with a purposive sampling method and obtained a sample of 41 property and real estate companies during 2014-2016. The results of variable test indicates that external pressure and change in director partially influences fraudulent financial reporting, while institutional ownership, financial stability, quality of external auditor, change in auditor, and frequent number of CEO’s picture partially does not influence fraudulent financial reporting. The Simultaneous test shows that external pressure, institutional ownership, financial stability, quality of external auditor, change in auditor, change in director and frequent number of CEO’s picture Keywords: External Pressure, Institutional Ownership, Financial Stability, Quality of External Auditor, Change in Auditor, Change in Director, Frequent Number of CEO’s Picture, Fraudulent Financial Reporting.


Author(s):  
Dr. Alhassan Haladu ◽  
Mohammed Haliru Beri

The study examines the cooperation between internal and external auditors in discharging duties and upholding organizational objectives. The aim is to know how the internal auditor relates with the external auditor once appointed and especially during the process of carrying out his/her duties. To achieve this primary data was collected through face-to-face interview from Mike Ukueje & Co. which is the case study of this research. The result showed that both the internal auditor and external auditor work in the interest of the organization through emphasis on the internal control system even though they are guided in their duties by the articles of association (internal auditor) and CAMA 2004 (external auditor). In the private sector external auditors are welcome whole heartedly by their internal counterpart, while in the public sector they are treated with suspicion and prejudice. For this reason it is advisable to enlighten the public sector more on the responsibilities of the external auditor.


2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irina Malaescu ◽  
Steve G. Sutton

ABSTRACT As a response to the increased demand for timely and ongoing assurance over the effectiveness of risk management and control systems, companies are moving toward a more automated control environment through the implementation of continuous audit modules. The purpose of this study is to evaluate external auditors' reliance on internal audit's work when advanced audit techniques are introduced by the internal auditor and the impact this reliance has on budgeted audit hours. Prior literature suggests that internal control deficiencies also have an impact on external auditor reliance and the audit budget. The reliance decision of an external auditor has important economic consequences and implications for efficiency and effectiveness of the overall audit. In recent years, the PCAOB has encouraged greater such reliance to improve audit efficiency. An experiment is conducted with 87 experienced external auditors to investigate the theorized effects. Using a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design, the frequency of the internal audit (traditional versus continuous audit) and prior year material weakness (absent versus present) are manipulated. Consistent with predictions, we find that auditors are willing to rely more on internal audit work in a continuous audit environment than in a traditional environment, and this effect is magnified when the prior year audit report on the effectiveness of internal controls indicates that controls are working properly. The presence of a material weakness, however, negatively impacts judgments on the budget for the valuation of a complex account. In addition, both material weakness and continuous audit have an impact on the overall audit budget, which is reduced only when the company has no prior year material weakness and a functioning continuous audit module is put in place. The results show that auditors increase budgeted hours for the engagement at a higher rate when the client uses traditional internal audit procedures.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 83-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Burt

ABSTRACT The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) argues that internal auditors often have a strong “employee” identity within their organization. While external auditors are concerned that this employee identity might negatively impact internal auditors' objectivity, the IIA argues this identity can actually be beneficial as employees may be more willing to share sensitive and audit-relevant information with the internal auditor than they would with the external auditor. Through an experiment relying on the social identity and organizational silence literatures, I test the prediction that non-audit employees will identify more highly with the internal than the external auditor and they will thus, be willing to share more information about internal control weaknesses with the internal than the external auditor. The results from a moderated mediation analysis support this prediction and also show the effect is stronger as the severity of the internal control weakness increases. Overall, this research informs external auditors and regulators about conditions under which the internal auditor may have an advantage over the external auditor in obtaining information that could help improve audit quality. It also informs managers about an important role played by their internal auditors that may result in increased quality of the internal control system while also potentially lowering audit fees.


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