Does SOX 404 Have Teeth? Consequences of the Failure to Report Existing Internal Control Weaknesses

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 1169-1200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah C. Rice ◽  
David P. Weber ◽  
Biyu Wu
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Class Action ◽  
Management Turnover ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
Enforcement Mechanisms

ABSTRACT We examine various penalties that could serve as enforcement mechanisms for Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404. We focus on firms with restatements, some of which had previously reported their control weaknesses as required and some of which acknowledged them only after announcing their restatement. We find no evidence that penalties are more likely for firms, managers, or auditors that fail to report existing control weaknesses. Instead, class action lawsuits, management turnover, and auditor turnover are all more likely in the wake of a restatement when control weaknesses had previously been reported. We find similar, although weaker, evidence for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sanctions. These results are consistent with disclosure of control weaknesses making it difficult for management to plausibly claim later that they were unaware of the underlying conditions that led to restatements. The results also suggest that the public and private enforcement mechanisms surrounding SOX 404 are unlikely to provide strong incentives for compliance and offer a potential explanation for why most restatements are issued by firms that previously claimed to have effective internal controls.

Breach of Data at TJX: An Instructional Case Used to Study COSO and COBIT, with a Focus on Computer Controls, Data Security, and Privacy Legislation

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-545 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra J. Cereola ◽  
Ronald J. Cereola
Keyword(s):  
Information System ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Data Security ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Free Enterprise ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Real World Problem ◽  
Privacy Legislation

ABSTRACT Internal control frameworks (ICF) provide a basis for understanding controls in an organization and for making judgments about the effectiveness of controls. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires companies to report, on an ongoing basis, the effectiveness of their internal controls in their annual filings. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommends companies use ICF to help achieve compliance with SOX. ICF provide a useful tool for management and auditors evaluating and addressing the adequacy of controls in their organization. As there is no such thing as a “risk-free” enterprise, developing an understanding of ICF is important for students entering the accounting profession. This instructional case provides students the opportunity to assess internal control risks within an organization's information system using a “real-world” problem following COSO (SEC-recommended ICF) and/or COBIT as a guide. Students then evaluate the organization's overall level of internal control risks and formulate recommendations for mitigating such risks.

Controls, Security, and Audit in Online Digital Accounting

2011 ◽  
pp. 318-383
Author(s):  
Ashutosh Deshmukh
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Control Structure ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company

Internal controls have existed since the dawn of business activities. Internal controls are basically systems of checks and balances. The purpose is to keep the organization moving along desired lines as per the wishes of the owners and to protect assets of the business. Internal controls have received attention from auditors, managers, accountants, fraud examiners and legislatures. Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 now requires the annual report of a public company to contain a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. Section 404 of the Act also requires the auditor to attest to and report on management’s assessment of effectiveness of the internal controls in accordance with standards established by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

Determinants of the Persistence of Internal Control Weaknesses

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie K. Klamm ◽  
Kevin W. Kobelsky ◽  
Marcia Weidenmier Watson
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Management Training ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Senior Management ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Specific Control

SYNOPSIS This paper analyzes the degree to which material weaknesses (MWs) in internal control reported under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) affect the future reporting of MWs. Particularly, we examine information technology (IT) and non-IT MWs and their breakdown into specific IT-related entity-level, non-IT-related entity-level, and account-level deficiencies. Analysis reveals that most account-level and entity-level deficiencies occur at a significantly higher rate in SOX 404 reports with at least one IT MW than in MW reports with only non-IT MWs. Further, the presence and count of both types of MWs and all three types of deficiencies are associated with increased future MWs, as are lower profitability, non-Big 6 auditor, and firm complexity. Specific control deficiencies related to senior management, training, and IT control environment have the strongest impact on future MWs. These results indicate that effective corporate governance of both the IT and non-IT domains is pivotal in establishing and maintaining strong internal controls over financial reporting. Data Availability:  Data are available from the public sources identified in the paper.

Real Earnings Management before and after Reporting SOX 404 Material Weaknesses

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tuukka Järvinen ◽  
Emma-Riikka Myllymäki
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Public Disclosure ◽  
High Quality ◽  
The Public ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Internal Control System ◽  
Before And After

SYNOPSIS The purpose of this study is to investigate whether SOX Section 404 material weaknesses manifest in real earnings management behavior. The empirical findings indicate that, compared to companies with effective internal controls, companies with existing material weaknesses in their internal controls engage in more manipulation of real activities (particularly inventory overproduction). This implies that the weak commitment by management to provide effective internal control system and high-quality financial information relates to a tendency to use real earnings management methods. Moreover, we find evidence suggesting that companies employ real earnings management (overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenses) after disclosing previous year's material weaknesses. We conjecture that the public disclosure of material weaknesses induces management to strive to mitigate the expected negative reactions of stakeholders to the disclosure by engaging in real earnings management, which is not easily detected or constrained by outsiders. Overall, this study suggests that material weaknesses in internal controls signal an environment where management is more inclined to employ real earnings management.

The Search for Order in Municipal Administration: Herman A. Metz and the New York City Experience, 1898–1909

2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-74
Author(s):  
Ryan P. McDonough ◽  
Paul J. Miranti ◽  
Michael P. Schoderbek
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
New York City ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
York City ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
The Public ◽  
Operational Activities ◽  
The City

ABSTRACT This paper examines the administrative and accounting reforms coordinated by Herman A. Metz around the turn of the 20th century in New York City. Reform efforts were motivated by deficiencies in administering New York City's finances, including a lack of internal control over monetary resources and operational activities, and opaque financial reports. The activities of Comptroller Metz, who collaborated with institutions such as the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, were paramount in initiating and implementing the administrative and accounting reforms in the city, which contributed to reform efforts across the country. Metz promoted the adoption of functional cost classifications for city departments, developed flowcharts for improved transaction processing, strengthened internal controls, and published the 1909 Manual of Accounting and Business Procedure of the City of New York, which laid the groundwork for transparent financial reports capable of providing vital information about the city's activities and subsidiary units. JEL Classifications: H72, M41, N91. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Part I Introduction, 1 Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Eu

This chapter explains the term ‘vertical agreements’ and what it covers. It addresses a number of general issues that are relevant to the EU competition law treatment of vertical agreements in general. It describes the implementation and the (public and private) enforcement of Article 101 TFEU before and after the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. The chapter provides the historical background of both Regulation 330/2010 and Regulation 461/2010. In particular, it devotes specific attention to the nature and legal and practical consequences of soft EU competition law (in the form of notices, guidelines, etc) as opposed to hard EU competition law (provisions of primary and secondary EU law).

Dialogue and Coordination: How Hybrid Models Can Strengthen Labor Standards Enforcement

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 312-334
Author(s):  
Kelly Pike
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid Approach ◽  
National Development ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Hybrid Models ◽  
Labor Standards ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement

This article examines the factors that limit and support the capacity of developing states to regulate labor in the public and private spheres, as well as the role of international parties in strengthening that capacity. The purpose is to better understand the potential for a more coordinated approach informed by hybrid models of enforcement, which can contribute to closing regulatory gaps. Fieldwork was carried out in the garment sectors in South Africa and Lesotho during 2018, including 20 semi-structured interviews with industry stakeholders representing government, business, and labor. Findings indicate that the developing state has an important role to play in facilitating a more coordinated approach between systems of enforcement, including public and private enforcement agencies, national development agencies, manufacturers, buyers, and unions. The case studies indicate the potential of such an approach to, for example, improve inspection quality, accountability, and transparency. The state can play an active role in facilitating a hybrid approach to regulation that involves both state and non-state actors, with dialogue and coordination at the core of addressing broader challenges for enforcement.

The Impact of Internal Controls and Penalties on Fraud

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberta Ann Barra
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Reliability Engineering ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Internal Control System ◽  
Analytical Reliability ◽  
Net Assets ◽  
Managerial Employees ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT: Little prior research exists on the parameters of internal control activities. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002) makes identifying the properties of these parameters under various conditions important. In this paper, an analytical/reliability engineering methodology is used to investigate the relative impact of penalties versus other types of internal controls on managerial and non-managerial employees’ propensity to commit fraud. Ceteris paribus, increasing required effort with internal controls and/or increasing employee penalties, increases the minimum amount stolen when a fraud incident occurs; that is, more net assets will be taken per fraud incident with controls than without controls. The findings show that the firm’s least-cost scenario with managerial employees is to enforce maximum penalties. The firm’s least-cost scenario with non-managerial employees is to utilize alternative internal controls while imposing minimum penalties. Further, the effectiveness of separation of duties is dependent on the detective controls in the internal control system.

Rethinking the Relationship Between Public Regulation and Private Litigation: Evidence from Securities Class Action in China

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 333-361
Author(s):  
Robin Hui Huang
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Class Action ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Securities Law ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The U.S

Abstract China has a civil procedure for collective litigation, which is dubbed Chinese-style class action, as it differs from the U.S.-style class action in some important ways. Using securities class action as a case study, this Article empirically examines both the quantity and quality of reported cases in China. It shows that the number of cases is much lower than expected, but the percentage of recovery is significantly higher than that in the United States. Based on this, the Article casts doubt on the popular belief that China should adopt the U.S.-style class action, and sheds light on the much-debated issue concerning the relationship between public and private enforcement of securities law. The Article also discusses the future prospects of securities class action in China in light of some recent developments which may provide its functional equivalents, including the regulator-brokered compensation fund and public interest group litigation.

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