Do Firms Manage Their Credit Ratings? Evidence from Rating-Based Contracts

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 163-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xia (Eliza) Zhang

SYNOPSIS This paper examines whether firms with rating-based performance-priced loan contracts (PPrating firms) manage cash flow from operations (CFO) and accruals to obtain better firm credit ratings. I find that for PPrating firms, both CFO management and accruals management, are positively associated with firm credit ratings. In the cross-section, the relation of CFO management and accruals management with firm ratings is less pronounced when there is a larger benefit associated with inflated firm ratings. These results support the view that financial statement manipulation helps PPrating firms achieve more favorable ratings; when these firms are subject to more stringent rating-agency monitoring, such manipulation proves less effective. JEL Classifications: G18; G20; G28.

Author(s):  
Doron Avramov ◽  
Tarun Chordia ◽  
Gergana Jostova ◽  
Alexander Philipov

2010 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michail Koubouros ◽  
Dimitrios Malliaropulos ◽  
Ekaterini Panopoulou

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-308
Author(s):  
Matthew Backus ◽  
Christopher Conlon ◽  
Michael Sinkinson

We empirically assess the implications of the common ownership hypothesis from a historical perspective using the set of S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2017. We show that the dramatic rise in common ownership in the time series is driven primarily by the rise of indexing and diversification and, in the cross section, by investor concentration, which the theory presumes to drive a wedge between cash flow rights and control. We also show that the theory predicts incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the widely held firm. (JEL D22, G32, G34, L21, L25)


2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (9) ◽  
pp. 2504-2519 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Qinghao Mao ◽  
K. C. John Wei

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