Evidence on the Association between Financial Restatements and Auditor Resignations

2012 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 439-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Huang ◽  
Susan Scholz
Keyword(s):  
Data Availability ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Client Relationships ◽  
Auditor Resignation ◽  
Client Risk

SYNOPSIS Financial restatements have significant implications for auditor-client relationships. We estimate that a restatement increases the odds of an auditor resignation dramatically. Restatements involving fraud, reversing profit to loss, and those disclosed in press releases appear to drive the increased resignation likelihood. Furthermore, companies with relatively severe restatements are more likely to hire smaller auditors following a resignation. Collectively, these results are consistent with auditors interpreting restatements as an indication of increased client risk. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the text.

Audit and Tax Career Paths in Public Accounting: An Analysis of Student and Professional Perceptions

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek W. Dalton ◽  
Steve Buchheit ◽  
Jeffrey J. McMillan
Keyword(s):  
Business Processes ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Accounting Students ◽  
Daily Routine ◽  
Limited Information ◽  
Student Survey ◽  
Public Accounting ◽  
Accounting Professionals ◽  
Job Opportunities ◽  
Client Relationships

SYNOPSIS Upper-division accounting students frequently direct their public accounting careers toward audit or tax “tracks” based on what appears to be limited information. Surprisingly, prior research has not investigated the factors that affect this fundamentally important career decision. We conduct two surveys to investigate the relevant factors of the audit-tax decision from the perspectives of upper-division accounting students and experienced public accounting professionals. Our student survey documents the underlying factors that influence the audit-tax decision. For example, accounting students who plan to pursue careers in audit believe that they will have more client interaction, better future job opportunities (i.e., industry positions), and greater knowledge of business processes if they work in audit (as opposed to tax). In contrast, accounting students who plan to pursue careers in tax perceive that they will have a more stable daily routine, develop more specialized skills, and build more collaborative client relationships if they work in tax (as opposed to audit). While our public accounting respondents agree with many of the students' perceptions, professionals also disagree with several of the students' perceptions, suggesting misimpressions of practice. Our results should be of interest to the accounting professionals, firm recruiters, and accounting professors who advise future accounting professionals. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.

The Economic Consequences of Financial Restatements: Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control

2014 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir Amel-Zadeh ◽  
Yuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Control ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Economic Resources ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Main Driver ◽  
Takeover Bids ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our analyses suggest that the information risk associated with restating firms is the main driver of these results. Overall, this study finds that financial restatements have profound consequences for the allocation of economic resources in the market for corporate control. JEL Classifications: D82; G14; G34; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

The Effect of Employee Treatment Policies on Internal Control Weaknesses and Financial Restatements

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (4) ◽  
pp. 1167-1194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Guo ◽  
Pinghsun Huang ◽  
Yan Zhang ◽  
Nan Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Employee Benefits ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Treatment Policies ◽  
Employee Treatment

ABSTRACT This study investigates the role of employment policies in reducing internal control ineffectiveness and financial restatements. We provide new evidence that employee treatment policies are an important predictor of ineffective internal control. We also find that employee-friendly policies significantly reduce the propensity for employee-related material weaknesses. These results suggest that greater employee benefits facilitate the acquisition, development, and motivation of the workforce and ameliorate the loss of valuable human capital, thereby mitigating employee failures to implement internal control tasks properly. Moreover, we document novel results that financial restatements, especially those caused by unintentional errors, are less likely to arise in firms that invest more in employee benefits. Collectively, our emphasis on the effect of employee treatment policies on the integrity of internal control and financial reporting distinguishes our paper from previous studies that focus on the role of top executives in accounting practices. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

Determinants and Market Consequences of Auditor Dismissals after Accounting Restatements

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 1051-1082 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen M. Hennes ◽  
Andrew J. Leone ◽  
Brian P. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Market Reaction ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
Corporate Boards ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Market Consequences

ABSTRACT This study examines the conditions under which financial restatements lead corporate boards to dismiss external auditors and how the market responds to those dismissal announcements. We find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after more severe restatements but that the severity effect is primarily attributable to the dismissal of non-Big 4 auditors rather than Big 4 auditors. We also document that among corporations with Big 4 auditors, those that are larger and more complex operationally are less likely to dismiss their auditors. Combined, this evidence suggests that firms with higher switching costs and fewer replacement auditor choices are less likely to dismiss their auditors after a restatement, which is informative to the debates about the costs and benefits of mandatory auditor rotation and limited competition in the audit market. Additionally, we examine contemporaneous executive turnover and find evidence that boards view auditor dismissals as complementary rather than substitute responses to restatements. Finally, we investigate the market reaction to auditor dismissals after restatements. The market reaction to the dismissal is significantly more positive following more severe restatements (5.9 percent) relative to less severe restatements (0.6 percent) when the client engages a comparably sized auditor. This positive market reaction is consistent with firms restoring financial reporting credibility by replacing their auditors and highlights the important role that auditors play in the financial markets. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

Are Seemingly Self-Serving Attributions in Earnings Press Releases Plausible? Empirical Evidence

2013 ◽  
Vol 89 (2) ◽  
pp. 635-667 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Kimbrough ◽  
Isabel Yanyan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Attribution Theory ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
External Causes ◽  
Earnings Press Releases ◽  
Industry Peers

ABSTRACT Seemingly self-serving attributions either attribute favorable performance to internal causes (enhancing attributions) or poor performance to external causes (defensive attributions). Managers presumably provide such attributions in earnings press releases to heighten (dampen) investors' perceptions of the persistence of good (bad) earnings news, thereby increasing (decreasing) the market reward (penalty) for good (bad) earnings news. Building on attribution theory and prior research on earnings commonality, this study investigates cross-sectional differences in investors' responses to quarterly earnings press releases that contain seemingly self-serving attributions. Using a random sample of press releases from 1999 to 2005, we find that firms that provide defensive attributions to explain earnings disappointments experience less severe market penalties when: (1) more of the their industry peers also release bad news, and (2) their earnings share higher commonality with industry- and market-level earnings. On the other hand, firms that provide enhancing attributions to explain good earnings news reap greater market rewards when: (1) more of their industry peers release bad news, and (2) their earnings share lower commonality with industry- and market-level earnings. Collectively, our results demonstrate that investors neither ignore seemingly self-serving attributions nor accept them at face value, but rely on industry- and firm-specific information to assess their plausibility. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

The Disclosure of Non-GAAP Earnings Following Regulation G: An Analysis of Transitory Gains

2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Baumker ◽  
Philip Biggs ◽  
Sarah E. McVay ◽  
Jeremy Pierce
Keyword(s):  
Unintended Consequence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Earnings Announcement ◽  
Earnings Per Share ◽  
Regulation G

SYNOPSIS We investigate how managers report one-time gains resulting from legal settlements and insurance recoveries in press releases following Regulation G. Regulation G may have had the unintended consequence of allowing managers to omit mention of these transitory gains, resulting in higher reported performance absent non-GAAP disclosure. We find that while managers generally provide some information about transitory gains in the earnings announcement, there is a large amount of variation in the granularity of the detail. For example, the vast majority of managers (88.5 percent) mention the gain in the earnings announcement, but few (34 percent) report non-GAAP earnings per share summary figures explicitly excluding transitory gains. This percentage is significantly lower than pre-Regulation G, where approximately 62 percent of firms reported non-GAAP earnings per share excluding the transitory gain. Interestingly, we find that gains are less likely to be carved out of earnings when there are no concurrent transitory losses, providing some evidence that there continues to be an opportunistic component of non-GAAP reporting following Regulation G. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

Characteristics of Managerial Tone Priced by Auditors: Evidence Based on Annual Letters to Shareholders of Large U.S. Firms

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-161
Author(s):  
Adam Greiner ◽  
Lorenzo Patelli ◽  
Matteo Pedrini
Keyword(s):  
Source Credibility ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Change Analysis ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Client Risk ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Corporate Disclosures

SUMMARY We examine the relationship between audit pricing and managerial tone as a proxy of source credibility. Prior research shows that source credibility influences auditors' perceptions of client risk. Textually analyzing annual letters to shareholders, we find that characteristics of managerial tone that reflect impaired source credibility are associated with higher audit fees. Additional tests, including a change analysis and controls for other managerial characteristics, future client performance, and aggressive accounting choices, corroborate and build on our inferences that managerial tone proxies for source credibility. Our study extends literature that uses corporate disclosures to measure managerial characteristics by showing that auditors price source credibility reflected in managerial tone. These findings are important because they empirically confirm that source credibility affects auditors' assessments of engagement risk and that analysis of tone can inform researchers, auditors, and investors who seek to enhance effectiveness and objectivity in assessing source credibility based on managerial tone. JEL Classifications: G21; G34; M41. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from public sources indicated in the paper.

The Timeliness of Bad Earnings News and Litigation Risk

2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 1967-1991 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dain C. Donelson ◽  
John M. McInnis ◽  
Richard D. Mergenthaler ◽  
Yong Yu
Keyword(s):  
Lower Incidence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Earnings Forecast ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Analyst Earnings ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study investigates whether the timely revelation of bad earnings news is associated with a lower incidence of litigation. The timeliness of earnings news is captured by a new measure based on the evolution of the consensus analyst earnings forecast. Holding total bad earnings news and other determinants of litigation constant, we find that earlier revelation of bad earnings news lowers the likelihood of litigation. This result holds for both settled and dismissed lawsuits. Further, we reconcile our findings with prior work that measures timeliness using managerial warnings via press releases. These tests suggest our findings are attributable to the ability of our timeliness measure to capture bad earning news revealed through disclosure channels beyond press releases. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: K22; K41; M41.

Technological Peer Pressure and Product Disclosure

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (6) ◽  
pp. 95-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Shun Cao ◽  
Guang Ma ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker ◽  
Chi Wan
Keyword(s):  
Product Development ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Peer Pressure ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Test Results ◽  
Management Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Negative Relation ◽  
Proprietary Costs

ABSTRACT We introduce a firm-specific measure of the technological aspect of competition—technological peer pressure—and examine firm-initiated product development-related press releases. We argue that empirical examinations of the theorized negative relation between competition and disclosure require the type of voluntary disclosure to be relevant to the dimension of competition under examination to ensure that firms incur significant proprietary costs of disclosure. In other words, many types of disclosure do not provide actionable information to competitors and, thus, should not be affected by that dimension of competition. We expect a negative relation between technological peer pressure and product disclosure because the latter reveals firms' strategies, allocations, and progress of technological investments in product development to competitors. In contrast, we do not expect a negative relation between technological peer pressure and management earnings forecasts—the most common type of voluntary disclosure used in accounting research. Our test results are consistent with these expectations. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources. Our TPP Measure is available for download, please see the link in Appendix G.

Priority Dissemination of Public Disclosures

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (6) ◽  
pp. 2235-2266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bei Dong ◽  
Edward Xuejun Li ◽  
K Ramesh ◽  
Min Shen
Keyword(s):  
Price Discovery ◽  
Market Liquidity ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Good News ◽  
Unintended Effects ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Public Disclosures ◽  
Reg Fd

ABSTRACT This study examines the unintended effects of a pre-Reg FD practice that gave a broad group of sophisticated market participants 15-minute earlier access to all corporate press releases than the general public. We find that roughly one-eighth of the price discovery to earnings announcements issued during regular trading hours was due to privileged access to information in earnings press releases, with the 15-minute priority dissemination contributing to just over 50 percent of price discovery from all privileged access. In addition, we find that transient institutions benefited from priority dissemination, especially when the earnings contained good news. Finally, consistent with economic theory, we find that intraday bid-ask spreads decreased post-Reg FD for firms that had sufficient market liquidity to allow trading opportunities during the 15-minute window. Our study has implications for current discussions on whether preferential information distribution by firms and information intermediaries creates an uneven playing field among investors. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the public sources identified in the paper JEL Classifications: D82; G14; K22; M45.

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