Review: The Housing of Oglethorpe County, Georgia, 1790-1860 by Ava D. Rodgers; The Early Architecture of Charleston by Albert Simons, Samuel Lapham, Jr.; The Cabildo on Jackson Square by Samuel Wilson, Jr., Leonard V. Huber; New Orleans Architecture, Vol. 1, The Lower Garden District, Howard Avenue to Jackson Avenue, Mississippi River to Claiborne Avenue by Samuel Wilson, Jr., Bernard Lemann, Mary Louise Christovich, Roulhac Toledano, Betsy Swanson; The Vieux Carre New Orleans, Its Plan, Its Growth, Its Architecture, Historic District Demonstration Study by Samuel Wilson, Jr.

1972 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 246-247
Author(s):  
Mark B. Lapping
1994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Hinks ◽  
Jack B. Irion ◽  
Kathryn M. Kuranda ◽  
Ralph Draughon ◽  
Athens Jr ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Richard Campanella

As an urbanized river-dominated delta, New Orleans, Louisiana, ranks among the most experimental of cities, a test of whether the needs of a stable human settlement can coexist with the fluidity of a deltaic environment—and what happens when they do not. That natural environment bestowed upon New Orleans numerous advantages, among them abundant fresh water, fertile soils, productive wetlands and, above all, expedient passage between maritime and continental realms. But with those advantages came exposure to potential hazards—an overflowing Mississippi River, a tempestuous Gulf of Mexico, sinking soils, eroding coasts, rising seas, biotic invasion, pestilence, political and racial discord, conflagration—made all the worse by the high levels of social vulnerability borne by all too many members of New Orleans’ population. More so than any other major metropolis on the North American continent, this history of disaster and response is about the future of New Orleans as much as it is about the past. This article examines two dozen disasters of various types and scales, with origins oftentimes traceable to anthropogenic manipulation of the natural environment, and assesses the nature of New Orleans’ responses. It frames these assessments in the “risk triangle” framework offered by David Crichton and other researchers, which views urban risk as a function of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. “Hazard” implies the disastrous event or trauma itself; “exposure” means human proximity to the hazard, usually in the form of settlement patterns, and “vulnerability” indicates individuals’ and communities’ ability to respond resiliently and adaptively—which itself is a function of education, income, age, race, language, social capital, and other factors—after having been exposed to a hazard.


1998 ◽  
Vol 64 (4) ◽  
pp. 733
Author(s):  
Karen Leathem ◽  
Malcolm Heard

2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (24) ◽  
pp. 7623-7628 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard W. Mielke ◽  
Eric T. Powell ◽  
Christopher R. Gonzales ◽  
Paul W. Mielke

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (33) ◽  
pp. 69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathijs Van Ledden ◽  
Joost Lansen ◽  
Hennes De Ridder ◽  
Billy Edge

This paper reports a reconnaissance level study of a storm surge barrier in the Mississippi River. Historical hurricanes have shown storm surge of several meters along the Mississippi River levees up to and upstream of New Orleans. Future changes due to sea level rise and subsidence will further increase the risk of flooding due to hurricane storm surge. A surge barrier downstream of New Orleans has been considered as an alternative to levee raise along the Mississippi River. Hydraulic computations show that the build-up of water behind the barrier due to the Mississippi River flow is (much) lower than the hurricane surge protruding up the river in the no-barrier situation. The barrier will probably eliminate the need to upgrade the system upstream of the barrier while providing the same level of hurricane risk reduction. A hybrid barrier (a combination of different gate types) with a primary swing gate for navigation (and flow) and secondary lift gates to accommodate for flow is a technically feasible alternative. The barrier remains open for almost the entire year and would only to be closed during severe tropical events (say once every 2 - 3 years). Several measures are included in the conceptual design to mitigate the navigation impact. The construction costs of the barrier are estimated at $1.6 - 2.6 billion. It is recommended to compare the investment costs of a barrier including adjacent tie-ins to the existing HSDRRS to the costs of upgrading and maintaining the levee system throughout the city of New Orleans.


Author(s):  
Michael R. Cohen

Chapter 2 focuses on the Civil War years. In the early years of the war, a Union blockade brought legal trade to a standstill, and for merchants who relied on trade networks between the North and the South, the blockade was catastrophic. But with soaring demand for cotton around the globe, economic opportunities abounded. Some merchants stockpiled cotton, and some wisely avoided Confederate currency, which would turn out to be worthless after the war. But once Ulysses S. Grant’s troops declared victory after the bloody battle of Vicksburg, which opened the Mississippi River for commerce, the landscape changed, and new opportunities emerged. With New Orleans and the Mississippi River in Union hands, legal cotton trade resumed between the North and South, and merchants flocked to the interior towns that facilitated this commerce. They also established or reestablished trade networks that closely resembled those that had emerged in the antebellum years. While the resumption of trade was slowed by a plethora of factors, by the end of the Civil War, firms that had saved capital, reestablished North-South networks, or both, were on sound footing, prepared to face head on the vicissitudes of the postbellum economy.


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